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ABSTRACT
A key factor in the success of social animals is their organization of work. Math-
ematical models have been instrumental in unraveling how simple, individual-based
rules can generate collective patterns via self-organization. However, existing models
offer limited insights into how these patterns are shaped by behavioral differences
within groups, in part because they focus on analyzing specific rules rather than gen-
eral mechanisms that can explain behavior at the individual-level. My work argues
for a more principled approach that focuses on the question of how individuals make
decisions in costly environments.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I demonstrate how this approach provides novel insights
into factors that shape the flexibility and robustness of task organization in harvester
ant colonies (Pogonomyrmex barbatus). My results show that the degree to which
colonies can respond to work in fluctuating environments depends on how individuals
weigh the costs of activity and update their behavior in response to social informa-
tion. In Chapter 4, I introduce a mathematical framework to study the emergence
of collective organization in heterogenous groups. My approach, which is based on
the theory of multi-agent systems, focuses on myopic agents whose behavior emerges
out of an independent valuation of alternative choices in a given work environment.
The product of this dynamic is an equilibrium organization in which agents perform
different tasks (or abstain from work) with an analytically defined set of threshold
probabilities. The framework is minimally developed, but can be extended to include
other factors known to affect task decisions including individual experience and social
facilitation. This research contributes a novel approach to developing (and analyzing)
models of task organization that can be applied in a broader range of contexts where
animals cooperate.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Social (group-living) animals are among the most ecologically successful species in na-
ture (Oster and Wilson, 1978; Ho¨lldobler and Wilson, 1990). A key reason for their
success is they collaborate on activities needed to survive, grow and rear offspring.
Social groups must also balance flexibility and robustness in their collective response
to environmental changes (Charbonneau and Dornhaus, 2015). Achieving this bal-
ance depends on how individuals assess and respond social information in relation to
the external environment. For instance, the ability of groups to exploit their environ-
ment when conditions are favorable depends on having behaviorally flexible members
who can switch between roles that contribute to group success (Charbonneau and
Dornhaus, 2015). However, groups must also regulate their collective activity across
tasks in order to minimize costs/risks when conditions become unfavorable (Pinter-
Wollman et al., 2013). This dissertation is primarily concerned with understanding
how mechanisms underlying behavioral activity at the individual-level can shape col-
lective behavior of groups and how they respond to work in fluctuating environments.
As we will see, the answer to this question may depend on social context considered
(i.e., the size and/or mix of individuals in the group) (Sih and Watters, 2005).
Social dynamics and task organization in animal societies
The proximate challenge of sociobiology is to understand how group-level patterns
of organization refer from individual-level mechanisms (Beshers and Fewell, 2001).
Mathematical models have been instrumental in this regard; specifically in showing
how collective patterns often emerge as a product of interactions among group mem-
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bers and their environment (Camazine, 2003; Hemelrijk, 2002). These models provide
a powerful lens to see how conspicuous organizational strategies like division of labor,
can self-organize from behavioral differences within groups. The paradigmatic mech-
anism for this is based on the concept of response thresholds (Bonabeau et al., 1998;
Theraulaz et al., 1998; Jeanson et al., 2007). Response threshold models posit that
division of labor can spontaneously develop in groups where: (i) individuals vary in
their task preferences, (ii) the task behavior of one individual changes the social en-
vironment (and behavior of others), and (iii) these changes generate closed feedback
loops in which behavior becomes amplified. This is because when one individual in
a group performs a task (e.g., nest construction or foraging), they necessarily reduce
the task need and so lower the likelihood that others will perform it in the future.
Over time, this dynamic can generate a positive feedback that drives individuals with
the lowest threshold for a task to become specialized (Fewell and Page Jr, 1999).
One perspective that almost never considered in emergence models of task orga-
nization is how individuals make decisions in costly environments. This question is
particularly relevant to understand how group-level needs are functionally integrated
with worker behavior in eusocial societies (Charbonneau and Dornhaus, 2015). More-
over, it is also relevant in broader contexts of sociality where individuals must balance
the costs and benefits of cooperation (Fewell and Page Jr, 1999; Cahan and Fewell,
2004; Jeanson et al., 2008; Holbrook et al., 2013). My work argues for an analysis
of proximate factors that determine how individuals decide what tasks to perform,
and how much to perform it in relation to social information (Gordon, 1999). This
perspective provides a general lens for understanding organizational patterns that
develop when individuals interact in groups (Clark and Fewell, 2013), and how these
interactions shape their collective ability to regulate work in changing environments
(Charbonneau and Dornhaus, 2015).
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Summary of Contribution
My work uses a combination of experimental analysis and mathematical modeling
to examine how social dynamics shapes the individual-level components of behav-
ior (i.e., activity and task choice) and its consequences for the task organization in
animals groups. I explore this question in the harvester ant (Pogonomyrmex spp.)
species living in both eusocial and communal contexts.
The first part of my dissertation examines how mature P. barbatus colonies reg-
ulate their foraging activity in response to changes in their environment. Harvester
ant colonies subsist on water and nutrients metabolized from the seeds collected by
specialized foragers. Because they live in arid habitats, the likelihood that any forager
returns with food decreases with the amount of time she spends searching. Conse-
quently, colonies must constantly balance desiccation costs (and predation risks) with
the expected benefits of finding food when conditions are favorable. How do they
achieve this balance? A recent study by Pinter-Wollman et al. (2013) identified two
distinct processes that likely mediate colony-level activity . Undecided foragers inside
the colony were more likely leave in search of food after having a threshold number of
encounters with successful foragers, but they were also more likely to retire into nest
(i.e, other tasks) if they experienced long latency periods between encounters (Pinter-
Wollman et al., 2013). Given that colonies operate in complex environments where
resource abundance and predation risks fluctuate unexpectedly, it is still unclear how
a forager decisions at individual-level can provide flexible yet robust system of regu-
lating colony-level activity. Moreover, as noted in previous experimental studies like
(Gordon, 2002; Gordon et al., 2011), colonies show characteristic differences in how
they well respond to (and recover from) perturbations.
In Chapter 2, I discuss the results of a mathematical model we recently published
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to understand this system (Udiani et al., 2015). A key goal of the study was to
understand what parameters a colony might adjust to balance foraging flexibility
and robustness in variable environments. Our analysis showed that foraging could
undergo both forward and backward bifurcations depending on the overall rate at
which individual foragers are (or become) available for recruitment. This result not
only suggests the existence of parameter regions where colonies can be described as
“risk-prone” and “risk-averse” in relation to their foraging behavior, but also provides
some insights into empirically noted differences in foraging regulation of neighboring
colonies Gordon (2013)
The second part of my dissertation relates to the role of social dynamics in shaping
patterns of work within Pogonomyrmex foundress associations. Foundress associa-
tions are incipient colonies containing few numbers of recently mated (unrelated)
queens who cooperate to raise the first generation of workers. As in mature colonies,
the work demands of incipient nests are inherently variable. Thus, foundresses must
mutually coordinate and divide their efforts to meet these demands and ensure brood
survival. Although working benefits the group, its physiological toll can vary signifi-
cantly from task to task (e.g., nest construction vs. brood care). Yet, observations of
experimental associations show that foundresses consistently differentiate into special-
ist task roles despite its obvious costs (Fewell and Page Jr, 1999; Cahan and Fewell,
2004; Jeanson and Fewell, 2008). Although a simple response-threshold model can
explain why task differentiation emerges in eusocial systems (where costs are evalu-
ated at the group level), it provides an incomplete description of the factors likely to
affect behavioral response in communal groups where individual and group benefit do
not completely align. Moreover, while division of labor may generate organizational
efficiencies as hypothesized for derived systems (Oster and Wilson, 1978; Chittka
and Muller, 2009), it is not exactly clear whether similar benefits can originate via
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emergent dynamics.
In Chapter 3, I discuss a behavioral experiment we developed to study the emer-
gence and scaling of division of labor in artificially forced associations of P. barbatus
ant foundresses. The choice of P. barbatus is particularly attractive because queens
are normally solitary in the field, but tolerant of conspecifics in lab associations
(Fewell and Page Jr, 1999). Moreover, because P. barbatus associations are de novo,
we can be confident that queens’ behavior should reflect an emergent response to
social environment (i.e., rather than a previously evolved strategy). We asked the fol-
lowing questions with experimental data: (a) what (if any) are the typical behavioral
patterns (i.e., activity level and task choice) of queens in solitary nests, and (b) how
do these patterns change in social settings (i.e., with the addition of more similar or
different individuals). We also examined the relationship between division of labor
and per-capita productivity (i.e., offspring production) across nests of different group
sizes. The study revealed several interesting observations. For instance, that queens
consistently decreased their performance of excavation in associations (a metabol-
ically expensive task) in favor of brood tending and self-maintenance. Moreover,
variation in per-capita productivity (i.e, number of offspring reared) across nests was
less connected with levels of division of labor, than on how consistent queens worked
over time. These results support the idea that both intrinsic and social factors shape
individual patterns of behavior (both in activity level and task choice) within groups.
But they also raise an interesting theoretical question about why particular struc-
tures of division of labor may enhance productivity for some groups and not others.
This question is particularly relevant to understand how emergent dynamics might
shape the outcomes of cooperation in natural foundress associations Cahan and Fewell
(2004); Jeanson et al. (2008)
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A Systematic Modeling Approach to Study Task Organization
The key to understanding why different patterns organization emerge in social
groups is to study how individuals make decisions in relation to their environments.
The existing modeling approach, which focuses only on the phenomenological concept
of response-threshold, can only offer limited insights into how causal mechanisms of
group behavior aggregate from the independent actions and decisions of individuals
(Beshers and Fewell, 2001). Indeed a more parsimonious modeling approach would:
(i) identify the underlying factors that shape behavioral response at the individual-
level, and (ii) study their resulting influence on the social environment and patterns
of collective behavior. The tools of nonlinear dynamical systems provide a way to
develop such models.
In Chapter 4, I propose a general framework to study the emergence of task or-
ganization in heterogeneous social groups. The framework is based on multi-agent
dynamical systems and builds on several components from previous studies (Pacala
et al., 1996; Bonabeau et al., 1997, 1998). Importantly, our model assumes that indi-
viduals make task decisions with reference to underlying rewards of different choices
adjust their behavior in favor of alternatives that provide the highest return in given
environment. This process of “melioration” has a neuronal basis (Giurfa, 2007; Guer-
rieri and d’Ettorre, 2010) and its (emergent) dynamics can be described theoretically
by a system of replicator equations (Loewenstein, 2010). For this Chapter, I focused
on groups where agents have fixed costs and assess their environment independently
(without the effects of experience or social influences). Our analysis reveals some
key findings. First, under the assumption that individuals have well-defined and
ordered preferences across different tasks, the dynamics of task choice always leads
to a division of labor with an equilibrium mix of task specialists, generalists and
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inactive (non-contributors). In particular, we obtain threshold conditions in which
agents perform different tasks (or abstain from work) with an analytically defined
set of probabilities. However, in groups where individuals have similar preferences
across all tasks, the equilibrium organization may be sensitive to initial conditions.
Our results suggest this might specifically relate to differences among individuals in
their initial propensity to perform different tasks (as well as their work rates across
different tasks). Although the framework is minimally developed, it can be extended
to include other factors known to affect task decisions including individual experience
and social facilitation (Webster and Fiorito, 2001; Ravary et al., 2007).
Broader Significance
In sum, this dissertation highlights how the integration of empirical and mathe-
matical modeling can inform studies of task organization in both simple and complex
animal societies. Our assumption that individuals make decisions with reference
to underlying rewards follows from common behavioral theories (e.g., reinforcement
learning (Herrnstein and Prelec, 1991; Loewenstein, 2010)) and is consistent with em-
pirical evidence (Weidenmu¨ller, 2004; Ravary et al., 2007; Giurfa, 2007; Guerrieri and
d’Ettorre, 2010). We believe this approach will lead to the development of more pow-
erful, explanatory models that can be applied in a broader range of contexts where
animals cooperate.
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Chapter 2
IDENTIFYING FACTORS THAT SHAPE THE REGULATION OF FORAGING
IN COLONIES OF HARVESTER ANTS
Abstract
The behavior of an ant colony emerges from the actions and decisions of workers
following simple rules. However, little is known about how colony behavior adapts in
response to environmental changes. Here, we develop a mathematical model to study
how harvester ants regulate their foraging behavior in risky environments. We propose
a set of differential equations describing the dynamics of: (1) available foragers inside
the nest, (2) active foragers outside the nest, and (3) successful returning foragers,
to understand how individual-level processes (e.g., interaction rates,) shape colony
response to foraging interruptions. Our analysis indicates that the model can undergo
a forward (transcritical) bifurcation or a backward bifurcation, which translates to
a risk-sensitive (vs. risk-averse) colony-level strategy. In the former case, foraging
can persist only when the average number of recruits per successful returning forager
is larger than one. In the latter case, the backward bifurcation creates a region
of bi-stability in which the size and fate of activity depends on the distribution of
the foraging workforce outside and inside the nest. We validate the model with
experimental data from the ant (Pogonomyrmex barbatus) and perform a sensitivity
analysis to rank parameters affecting model outcomes. Our study suggests that the
degree to which foragers make flexible decisions at the nest increases the ability of
colonies to forage efficiently in risky environments.
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Introduction
Almost all complex behaviors observed in ant societies emerge from the interac-
tions of individual workers following simple rules (Detrain et al., 1999). Foraging is no
exception. Ant colonies must maintain a flow of information about their environment
in order to locate and transport food from multiple sources without central control
(Detrain et al., 1999; Gordon et al., 2008; Dussutour and Nicolis, 2013). Yet like
any solitary animal, they must collectively respond to changes in their environment
(Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996). Importantly, colonies face a trade-off between using
strategies that allow them to flexibly exploit their environment when conditions are
favorable versus strategies that are resilient to potential catastrophes (i.e., if con-
ditions suddenly become unfavorable). This is a particularly cumbersome problem
for the desert harvester ant Pogonomyrmex barbatus. Because harvester ants obtain
most of their water from metabolizing seed fats (Lighton and Feener Jr, 1989), for-
aging colonies must balance desiccation costs with the expected benefits of finding
food when conditions are favorable (Gordon et al., 2013). Achieving this balance
requires a process of information sharing between foragers inside and outside the nest
(Pinter-Wollman et al., 2013). Yet, we still lack an understanding of the fundamental
mechanisms underlying this process and how they affect colony response in different
environments (Gordon, 2002). In the subsequent section, we will review empirical
studies aimed at understanding these questions using behavioral experiments on field
colonies.
Mechanisms of Foraging Regulation in Harvester Ants
Pogonomyrmex barbatus is a granivorous ant species native to the southwestern
United States. Colonies favor arid, chaparral habitats and subsist on grass seeds they
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collect and store year round (Gordon, 1991). Although neighboring colonies compete
for food, foraging intensity is mostly affected by changes in temperature and humidity
(Gordon, 1991; Gordon and Kulig, 1996; Gordon, 2002). Ants foraging in hot, dry
conditions lose water, but obtain water from metabolizing fats in the seeds that they
eat (Lighton and Feener Jr, 1989). Foragers are also routinely disturbed by predation
from horned lizards, which tend to hunt near active trails (Munger, 1984).
Previous work suggest that P. barbatus colonies change their foraging behavior in
response to daily and seasonal conditions (Gordon, 1991). Colonies are most likely
to forage on humid days following a heavy rainfall. This pattern is likely beneficial
because food distributed by wind and flooding uncover seeds in the top layer of the
soil (Gordon et al., 2013). Within a day, foraging rate are partly mediated by the
return of successful foragers who interact with inactive (recruitable) foragers near
the colony entrance (Fig. 2.1). These interactions consist of brief antennal contacts
during which recruits can detect the task-specific cuticular hydrocarbon profile of the
other and whether it is carrying food (Greene and Gordon, 2003, 2007) Empirical
observations suggest that inactive foragers require a threshold number of interactions
with successful ones at a particular rate before they leave the nest to look for food
(Greene et al., 2013).
A recent study by Pinter-wollman et al. (2013) suggests that P. barbatus colonies
may regulate foraging at two separate timescales. In an experiment to discern how
colonies react to changes in forager return rates, the authors showed the average
rate of interaction experienced by ants inside the vestibule (Fig. 2.1) corresponded
with the arrival rate of successful foragers on a timescale of seconds (Fig. 2.2(a)).
Forager availability was also influenced by return rates on the timescale a minutes.
On average, the number of available foragers in the vestibule increased one to two
minutes after an increase in the number of returning foragers (Fig 2.2(b)). In a
10
Figure 2.1: Nest Entrance of a Typical P. barbatus Colony from Pinter-Wollman et al.
(2013). Uncommitted Ants Interact with Returning Foragers Inside the Vestibule (Region
Outlined in Blue). Ants Move to and from the Inner Nest Using the Tunnels (Yellow
Arrows). The Dotted Circle Denoted ROI Is the Area Where Most Interactions Occur
Before Foragers Exit the Nest.
subsequent experiment to discern how colonies responded to foraging disruptions, the
authors showed that the degree to which colonies recovered from simulated predation
depended on the duration of the interruption. For short interruptions, the average
amount of time it took for colonies to recover to their previous foraging levels was
similar to the length of the perturbation. For longer interruptions, colonies recovered
much more slowly suggesting that most inactive foragers in the vestibule went back
into the nest. In sum, these experiments reveal that although inactive foragers in the
vestibule are likely to be activated by encountering successful foragers (Greene and
Gordon, 2007), they are also likely to retire back into nest (and perhaps do other
tasks) if they experienced long latency periods between encounters.
Forager interactions are clearly important aspect of how harvester ants regulate
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foraging in different environments. However, previous work suggest that P. barbatus
colonies differ in how likely they are to adjust the rate of outgoing foragers to the
rate of forager return (Gordon et al., 2011). While most colonies can adjust foraging
rate closely when conditions are good, only some do so in poor conditions. From a
theoretical perspective, colonies also face a fundamental dilemma in how to insure
foraging returns against short-term versus long-term disturbances (e.g., predation by
horned lizards Munger (1984)). This trade-off is perhaps best understood from the
perspective of risk analysis. The more foragers a colony sends out, the more food
it will gather. However, colonies which consistently have more foragers outside the
nest, rather than inside, will be more vulnerable to catastrophic perturbations than
colonies where fewer foragers leave the nest. One way colonies might mange these
risks is by regulating the number of recruitable foragers inside the vestibule (Fig. 2.1).
This can be achieved if ants modify the way they move when forager return rate is
high, to increase interaction rate (Pinter-Wollman et al., 2011). Foragers may also
vary the amount of time they spend without recruitment before retiring back inside
(Pinter-Wollman et al., 2013). However, it is not immediately clear what the costs
and benefits of such strategies would be in relation to how colonies would respond to
different kinds environmental disturbances. Mathematical models are useful tool to
study these kinds of questions (Sumpter and Pratt, 2003).
A Mathematical Model
In a recent article, we developed a model of collective foraging in P. barbatus
Udiani et al. (2015). The model captures the positive and negative mechanisms of
information sharing within the colony based on forager interactions at the nest en-
trance (Fig. 2.3). In the subsequent section, I provide a brief description of this model
and discuss a set of analyses I performed to understand its dynamics. Mathematical
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Figure 2.2: Experimental Observations of an Active P. Barbatus Colony. (a) Time Series
of Foragers Inside and Outside the Nest Following the Addition of Seeds to Foraging Trails;
Arrows Shows Time Points When Seeds Were Added and Depleted by the Colony. (b)
Cross-correlation Coefficients of Series as a Function of Time Lag (τ). The Correlation
Between Returning Foragers and Available Individuals (Left) and Between Returning and
Outgoing Foragers (Right) Is Maximized at τ = 1 and τ = 0 Respectively, Suggesting That
Changes in the Forager Return Rate Affects Outgoing Foragers Almost Immediately, but
Influences the Number of Ants in the Vestibule a Short While Later.
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proofs are omitted for clarity; but are shown in full detail in the appendix. Instead, I
will highlight theoretical results and the biological insights they provide about mecha-
nisms driving foraging outcomes (e.g., conditions under which the colony can reliably
forage at stable levels). I conclude with a discussion of the model’s predictions and
how they might explain variation observed in natural colonies (Gordon et al., 2008,
2013; Gordon, 2013).
Model Derivation
Let N(t) = A(t)+F (t)+R(t) represent the foraging workforce of a colony at time
t where A(t) denotes the number of available (recruitable) foragers at the nest, F (t)
denotes the number of active (outgoing) foragers on the trail, and R(t) denotes the
number of successful foragers returning to the nest. The foraging state of the colony
can be described as a time vector D = (A,F,R), which evolves deterministically
according to the following system:
dA
dt
= k1 − βAR + γR− k2A1+ωR
dF
dt
= βAR− (α + df )F
dR
dt
= αF − (γ + dr)R.
(2.1)
The biological assumptions underlying this model are discussed subsequently.
1. Available Foragers A(t): The number of available (recruitable) foragers at
the nest is influenced by the following factors:
(a) The immigration rate Λ(t), which describes the movement of naive
workers from the inner nest to the vestibule. For simplicity, I assume this
rate is constant over the model’s timescale: Λ(t) = k1. In nature, Λ(t)
might fluctuate due to changes in task allocation; but this will depend on
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Figure 2.3: Flow Diagram of the Proposed Model (2.1). The Number of Active Foragers
Increases with the Interactions of Available and Returning Foragers (βAR). We Assume
That There Is a Constant Rate of Flow Between Inner Nest and the Vestibule as Available
Ants Move Between. However, the Rate of Flow into Inner Nest at Decreases with the
Number of Returning Foragers (ω > 0). Parameters Are Defined In Table 2.1
the colony’s age/size (Gordon, 1999).
(b) The recruitment rate Ψ(A,R) = βAR, which describes the increase in
the number of active foragers via activation. This mass action formulation
assumes that interactions between successful foragers and recruitable for-
agers inside the nest are density-dependent (Fig. 2.1). More specifically,
I assume that (i) foragers contact a fraction ρ of successful returning for-
agers at an average rate of c interactions per unit time, (ii) interactions
are independent of one another and are equally likely to occur anywhere
in the vestibule, and (iii) each interaction has a fixed probability (µ) of
activation. Hence, the effective contact rate β is the number of interac-
tions per unit time made by a successful, returning forager that activates
an available forager: β = cρµ.
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(c) The turnover rate Υ(R) = γR, which describes the rate at which re-
turning foragers become re-available for recruitment. This rate will be
influenced by the distance between the resource site and the nest, search-
ing and handling times, as well as the total amount of time spent inside
the nest after a successful trip (Beverly et al., 2009). I aggregate these
effects into a single constant (1/γ), which describes the average time spent
as a returning forager.
(d) The emigration rate χ(A,R) = k2
A
1+ωR
, which describes the movement
of available workers from the vestibule into the nest, where they cannot be
directly recruited. In accordance with the observations of Pinter-Wollman
et al. (2013), I assume that workers emigrate at a rate proportional to
k2A , which is maximum when there are no returning foragers (R = 0). I
also introduce a parameter ω, which models the responsiveness of available
workers to changes in the number of returning foragers. Note that as ω
increases, the emigration rate decreases; that is, more workers will remain
available in the vestibule for the same number of returning foragers ( ∂χ
∂ω
<
0).
This leads to the following equation:
A′ = k1︸︷︷︸
arrive
− βAR︸ ︷︷ ︸
activate
+ γR︸︷︷︸
rejoin
− k2A
1 +R︸ ︷︷ ︸
retire
.
2. Active Foragers F (t): In addition to the recruitment rate βAR, the number
of active foragers is influenced by: (i) the rate at which they find, process and
handle seed items α(t)F , and (ii) the rate at which they become lost during their
excursion dfF . The effective seed density around a typical harvester ant colony
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Parameter Description Range Default
k1 Immigration of naive foragers (ants · sec−1) (0, 5) 0.5
k2 Retirement of available foragers (ants · sec−1) (0, 5) 0.2
ω Adaptive response factor (0, 2) 1
β Effective contact rate (sec−1) (0, 2) 0.1
α Seed discovery rate (sec−1) (0,1) 0.04
df Loss rate: outgoing foragers (sec
−1) (0, 1) 0.025
dr Loss rate: returning foragers (sec
−1) (0, 1) 0.025
1/γ Avg. time successful foragers spend recruiting (sec) (0, 90) 30
Table 2.1: Description of Parameters Used in the Foraging Model (2.1).
is generally several orders of magnitude greater than its workforce (Schafer
et al., 2006), and might change over several days following rainfall Gordon (1991,
1993). For simplicity, I’ll assume that seed densities are relatively constant (i.e.,
α(t) = α), and that foragers search randomly until they discover a seed item
(Beverly et al., 2009). This leads to the following equation:
F ′ = βAR︸ ︷︷ ︸
activate
− αF︸︷︷︸
discover food
− dfF︸︷︷︸
lost
.
3. Returning foragers R(t): The number of returning (incoming) foragers on
the trail depends on the rate at which active foragers discover food items, αF ;
as well as the rate of predation or loss while en route to the nest, drR. As noted
in my earlier discussion of recruitment and turnover rates, only a fraction of
foragers successfully return to the nest at time t. I assume these foragers spend
an average of 1/γ units of time recruiting workers at the nest entrance before
entering to cache their seeds. This leads to the following equation:
R′ = αF︸︷︷︸
discover food
− drR︸︷︷︸
lost
− γR︸︷︷︸
rejoin
.
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Mathematical Analysis
In this section, I provide a complete mathematical analysis of model (2.1). The
analysis, which includes a characterization of equilibrium bifurcations, will provide
theoretical conditions under which foraging can reliably persist at different levels of
activity. It also outlines the relationship between colony-specific and environmen-
tal parameters influencing foraging outcomes. I will begin by establishing the basic
properties of solutions to the dynamical system (2.1).
• Given positive initial conditions, solutions remain positive and bounded for all
time.
• There are at least 2, and at most 3, equilibrium foraging states.
• The system only admits equilibrium behavior: no periodic or chaotic solutions
exist.
I will also provide a sensitivity analysis of the model to understand how changes in
colony-specific parameters, such as forager interaction rates, and environmental pa-
rameters, such as food availability, might influence foraging dynamics and long-term
outcomes, Finally, I will validate the model by comparing its dynamics under simu-
lated perturbations to the experimental observations of Pinter-Wollman et al. (2013).
Detailed proofs and analysis associated with system (2.1) (i.e., on well-posedness,
global dynamics, and bifurcations) can be found at the end of this chapter.
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Well-posedness and Boundedness
Theorem 2.0.0.1. [Compact Attractor] System (2.1) is positively invariant in
R3+ and every trajectory starting in R3+ is attracted to the following compact set C:
C =
{
(A,F,R) ∈ R3+ :
k1
max{k2, df , dr} ≤ N ≤
k1 +
k21
4dr
min{k2, df , dr}
}
where N = A+ F +R.
Notes: It is reasonable to expect that the number of workers the colony commits
to foraging N(t) over the course of daily activity is bounded due to constraints from
other tasks (Gordon and Kulig, 1996). Thus, theorem 2.0.0.1 suggests that model
(2.1) is at least biologically plausible.
Equilibria and Stability
Theorem 2.0.0.2. [Existence & Stability of Equilibria] Model (2.1) can have one
(E0), two (E0 and E2), or three equilibria (E0 and Ei, i = 1, 2) depending on the
values of R0, RA, and R∆. Sufficient conditions for the existence and local stability
of these equilibria are summarized in Table (2.2).
Equilibrium Component Existence Condition Stability Condition
E0 (A
∗
0, 0, 0) Always
Locally stable if R0 < 1
Saddle if R0 > 1
E1 (A∗f , γ+drα R∗1, R∗1) R˜∆ < R0 < 1 Always a saddle
E2 (A∗f , γ+drα R∗2, R∗2) R˜∆ < R0 < 1; or R0 > 1 Always locally stable
Table 2.2: Existence and Stability of Equilibria in (2.1). A∗0 =
k1
k2
, R0 = A
∗
0
A∗f
, RA = βA
∗
0
ωk1+γ
,
R∆ = k1φmax , and R˜∆ = max (RA,R∆). A∗f and φmax are given in (2.2) & (2.5) respectively.
Notes: The model predicts up to three possible equilibrium states. There is a unique
inactivity state where the colony does not forage: E0 = (A
∗
0, 0, 0) = (
k1
k2
, 0, 0). There
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are two additional interior activity states Ei = (A
∗
f , F
∗
i , R
∗
i ) =
(
A∗f ,
γ+dr
α
R∗i , R
∗
i
)
i =
1, 2 where;
A∗f =
(α + df )(γ + dr)
αβ
>
γ
β
⇒ βA∗f − γ > 0 (2.2)
and R∗i are the roots of the equation:
φ(R∗) =
[
k1 − (βA∗f − γ)R∗
]
(1 + ωR∗) = k2A∗f .
Explicitly, these roots R∗i are given by:
R∗1,2 =
k1
2(βA∗f − γ)
− 1
2ω
±
√√√√( k1
2(βA∗f − γ)
− 1
2ω
)2
+
k1 − k2A∗f
ω(βA∗f − γ)
, R∗1 < R
∗
2.
(2.3)
Theoretically, φ(R) represents the net average rate of forager availability; it
describes how the net number of recruitable foragers in the system changes with
number of successful (returning) foragers. Recall that forager availability is both
negatively and positively affected by returning foragers. Returning foragers deplete
the recruit pool by activating previously uncommitted foragers. Yet, they increase the
recruit pool both by reducing forager retirement rates and by becoming recruitable
themselves. The stability of foraging activity critically depends on how these forces
interact to provide a balanced pool of recruits to meet recruiters at the nest entrance.
To this end, we now define the following quantities.
Thresholds for Collective Foraging
1. φ(R) has a unique maximum φmax at its critical point:
Rc =
γ − βA∗f + ωk1
2ω(βA∗f − γ)
. (2.4)
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(a) Rc < 0 (b) Rc > 0
Figure 2.4: Equilibria of Model (2.1) Classified as Attractors (Blue), Saddles (Green)
or Repellers (Black). An Equilibrium Occurs When the Rate of Forager Availability
φ(R) Equals the Maximum Rate Forager Retirement (dashed horizontal lines: φi =
k2A
∗
f , i = 1, 2). (a) If Rc < 0, Then φ(R) Is Strictly Decreasing With the Number of
Returning Foragers R (φ1). (b) When Rc > 0, φ(R) Is Non-decreasing for a Range of
Returning Foragers (φ1,2).
Thus, Rc represents the critical number of returning foragers above which the
expected reduction in forager retirement rates is insufficient to increase overall
availability. Thus, it follows that:
φmax = φ(Rc) =
(βA∗f − γ + ωk1)2
4ω(βA∗f − γ)
≥ φ(0) = k1 (2.5)
is the maximum rate of forager availability.
2. The forager generation number is a dimensionless quantity given by:
R0 = A
∗
0
A∗f
= β
k1
k2︸︷︷︸
Baseline recruitment rate
· α︸︷︷︸
Resource discovery rate
· 1
(α + df )(γ + dr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean foraging duration
(2.6)
R0 represents the average number of recruits generated by a single returning forager
when the colony is near the inactivity state. It is the product of the expected
production rate of new foragers (via recruitment) and sucessful foragers (via
21
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(b) Backward bifurcation when RA < 1
Figure 2.5: Plot of Returning Foragers Equilibria (R∗) as a Function of Forager Generation
Number (R0). Bifurcations occur Depending on the Ratio R0/RA = βk1/k2(ωk1+γ)R0 . (a) If
RA > 1, A Stable Interior Equilibrium (Solid) Bifurcates “forward” from the Origin at
R0 = 1. (b) If RA < 1, An Unstable Interior Equilibrium (Dashed) Bifurcates “backward”
from the Origin at R0 = 1 and Merges with Its Stable Branch at R0 = R∆.
resource discovery) over the typical duration of a foraging trip.
3. The forager availability number is a dimensionless quantity given by:
RA = βk1/k2
ωk1 + γ
. (2.7)
RA describes the relationship between forager recruitment and availability. The
numerator describes the mean recruitment rate of a single returning forager
when the colony is near the inactivity state. The denominator describes the
mean rate of increase of available foragers via: (i) new worker arrivals from the
inner nest, (ii) recent foragers joining the recruit pool, and (iii) reductions in
the number of retiring (uncommitted) foragers.
Global Dynamics and Bifurcations
Based on our analytical results shown in Theorem 2.0.0.1-2.0.0.2, we can classify
global dynamics of model (2.1) in terms of R0 RA, and R∆.
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Corollary 2.0.0.1 (Global Dynamics). Depending on the values of R0 RA, and
R∆, the global dynamics of (2.1) can be classified into one of three scenarios (also
see Table 2.3):
1. No activity: If R0 < min{1,RA} or R0 < R˜∆ < 1, then model (2.1) has only
the non-foraging equilibrium E0 = (
k1
k2
, 0, 0) which is globally stable. In either
scenario, the colony will be unable to maintain its foraging activity.
2. Persistent activity: If R0 > 1, then model (2.1) has two possible equilibria:
E0 which is a saddle and E2 which is globally stable. In this scenario, the colony
will consistently reach stable foraging levels.
3. Bi-stability: If R0 is intermediate such that R˜∆ < R0 < 1, then model (2.1)
has three possible equilibria: E1, which is always a saddle, as well as E0 and
E2, which are both asymptotically stable. In this scenario, the colony may be
able to maintain its activity; but this depends on initial conditions.
Scenario Condition Dynamics
Only E0
R0 < min{1,RA} or
R0 < R˜∆ < 1 Globally stable.
E0 and E2 R0 > 1 E0 is a saddle and E2 is globallystable
Ei, i = 0, 1, 2 R˜∆ < R0 < 1 Both E0 and E2 are locallystable and E1 is a saddle.
Table 2.3: Global Dynamics of Model (2.1) . A∗0 =
k1
k2
, R0 = A
∗
0
A∗f
, RA = βA
∗
0
ωk1+γ
,
R∆ = k1φmax , and R˜∆ = max (RA,R∆). A∗f and φmax are Shown in (2.2) & (2.5).
Mechanism underlying the backward bifurcation
The backward bifurcation is the result of two opposite nonlinear feedbacks in the
model. The net effect of successful foragers on the pool of available recruits can
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Figure 2.6: Dynamics of Model (2.1) Starting from Initial Conditions (Filled Circles)
(a) When R0 > 1, Trajectories Are Globally Attracted to E2 Where Foraging Persists
. (B) When R˜∆ < R0 < 1, E1 Comprises a Separatrix That Partitions Regions Where
Trajectories Approach E2 or E0 Where Foraging Dies Out.
be positive or negative depending on the forager return rate. Foraging will persist
whenever R0 > 1 (i.e., every returning forager activates at least one new forager).
However, if this fails (R0 < 1), the colony may be unable to maintain its activity (Fig.
2.6). This potential depends on RA the mean ratio of recruited foragers to available
foragers. If RA > 1, the colony always has more workers outside the nest than inside.
Hence, if every returning forager is unable to recruit another (i.e., R0 < 1) then
foraging cannot be sustained. On the other hand, if RA < 1, the colony always has
more workers inside the nest than outside. Under this condition, foraging may still
be sustained even when R0 < 1, provided forager return rates are not too low. The
effective minimum number of forager recruits sufficient for the colony to maintain its
activity is given by:
R˜∆ = max (RA,R∆) = RA +R∆
2
+
∣∣RA −R∆∣∣
2
(2.8)
where R∆ = φ(0)φmax = k1φmax =
4ωk1(βA∗f−γ)
(βA∗f−γ+ωk1)2
≤ 1 is the relative ratio of the minimum
and the maximum rate of forager availability. R˜∆ represents a sub-critical threshold
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where (2.1) undergoes a saddle-node bifurcation (i.e., goes from having zero to two
interior equilibria) (Fig. 2.5(b)). Biologically, it reflects a lower bound for R0 below
which foraging is completely unsustainable.
Sensitivity of Foraging Basin of Attraction
Under the condition: max{R˜∆,RA} < R0 < 1, a two-dimensional separatrix
in R3+ partitions the basin of attraction for the null (E0) and foraging (E2) activity
states. Biologically, the separatrix defines a critical foraging allocation: D˜ = (A˜, F˜ , R˜)
below which the colony ultimately ceases foraging. Simulations suggest that there is
a postive scaling relationship between R0, R˜∆ and the basin of attraction for E2
(cf. Fig. 2.7). To better understand and quantify how small changes in one (or
more) model parameters will affect the size of this region, I employed the normalized
sensitivity index:
Γup := lim
δp→0
(
δu
u
)
(
δp
p
) = p
u
∂u
∂p
u 6= 0 (2.9)
where u is a differentiable output variable of interest and p is a nominal input param-
eter (Arriola and Hyman, 2009). The normalized sensitivity index (Γup ) effectively
estimates the expected percent change of a focal quantity (e.g., R0) given a unit
percentage change (i.e., ±1%) of one of its component parameters (e.g., γ). Because
parameters can be classified into those that are likely colony-specific (i.e., k1, k2, β
& ω), and those that reflect environmental conditions (e.g., α, γ, etc.), the sensitiv-
ity index provides a way to quantify the potential costs (or benefits) to colonies of
regulating different components. Moreover, these indices can provide some intuition
about what parameters most influences colony’s ability to recover foraging after an
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Sensitivity Index (Γup)
Parameter ξ RA
k1 +1.78 +0.05
β +0.99 1.0
ω 0.78 −0.94
γ −0.8 −0.05
k2 −1.0 −1.0
Table 2.4: Normalized Sensitivity Indices for ξ = R0 − R˜∆ and RA. Sensitivity Indices
Describe the Expected Impact of a 1% Change in Focal Parameters. Although k1 and k2
Independently Have the Largest Effects on Decreasing RA and Increasing ξ Respectively,
ω Has the Largest Joint Effect.
interruption (Pinter-Wollman et al., 2013).
Table 2.4 lists the predicted change in ξ = R0 − R˜∆ and RA, based on the
parameter values in table 2.1. Results here suggest that increasing the rate at which
foragers arrive at the nest entrance (k1) should have the largest positive impact on
ξ (and potentially the foraging basin of attraction; Fig. 2.7). On the other hand,
changes in retirement rates (k2) should have the largest negative impacts on RA
(equation 2.7), and thus increase forager availability (cf. 2.5). Finally, results suggest
that changes in the colony response factor (ω) may produce the largest favorable
effects on foraging dynamics (i.e., by maximizing the difference between ξ and RA).
Experimental Validation
To examine whether our model simulates realistic responses to perturbations, we
replicated in silico the experimental perturbation described in Pinter-Wollman et al.
(2013). In multiple observations over a 3-day period, returning foragers of mature P.
barbatus were artificially prevented from entering the nest for either 3 minutes or 10
minutes during periods of high foraging activity. Throughout the trial, the number of
available foragers in the vestibule along with the number of outgoing and returning
foragers were recorded. In most instances, the number of outgoing foragers declined
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(a) ξ = 0.143 (b) ξ = 0.256
Figure 2.7: Region of Attraction for E2 (blue) vs. E0 (red) Assuming RA < 1.
The Separatrix Partitions the Set of Initial Conditions (F˜ , R˜) For Which Foraging
Persist for Any Fixed Number of Available Foragers. Plots Show That Decreasing
ξ = R0−R˜∆ by Less than 50% from 0.256 to 0.143 Doubles the Region for E0. Thus,
the Critical Number of Returning Foragers R˜ Necessary to Sustain Activity Scales
Nonlinearly with the Number of Active Foragers F˜ . Other parameters: k1 = .5, k2 =
.2, γ = .03, α = .04, df = 2dr = .005.
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Figure 2.8: Exploring the Influence of k1 and ω on Foraging Outcomes. ’Risk Prone’
Regions Indicate Equilibria where the Colony has a Larger Portion of Its Workforce Outside
the Nest (i.e., 1 < R0 < RA). ’Risk Averse’ Regions Indicate Equilibria Where the Colony
has a Larger Portion of Its Workforce Inside the Nest (i.e., max{R˜δ,RA} < R0 < 1).
Numerical Scale reflects the size of the Attraction Region for E2 (vs. E0)
in response to the removal of returning and recovered to varying levels of activity
once returning foragers were allowed to enter to the nest again. We estimated model
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parameters using the averaged time-series for each colony (see Table 2.5). Along with
fixed experimental parameters (e.g., times of removal) we generated best-fit response
curves corresponding to observations for both 3 and 10 minute removals. Because
the quality of fits did not vary extensively among colonies, I show results for a single
colony (Fig. 2.9).
The estimates of R0 and R˜∆ after the perturbation indicate that colony activity
was in the bistable foraging region during the 3 minute removals (R0 = .03 , R˜∆ =
.0011) and 10 minute removal (R0 = .52 , R˜∆ = .18). These results are consis-
tent with empirical observations noting that harvester ant colonies will suppress and
sometimes suspend foraging altogether if there are persistent declines in the forager
return rate (Gordon, 2002; Gordon et al., 2011). However, the low estimates of R˜∆,
particularly in the 3 minute removals, do not suggest that foraging can be recovered
without recruitment. In the context of our model, the low values reflect the increased
potential of colonies to recover from short-term versus long-term interruptions. Al-
though inactive foragers can leave the nest independent of social recruitment (Gordon
et al., 2011), we stress that the ability of colonies to maintain their activity, in the
bistable foraging region (i.e., R˜∆ < R0 < 1), depends critically on the distribution of
the forager workforce between the available, active, and returning states (Fig. 2.7).
In terms of biological significance, these estimates likely reflect the fact that harvester
ant colonies are not very sensitive to foraging interruptions once they have reached
stable levels of activity (Gordon, 2002; Gordon et al., 2011).
Finally, I acknowledge some model limitations may have affected the goodness of
fit. Most obviously, our model does not capture any biological stochasticity. Thus, I
cannot comment extensively on the ability of our estimates of R0 and R˜∆ to predict
the recovery dynamics after the perturbation when the number of foragers becomes
very small. Furthermore, we did not account for spatial constraints of vestibule
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Figure 2.9: Predicted Best Fit Model to Experimental Data from Pinter-Wollman
et al. (2013). Plots Show the Mean ± SD Numbers of Available (Top), Outgoing
(Middle), and Returning (Bottom) Foragers in Colony N7 during Removal Trials
Lasting 3 Minutes (left panel) or 10 Minutes (right panel). Parameter estimates are
shown in Table 2.5.
Estimated Values (Colony N7)
Parameter 3-min removal SD 10-min removal SD
α .6354 .3930 8.251 15.325
β .0386 .0236 .5003 .8878
γ .4568 .2973 6.028 11.493
k1 11.067 12.783 10.763 6.532
k2 34.642 57.712 1.729 6.056
Table 2.5: Mean (scaled in minutes) and 1-SD of Parameters Estimated for Colony N7
Using the Nonlinear grey-box modeling toolbox in MATLAB R©. Death Rates Were
Fixed Before and After the Perturbation (df = dr = 0, t < 4 & t > 14) and Estimated
for Returning foragers in 3-minute removals: (a) dr = 1.01101 ± 0.39937, t ∈ [4, 7];
and 10-minute removals (b) dr = 1.01085± 0.278261, t ∈ [4, 14]. Baseline Parameter
Values and Sampling Range are Shown in Table 2.1.
size and structure which will influence the baseline numbers of available foragers,
interaction patterns inside the vestibule, and any delays affecting the re-availability
of returning foragers once inside the nest. Indeed, a summary analysis of (Pinter-
Wollman et al., 2013) data revealed a lagged correlation between the numbers of
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ants in the vestibule and number of returning foragers (Pearson’s product-moment
correlation, t = 1.9592, df = 13, p= 0.07189; Fig. 2.2(b)). Such delays should be
accounted for in future models.
Discussion
Harvester ants face a fundamental trade-off between maximizing foraging returns
while remaining both flexible and robust to environmental disturbances (Gordon,
2002; Gordon et al., 2011; Pinter-Wollman et al., 2013). The modeling study dis-
cussed in this chapter provides theoretical insights into how P. barbatus colonies
might bridge these regimes. First, the model predicts the existence of several key
thresholds (i.e., R0, RA, R˜∆) that together determine long-term foraging outcomes.
These predictions can be summarized as follows:
1. Foraging persists if the expected number of recruits per successful returning
forager, over the typical duration of a foraging trip, is larger than one (i.e.,
R0 > 1).
2. If R0 is less than one, foraging may still be sustained if the colony has more
foragers inside the nest than outside (i.e., RA < 1).
Previous studies of foraging in P. barbatus have focused on interaction rates as
the primary factor affecting colony response to changes in environmental profitability
(Prabhakar et al., 2012; Gordon et al., 2013). Here, we provide a more complete
discussion of factors that might affect colony response by defining the relationships
between R0 and RA. In addition to variables set by the environment outside the
nest (e.g., 1/α, the nominal length of a typical a foraging trip), R0 is defined by
parameters that likely reflect colony-specific attributes (see Eq. 2.6). For instance,
empirical studies suggest that colonies can vary significantly in their foraging intensity
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in similar environments (Gordon, 2002; Gordon et al., 2011). This pattern might be
due to differences in baseline rates of recruitment (i.e., βA∗0), which the model predicts
should depend on average number of foragers inside the nest (i.e., k1/k2). On the
other hand, the inherent cost of having high baseline recruitment rates relative to
rates of forager availability suggests that colonies ought to regulate RA in response to
external conditions (see Table 2.4). Unlike R0, RA depends only on colony-specific
parameters (see Eq. 2.7) and could be used to evaluate tendency towards risk-prone
versus risk-sensitive foraging strategies (Fig 2.8). For instance, colonies who tend to
have foragers outside the nest, rather than inside (RA > 1), might be more vulnerable
to a large foraging disturbance, even if this only lasts for a short period of time.
What parameters might be under selection to optimize foraging in different
environments?
Harvester ant colonies can vary in their collective response to changing foraging
conditions on an hourly, daily, and seasonal timescale (Gordon, 1991; Gordon et al.,
2011). Colonies also exhibit characteristic foraging behavior from year to year, which
as noted in a recent survey (Gordon, 2013) can influence their lifetime reproductive
success (measured in the production of offspring colonies). Although the model pre-
sented focuses on proximate mechanisms, it is important to understand how these
mechanisms might be shaped by selection. We can examine this question using the
sensitivity indices (see table 2.4). As noted previously, R0 and RA may be con-
sequential for evaluating a colony’s ability to rapidly increase foraging in favorable
environments and minimize risks in unfavorable ones. The potential costs (or bene-
fits) to colonies of regulating these quantities is reflected in the sensitivity indices (see
Table 2.4). There is a clear trade-off between parameters that tend to increase R0
( k1, β) versus those that tend to decrease RA (k2, γ). However, changes in colony
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response factor ω, tend to have a more balanced effect (Table 2.4). Thus, regulating
ω may provide the greatest return to colonies in terms of balancing flexibility and
robustness in fluctuating environments. Pinter-Wollman (2012) provides an excel-
lent discussion of how colonies might achieve this through consistent variation among
foragers? behavioral propensities.
Limitations
One limitation of the model is that it does not explain experimental observation
that colonies can be perturbed into different (stable) levels of activity (Gordon, 2002;
Gordon et al., 2011; Pinter-Wollman et al., 2013). This might be related to specific
components not captured in the current model. For instance, inactive foragers often
leave the the colony at a baseline rate independent of forager return (Gordon et al.,
2011). Moreover, we did not consider potential feedbacks between forager return rates
and worker arrival rates or explore how spatial constraints might influence interaction
patterns inside the vestibule (Fig. 2.1). All these factors have been empirically
noted as important in the context of foraging regulation (Gordon et al., 2013; Pinter-
Wollman, 2015). A simple modification of the model can link worker arrival rates to
the number of available foragers, and employ a saturating forager recruitment term to
capture the effect of fixed vestibule size. Another extension that can be explored is the
how forager learning shapes colony’s ability to exploit resources in complex settings.
For instance, in high-competition environments where food sources are constantly
being depleted , colonies might need to have a critical number of foragers outside the
colony to find new food sources (and minimize risk of losing profitable foraging areas
to neighbors) (Adler and Gordon, 2003; Sanders and Gordon, 2004). It would also be
useful (and more realistic) to study the effects of stochasticity on the foraging basin
of attraction in an alternate formulation
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Concluding remarks
In conclusion, our results support the evidence that a simple interaction-based
recruitment strategy can provide a resilient system for regulating foraging in ant
colonies (Pinter-Wollman et al., 2013; Greene et al., 2013). Furthermore, our model
provides useful insights into how internal and external variables can impact foraging
dynamics, including identifying potential sources of inter-colony variation (Gordon,
2013). Finally, since the model is based on information sharing via local interactions,
it can extended to study analogous systems that rely on similar mechanisms (e.g.,
nest construction in social wasps Jeanne (1986), quorum-sensing in rock ants Pratt
(2005) and others).
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.0.0.1
Proof. According to the formulation of the foraging model (2.1), the following holds
for (A,F,R) ∈ R3+:
A′|A=0 = k1 + γR ≥ k1
F ′|F=0 = βAR ≥ 0
R′|R=0 = αF ≥ 0.
Thus, applying the results of Theorem A.4, p.423 in Thieme (2003), we can conclude
that the foraging model (2.1) is positively invariant in R3+.
Let N = A+ F +R, then we have
N ′ = A′ + F ′ +R′ = k1 − k2A1+R − dfF − drR.
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Thus, we have the following inequalities based on the positive invariance property:
k1 −max{k2, df , dr}N ≤ N ′ ≤ k1(1 +R)− k2A− dfF − drR(1 +R)
1 +R
.
This indicates the following two cases:
1. Bounded below:
N ′ ≥ k1 −max{k2, df , dr}N ⇒ lim inft→∞N(t) ≥ k1max{k2,df ,dr} .
2. Bounded above:
N ′ ≤ k1(1+R)−k2A−dfF−drR(1+R)
1+R
=
k1(1+R)−drR2−k2A−dfF−drR
1+R
≤ k1(1+R)−drR2−min{k2,df ,dr}N
1+R
=
−dr(R− k12dr )
2
+
k21
4dr
+k1−min{k2,df ,dr}N
1+R
≤
k21
4dr
+k1−min{k2,df ,dr}N
1+R
.
This indicates that
lim sup
t→∞
N(t) ≤ k1 +
k21
4dr
min{k2, df , dr} .
Therefore, we can conclude that every trajectory starting in R3+ is attracted to the
following compact set
C =
{
(A,F,R) ∈ R3+ :
k1
max{k2, df , dr} ≤ A+ F +R ≤
k1 +
k21
4dr
min{k2, df , dr}
}
which also implies that the foraging dynamics of model (2.1) can be restricted to the
compact set C. Now, let M =
k1+
k21
4dr
min{k2,df ,dr} . Because model (2.1) is bounded by M ,
the number of returning ants R is also bounded by M . This implies that for any
34
 > 0, there exists time T large enough, such that we have
A′ = k1 − βAR + γR− k2 A
1 +R
≥ k1 − β(M + )A− k2A ≥ k1 − (β(M + ) + k2)A
for all t > T . This indicates that lim inft→∞A(t) ≥ k1βM+k2 . Therefore, we can conclude
that A is persistent in R3+.
Proof of Theorem 2.0.0.2
Proof. Because the non-foraging equilibrium E0 = (A
∗
0, 0, 0) = (
k1
k2
, 0, 0) always
exists, we focus on sufficient conditions that lead to the existence of the foraging
equilibrium Ei = (A
∗
f , F
∗
i , R
∗
i ) =
(
A∗f ,
γ+dr
α
R∗i , R
∗
i
)
, i = 1, 2 where A∗f =
(α+df )(γ+dr)
αβ
and R∗i are roots of the equation φ(R
∗) = k2A∗f with
φ(R) =
[
k1 − (βA∗f − γ)R
]
(1 +R).
Therefore, the existence of Ei is determined by the positive intercept(s) of the quadratic
function φ(R) and the horizontal line k2A
∗
f , which can be classified into the following
two cases depending on the sign of the critical point Rc =
γ−βA∗f+k1
2(βA∗f−γ)
of φ(R) (see Fig.
2.4(b)):
1. If Rc < 0 (see Fig. 2.4(a)), then we have
Rc =
γ − βA∗f + k1
2(βA∗f − γ)
< 0⇔ A∗f >
k1 + γ
β
⇔ R0 = k1
k2A∗f
<
k1β
k2(k1 + γ)
.
In this case, the foraging dynamics can have E0 or Ei, i = 0, 2 depending on
the ratio of φ(0)
k2A∗f
= k1
k2A∗f
:
(a) If φ(0)
k2A∗f
= k1
k2A∗f
< 1 (i.e., R0 < 1, see the purple horizontal line in Fig.
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2.4(a)), then either there is no intercept of the null clines or the intercepts
of φ(R) and the horizontal line k2A
∗
f are located in the black region (i.e.,
negative values). In this scenario, the foraging model (2.1) only has the
non-foraging equilibrium E0.
(b) If φ(0)
k2A∗f
= k1
k2A∗f
> 1 (i.e., R0 > 1, see the cyan horizontal line in Fig.
2.4(a)), then there is a unique foraging equilibrium E2. Thus, in this
scenario, the foraging model (2.1) has the non-foraging equilibrium E0
and the foraging equilibrium E2.
2. If Rc > 0 (see Fig. 2.4(b)), then we have
Rc =
γ − βA∗f + k1
2(βA∗f − γ)
< 0⇔ A∗f <
k1 + γ
β
⇔ R0 = k1
k2A∗f
>
k1β
k2(k1 + γ)
.
In this case, the foraging dynamics can have E0 or Ei, i = 0, 2 or Ei, i = 0, 1, 2
depending on the ratio of φ(0)
k2A∗f
= k1
k2A∗f
and φmax
k2A∗f
:
(a) If k2A
∗
f > φmax ≥ φ(0) = k1, we have
k2A
∗
f > φmax ≥ φ(0) = k1 ⇔ 0 < R0 =
k1
k2A∗f
< R∆ = k1
φmax
.
In this case, the horizontal line k2A
∗
f (see the purple horizontal line in
Fig. 2.4(b)) is above the quadratic equation φ(R), i.e., there is no foraging
equilibrium. Thus, in this scenario, the foraging model (2.1) has only the
non-foraging equilibrium E0.
(b) If k1 < k2A
∗
f < φmax (see the dark green horizontal line in Fig. 2.4(b)),
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then we have the following equalities:
k1 < k2A
∗
f < φmax ⇔ 0 < R∆ =
k1
φmax
<
k1
k2A∗f
= R0 < 1 <
k2A
∗
f
φmax
.
In this scenario, the foraging model (2.1) has the non-foraging equilib-
rium E0 and two foraging equilibria Ei, i = 1, 2.
(c) If φ(0)
k2A∗f
= k1
k2A∗f
> 1 (i.e., R0 > 1, see the cyan horizontal line in Fig.
2.4(b)), then there is a unique foraging equilibrium E2. Thus, in this
scenario, the foraging model (2.1) has the non-foraging equilibrium E0
and the foraging equilibrium E2.
Now we focus on the local stability of the non-foraging equilibrium E0 and two
foraging equilibria Ei, i = 1, 2 when they exist. The local stability of E0 is deter-
mined by the eigenvalues λi, i = 1, 2, 3 of the Jacobian matrix associated with the
foraging model (2.1)
J |E0 :=

−k2 0 −βk1k2 + k1 + γ
0 −(α + df ) βk1k2
0 α −(γ + dr)

where
λ1 = −k2, λ2 + λ3 = −(α + df + dr + γ) < 0
and
λ2λ3 =
−αβk1
k2
+ (γ + dr)(α + df ) = (γ + dr)(α + df ) [1−R0] .
This indicates that ifR0 < 1, then λi < 0, i = 1, 2, 3; while ifR0 > 1, then λi > 0, 2, 3.
Therefore, E0 is locally asymptotically stable if R0 < 1 and it is a saddle if R0 > 1.
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The Jacobian matrix evaluated at Ei, i = 1, 2 can be represented as follows:
J |Ei :=

−βR∗i − k21+R∗i 0 −βA
∗
f + γ +
k2A∗f
(1+R∗i )2
βR∗i −(α + df ) βA∗f
0 α −(γ + dr)

whose eigenvalues satisfy the characteristic polynomial:
ρ(λ) = λ3 + c2λ
2 + c1λ+ c0 = 0 (2.10)
with
c2 = βR
∗
i + (α + df + dr + γ) +
k2
1 +R∗i
> 0
c1 = (α + df + dr + γ)
[
βR∗i +
k2
1 +R∗i
]
> 0
c0 = βR
∗
i [(γ + dr)df + αdr]−
k2R
∗
i (γ + dr)(α + df )
(1 +R∗i )2
(2.11)
According to the Routh-Hurwitz criteria (Brauer et al., 2001), we conclude that the
foraging equilibrium Ei is locally asymptotically stable if and only if c1c2 > c0 > 0.
According to (2.11), we have
1. c1c2 > βR
∗
i (α + df + dr + γ)
2 indicates that
c1c2 − c0 > βR∗i (α + df + dr + γ)2 − βR∗i [(γ + dr)df + αdr] > 0.
Because c1c2 > c0 ⇔ c1c2−c0 > 0, thus, we can conclude c1c2 > c0 always holds
for both R∗i , i = 1, 2.
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2. The following equivalent relationships hold:
c0 > 0⇔ β(1 +R∗i )2 [(γ + dr)df + αdr]− k2(γ + dr)(α + df ) > 0
⇔ (1 +R∗i )2 >
k2(γ + dr)(α + df )
β [(γ + dr)df + αdr]
=
k2A
∗
f
βA∗f − γ
(2.12)
Notice that 0 < R∗1 < R
∗
2 are roots of φ(R) = k2A
∗
f , thus we have
φ(R∗i ) =
[
k1 − (βA∗f − γ)R∗i
]
(1 +R∗i )
= k2A
∗
f ⇔
[
k1
βA∗f − γ
−R∗i
]
(1 +R∗i ) =
k2A
∗
f
βA∗f − γ
.
This indicates that
c0 > 0 ⇔ (1 +R∗i )2 >
[
k1
βA∗f−γ
−R∗i
]
(1 +R∗i )
⇔ 1 +R∗i > k1βA∗f−γ −R
∗
i
⇔ R∗i > k12(βA∗f−γ) −
1
2
Recall that
R∗1 =
k1
2(βA∗f − γ)
− 1
2
−
√√√√( k1
2(βA∗f − γ)
− 1
2
)2
+
k1 − k2A∗f
βA∗f − γ
R∗2 =
k1
2(βA∗f − γ)
− 1
2
+
√√√√( k1
2(βA∗f − γ)
− 1
2
)2
+
k1 − k2A∗f
βA∗f − γ
(2.13)
Then we have
R∗1 <
k1
2(βA∗f−γ)
− 1
2
⇒ c0 < 0
R∗2 >
k1
2(βA∗f−γ)
− 1
2
⇒ c0 > 0
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The discussion above implies that if the foraging equilibrium Ei exists, then E1 is
always a saddle and E2 is always locally asymptotically stable.
Proof of Corollary 2.0.0.1
Proof. According to Theorem 2.0.0.1, every trajectory of (2.1) is attracted to a com-
pact set C. Thus the dynamics of model (2.1) is restricted to this set. Based on the
results of Theorem 2.0.0.2, we have the following three cases:
1. If R0 < min{1, k1βk2(k1+γ)} or
k1β
k2(k1+γ)
< R0 < R∆, then the foraging model (2.1)
has only the non-foraging equilibrium E0 = (
k1
k2
, 0, 0) which is locally asymptoti-
cally stable. model (2.1) enters a compact set C and has a unique locally stable
equilibrium E0. Thus, applying the results of Poincare-Bendixson trichotomy
in 3D (Thieme, 1992), we conclude E0 is globally stable.
2. If R0 > 1, then the foraging model (2.1) has the non-foraging equilibrium E0
and the foraging equilibrium E2 where E0 is a saddle and E2 is locally asymp-
totically stable. Again, applying the results of Poincare-Bendixson trichotomy
in 3D (Thieme, 1992), we can conclude that every trajectory starting with strict
positive initial condition converges to E2, i.e., and E2 is globally stable.
3. If max{ k1β
k2(k1+γ)
,R∆} < R0 < 1, then the foraging model (2.1) has the non-
foraging equilibrium E0 and two foraging equilibria Ei, i = 1, 2 where both E0
and E2 are locally asymptotically stable. This implies that the foraging model
(2.1) has bistability, i.e., depending on the initial condition, the trajectory may
converge to the non-foraging equilibrium E0 or the foraging equilibrium E2.
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Chapter 3
IDENTIFYING FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE DIVISION OF LABOR AND
PRODUCTIVITY IN FORCED ASSOCIATIONS OF HARVESTER ANTS
Abstract
Division of labor (DOL) is a prominent feature of task organization in animal
societies. Previous work suggests that it can develop via self-organizing feedbacks
that amplify behavioral differences within groups. However, not much is known about
how these feedbacks affect productivity especially in a context where individuals
must weigh the costs of performing different activities. To explore these questions,
we created foundress associations (groups of colony-founding queens) in a normally
solitary ant species (Pogonomyrmex barbatus). We compared the behavior of queens
nesting alone to those in groups containing between two to six individuals over a
6-week founding period. Our results demonstrate that individual task choice, and its
consequences on productivity, was influenced by social context. Solitary queens spent
relatively more time engaged in work activities (excavation and brood tending) than
on self-maintenance (grooming and resting). In groups, queens tended to specialize
more on excavation or brood care. Although division of labor was intensified in larger
associations, it did not translate to increased productivity. Brood production (per-
capita) declined with increasing group size in part because queens laid fewer eggs.
However, nesting pairs reared more adult offspring than any other group. To explore
possible causal mechanisms for this pattern, we developed an agent-based model of
the system. We hypothesized that short-term declines in task availability (e.g., due
to queen inactivity) might exacerbate costs of specialization in larger groups where
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demands of offspring care likely fluctuate. Simulations of a model in which queens
had a decreased likelihood of activity following consecutive periods when they were
unable to find work showed a curvilinear relationship between group size and expected
productivity (measured as the variability of work needed across tasks). This result
was further amplified if queens had a tendency to engage in recently performed tasks.
In sum, our analyses provide a nuanced understanding about the internal factors
that might shape the efficiency of task organization across the range of group sizes
typically found in most cooperative species.
Introduction
Division of labor (DOL), or the degree to which different individuals tend to per-
form different tasks, is an integral feature of task organization in animal societies. Its
foundational component, individual specialization on task roles, is found ubiquitously
in eusocial societies (Michener, 1974; Oster and Wilson, 1978; Ho¨lldobler and Wilson,
1990; Fewell et al., 2009), but also in cooperative (non-eusocial) societies, which occur
broadly across social taxa (Bednarz, 1988; Stander, 1992; Underwood and Shapiro,
1999; Gazda et al., 2005; Jeanson et al., 2005; Holbrook et al., 2013). Previous work
suggest that DOL is an emergent property of sociality that self-organizes from be-
havioral variation within groups (Fewell and Page Jr, 1999; Cahan and Fewell, 2004;
Jeanson et al., 2005; Jeanson and Fewell, 2008; Holbrook et al., 2013). These results
motivate a set of mechanistic questions about how social dynamics shape division of
labor and what effects they might have on productivity in different contexts.
Group size is an important driver of social organization, influencing the emer-
gence of task organization across social taxa (Oster and Wilson, 1978; Anderson and
McShea, 2001). For instance, empirical estimates of division of labor, using worker
specialization and/or polymorphism as a metric, increase with colony size in several
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species of wasps and ants (Jeanne, 1986; Gordon, 1989; Karsai and Wenzel, 1998;
Thomas and Elgar, 2003); but see (Dornhaus et al., 2009). With respect to ultimate
function, division of labor might generate organizational efficiencies that are selected
for in larger groups (Bonner, 2004) and/or costs that are selected against in smaller
ones (Oster and Wilson, 1978; Herbers, 1981; Karsai and Wenzel, 1998). However,
the ways in which selection shapes DOL is likely different within cooperative taxa,
where individual and group success are related but not completely aligned (Fewell
et al., 2009). In wild dogs, for instance, the need for a certain number of helpers to
carry out several tasks essential to the group (e.g hunting, pup-guarding etc.) may
diminish the benefits of dividing labor and increase individual costs below a criti-
cal group size (Courchamp et al., 2002). Similar effects are likely to exist in taxa
where multiple individuals reproduce (Bernasconi and Strassmann, 1999). However,
these systems remain relatively understudied despite the fact that they represent a
potentially more generalizable model of social evolution (Clark and Fewell, 2013).
In this chapter, we use a combination of empirical and theoretical approaches
to explore factors that influence task organization in foundress associations of the
ant Pogonomyrmex barbatus (Fewell and Page Jr, 1999). Like most ant species, P.
barbatus colonies are initiated by a solitary queen who performs all of the initial
tasks necessary for nest construction and offspring care (Bartz and Ho¨lldobler, 1982;
Johnson, 2002). However, queens increasingly specialize on a single task when forced
to initiate colonies laboratory pairs (Fewell and Page Jr, 1999; Cahan and Gardner-
Morse, 2013). Here, we examine the proximate mechanisms underlying this pattern
and its scaling effects by comparing the behavior of solitary founding queens to those
in groups containing between two and six conspecifics. In doing so, we ask: (i)
how division of labor scales with group size, (ii) whether individual specialization
confers work benefits to groups in terms of per-capita output and offspring production,
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and (iii) how the tension between individual costs and group benefit might shape
productivity outcomes in small versus large groups.
How might division of labor (DOL) be proximately linked with group size? A
leading self-organizational hypothesis, the response threshold model, predicts that
DOL can emerge in a context where individuals vary in their sensitivity to task-
related stimuli and modify their behavior using simple rules (Robinson and Page Jr,
1989; Bonabeau et al., 1996; Page and Mitchell, 1998; Theraulaz et al., 1998). Similar
models also predict that DOL should increase with group size if work demands decline
relative to the availability of individuals to perform tasks (Gautrais et al., 2002;
Merkle and Middendorf, 2004; Jeanson et al., 2007). However, this result may change
depending on what factors are assumed to drive behavior. For instance, some authors
have proposed that individual experience can modulate task-related thresholds via
positive feedback (Pasteels et al., 1987; Plowright and Plowright, 1988; Theraulaz
et al., 1998). This might occur if individuals who are successful at a task are more
likely to continue performing it, and vice versa (Hogeweg and Hesper, 1983; Ravary
et al., 2007; Weidenmu¨ller, 2004). Moreover, the addition of self-reinforcement as a
mechanism of task choice can lead to increased specialization in larger groups (Merkle
and Middendorf, 2004; Jeanson et al., 2007).
One question that is particularly relevant for studying division of labor in cooper-
ative associations, but often ignored in self-organizational theories, is how individuals
make decisions in costly environments. Existing models tend to focus on large euso-
cial societies, where individuals suffer negligible costs of activity and are theoretically
motivated to maximize colony benefit (Gautrais et al., 2002; Merkle and Middendorf,
2004; Jeanson et al., 2007). However, this assumption is ill suited for studying systems
where individuals must balance the costs and benefits of cooperation–a trade-off that
is often shaped by group size (Elgar, 1989; Creel, 1997; Clutton-Brock et al., 2001;
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Gusset and Macdonald, 2010; Kerhoas et al., 2014). In a context where there are un-
derlying trade-offs from performing different tasks, individuals might regulate costs
by abstaining from work during periods when demands are perceivably low or absent
(Jeanson and Fewell, 2008). However, this strategy may have unexpected group-level
consequences for task organization and potentially alter the benefits of sociality in
different contexts. For instance, short-term declines in task availability (e.g., due to
queen inactivity) might increase the variability of work output in larger, more differ-
entiated groups particularly in environments where task demands tend to fluctuate
(Charbonneau and Dornhaus, 2015).
Our study of P. barbatus will explore the proximate mechanisms underlying the
emergence and scaling of division of labor in a de novo context of sociality. Because
P. barbatus queens are normally solitary in the field, their behavioral repertoire in
groups should reflect an emergent response to a novel social environment rather than
an evolved strategy (Fewell and Page Jr, 1999). In keeping with the variance-based
models of self-organization, we expect that division of labor should increase with
group size as a consequence of decreased need for work relative to number of tasks to
be performed (Jeanson et al., 2007). With regards to its resulting structure, we ex-
pect that queens should invest less in nest excavation when paired with a conspecific,
and increasingly less in larger associations due to its high physiological costs (John-
son, 2000). Likewise, we expect that queens should perform more self-maintenance
activities (e.g., grooming and resting) in groups than in a solitary context.
Our study also explores whether the emergence of division of labor in incipient
groups like P. barbatus has related effects on task organization and productivity as
a token of fitness. Division of labor (DOL) may provide functional benefits in the
context of colony foundation, as seen in more evolved contexts (Oster and Wilson,
1978; Chittka and Muller, 2009). We hypothesize that dividing labor may reduce the
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aggregate costs of task switching allowing groups to provide more consistent patterns
of offspring care than solitary queens (e.g., feeding and monitoring larvae). Under
this hypothesis, we expect that scaling of DOL with increasing group size should
correspond to increased per-capita efficiency of offspring production in larger groups
verus smaller ones.
Methods
Collection and Experimental Setup
Queens of the normally solitary ant P.barbatus were collected in Scottsdale, AZ,
USA, shortly after a mating flight in August 2005; all had removed their wings and
were in search of a nesting site. Each queen was placed into a ventilated 1.5 ml
eppendorf tube with moistened pieces of paper towel for transport from the collection
site to the laboratory at Arizona State University. In the laboratory, queens were
weighed, individually marked with enamel paint, before being assigned to observation
nests in groups of two (n=24), or six (n=23). Queen weights were normally distributed
with a mean 45.6 mg and variance of 3.53 mg; so we divided queens into 3 equally
apportioned weight classes: small (33 to 45.0 mg); medium (45.1 to 48.8 mg); large
(48.9 to 58.6 mg). We paired queens with another of the same weight class in groups
of two. Groups of six received two queens from each weight class. Each observation
nest was constructed using 2 panes of glass (12.5 17.5 cm) separated by thin (0.32cm)
plastic strips, and were filled with moistened sifted soil from the collection site. Nests
were maintained in the laboratory for 55 days (until the appearance of the first
workers) under natural light conditions, and at a constant temperature of 28◦C. Nests
were also re-moistened approximately every 4 days, and provided with fresh seeds
(Kentucky blue grass) ad libitum throughout the experiment.
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Behavioral Observations (wk 1)
Behavioral scans began as soon as queens were placed in their nests. For the first
2 days, nests were continuously monitored for 40 minutes every hour for 8 daylight
hours, during which all instances of nest excavation were noted. A bout of nest
excavation occurred when a queen brought a piece of soil out of the nest and deposited
it on the surface. Nest excavation is the first task activity performed by queens, before
the appearance of brood and initiation of brood care. Starting on the third day,
nests were briefly scanned once each hour, during which each queen’s behavior was
noted. Behavioral actions fell under the general categories of: task, non-task, and self-
maintenance. In addition to nest construction, other tasks included brood care (laying
an egg, interacting or standing over the brood pile), and foraging (manipulating
seeds in the mandibles). Non-task behaviors consisted of walking, social interactions
(antennation), and agonistic contact (e.g., biting or dragging another queen). Bouts
of self-grooming and inactivity (resting) were classified as self-maintenance behaviors.
Nest productivity (wk 1-6)
Queens began producing eggs by day 3. Starting on the fourth day, all eggs and
larvae were counted every 2 days until day 18. Brood production was subsequently
monitored every week until day 55.
Data Analysis
Several queens died within the first 4 days of nest initiation; and most of these
deaths occurred in the large groups. About 58% of 2-queen nests (10 out of 24) and
78% of 6-queen nests (18 out of 23) experienced at least one instance of mortality by
the end of day 4. Based on these observations, we reclassified the number of queens
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Figure 3.1: Behaviors Displayed by Queens in During the First Week (Day 3-8) of Colony
Establishment. Histogram Shows the Percentage Distribution by Nesting Context.
in each nest as the number surviving after day 4 for our analysis. We excluded nests
that experienced more than two deaths, or where all queens died; we also pooled data
for nests with four or more individuals for analyses, except where noted. Foraging
occurred infrequently (< 1%) relative to the volume of other tasks across nests (sup-
plementary Fig. 3.1). This was expected since P. barbatus queens are fully claustral
during nest founding (Johnson, 2002). Based on these observations, we subsumed for-
aging into brood care and classified other behaviors into the following categories (a)
Self-maintenance (resting or grooming), (b) Non-tasks (walking or interacting with a
nest mate), (c) Excavation, and (d) Brood care. We used the normalized DoLi statis-
tic (Gorelick et al., 2004; Dornhaus et al., 2009; Holbrook et al., 2011) to quantify the
degree behavioral specialization in each nest, and examine how queen number influ-
enced division of labor. To calculate DoLi, we generated an activity matrix, in which
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each cell contained the proportion of task observations in which a specific queen was
seen performing excavation or brood care throughout the experiment. Observations
of foraging behavior were not included, because the frequency of this behavior is much
lower than the two other tasks. From this matrix, we calculated Shannon’s index of
entropy, for the distributions of individuals across activities and mutual entropy for
the entire matrix (see Gorelick et al. (2004) for detailed methodologies). Finally, di-
viding the mutual entropy by Shannon’s index yields a specialization intensity DoLi
between zero (low) and one (high). We tested (post-hoc) the effect of group size on
the mean DOL values over the 6-day observations using a single-factor ANOVA. We
performed a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for performance differ-
ences between queens in solitary and group contexts, and to examine the effects of
group size on egg and worker production. Where necessary, we performed a post-hoc
Tukey honesty significance difference (T-HSD) test to note where differences occurred
at p < .05 significance alpha level. For each test, normality and homoscedasticity as-
sumptions of sample data were validated using Shapiro-Wilk normality test and the
Bartlett test of homogeneity of variances.
Results
Activity Budgets and Work Output
We compared the activity budgets among queens founding alone to those in pairs,
and groups with at least four (or more) conspecifics in the first week of colony ini-
tiation. This period is important because queens must manage concurrent demands
for nest excavation, and brood care. By the end of this period, queens were engaging
primarily in brood care. Solitary queens spent more time performing the tasks of
excavating, brood care and/or foraging, and less time on self-maintenance activities
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(grooming and resting) than did individual queens in associations (supplementary Fig.
3.1). In contrast, paired queens spent more time on brood care than did any other
group (43% of observations). Non-task behaviors (i.e., walking and social contact)
were more common in large groups than small ones. Social interactions accounted
for 9% of observations among paired queens compared to 14% in groups with 4+
queens. Queens in larger groups had lower per capita performance of nest construc-
tion (ANOVA: F2,39 = 6.61, p < 0.01) (Fig 3.2). Solitary queens excavated about
twice more often per-capita than queens in pairs (Mean ± SE: 11.6 ± 1.7 vs. 6.25
± 0.7) or in groups with 4+ individuals (Mean ± SE: 4.7 ± 0.86) (Post-hoc analysis
for pair sets, T-HSD: p < 0.01). Group size had a significant, but more mixed effect
on performance of brood care (ANOVA: F2,39 = 6.55 , p < 0.01). Post hoc analyses
indicated that solitary queens did not differ significantly in brood tending from either
queens in pairs or queens in larger groups, but queens in pairs did tend brood signif-
icantly more than queens in larger groups (Mean ± SE: solitary 17.2 ± 1.89; pairs,
20.8 ± 1.47; 4+ queens, 12.4 ± 1.76) (T-HSD: p < 0.01).
Task Organization
Division of labor
Group size also affected the level of division of labor in nests with multiple queens.
Calculated DoLi was significantly higher in groups with four or more queens (Mean
± SE: 0.4 ± 0.04) than in pairs (0.23 ± 0.03) (ANOVA: F1,31 = 9.64, p < 0.01),
indicating that the degree to which different queens specialized on different tasks in-
creased with group size. To examine individual task repertoires in more detail, we
independently ranked queens by their excavation performance in associations. For
every pair, the queen that excavated more frequently was classified as the higher fre-
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Figure 3.2: Bars Show Mean ± SEM Performance of Work (Vs. Non Work) Activities Per-
capita. Group Size Had a Super-linear Effect on Performance of Self-care (Grooming and
Resting) and Non-tasks (Walking and Social Contacts). In Contrast, It Had a Sub-linear
Effect on Excavation, and Curvilinear Effect on Brood Care.
quency excavator (HFE) and the queen that excavated less frequently was classified as
the lower frequency excavator (LFE) (following Fewell and Page Jr (1999)). Likewise,
in groups of four or more individuals, queens with the highest and lowest excavation
frequency were designated as the HFE and LFE respectively. We then compared the
brood care performance of HFE vs LFE queens, to determine: whether queens who
performed more excavation were less likely to perform brood care, indicating that
queens were specializing on different tasks; or alternatively whether individuals who
performed more excavation were also likely to perform more brood care, suggesting
queens varied in activity level rather than specialization. We also used these compar-
isons to explore differences between the level of specialization in small versus large
groups (Fig 3.3).
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Tasks: The level of excavation performed by solitary queens was similar to that
of the HFE queens in associations (F2,39 = 1.132, p = 0.33). This was not true
for LFE queens (ANOVA: F2,39 = 53.84, p < 0.01). On average, solitary queens
excavated more per-capita than did LFE queens whether they were in a nesting
pair (Mean ± SE: 11.67 ± 1.69 vs. 2.71 ± 0.69) or in a group with four or more
individuals (0.4 ± 0.1; T-HSD: p < 0.01), a result consistent with the response
threshold expectation that performance of a task by one individual should reduce
its performance by others in the group Fewell and Page Jr (1999). There was also
a negative relationship between excavation and brood care. In pairs, LFE queens
performed more brood care bouts than did HFE queens (Mean ± SE: 24.8 ± 1.84
vs. 16.78 ± 2.1, F1,26 = 8.52, p < 0.01). Interestingly, they also had higher rates of
brood care performance than did solitary queens (17.2 ± 1.89, F1,21 = 7.64, p < 0.01).
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Likewise, LFE queens performed more brood care than did HFE queens in groups
with 4+ individuals (Mean ± SE: 13.15 ± 1.09; F1,39 = 4.9, p < 0.05). But their
performance was not statistically different from solitary queens.
Self-maintenance : LFE queens performed more self-maintenance activities
(grooming and resting) than HFE queens regardless of context (Pairs: 16.78 ± 1.24
vs. 11.84 ± 1.16; F1,26 = 8.34, p < 0.01; 4+ groups: 20.94 ± 1.3 vs. 13.48 ± 1.26;
F1,36 = 13.8, p < 0.01). In pairs, LFE queens performed self-maintenance twice more
often than solitary queens (Mean ± SE: 20.94 ± 1.43 vs. 10.5 ± 2.38, F1,45 = 16.4,
p < 0.01), but no more often than the average LFE queen in groups with 4+ indi-
viduals (Fig 2). In pairs, HFE queens performed similar levels of self-maintenance
as solitary queens (p = 0.05), but significantly lower than the average HFE queen in
groups with 4+ individuals (F1,45 = 6.2, p < 0.01).
Non-tasks : HFE queens performed more non-task activities (i.e., walking and
social contact) than did LFE queens regardless of context (Pairs: 9.57 ± 1.09 vs. 3.64
± 0.71; F1,26 = 20.5, p < 0.01; 4+ groups: 14.2 ± 1.25 vs. 7.7 ± 1.35; F1,36 = 12.5,
p < 0.01). In groups with 4+ individuals, the top 2 excavators performed non-tasks
1.2 times more often than HFE queens in pairs (11.6 ± 0.87 vs. 9.57 ± 1.09), and 1.6
times more often than solitary queens (7.2 ± 1.01). The latter result was significant
(F1,45 = 5.4, p < 0.01). In contrast, solitary queens performed more non-tasks than
LFE queens in pairs (F1,21 = 8.8, p < 0.01), but no more often than the average LFE
queen in groups with 4+ individuals (Fig 3.3).
Temporal patterns of behavior in solitary versus group founding context
We assessed how behavioral activity differed on the timescale of hours among queens
in solitary versus group-founding context (Fig. 3.4-3.6). We also examined how the
temporal progression of work in solitary versus group-founding nests varied during
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Figure 3.4: Temporal Activity of Solitary Queens. Average Fraction of Time Spent Daily
by Solitary Queens on Task and Non-task Activities During the Experiment (left), and
Frequency of Hourly Transitions Between Behaviors over 6 Days (right).
nest establishment. We observed progressive changes in ask organization between
day 3 and day 8 as queens shifted from nest excavation to brood tending. Prior to
day 5, the solitary queens spent a majority of their time excavating (35%); followed
by self-maintenance (30%) and non-task activities (25%). From day 5, however, they
were spending increasingly more time tending brood (Fig. 3.4). Similar changes in
task organization emerged in groups with notable differences in the timing of the
shift towards brood care. For instance, among nesting pairs, queens were spending
on average more than 50% of their time tending brood by day 6 (Fig. 3.5). This was
not the case in groups with 4+ individuals, where queens spent most of their time
prior to day 4 engaged in non-task behaviors, particularly social interactions (Fig.
3.6 ).
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Productivity
Brood and worker production
We monitored nests over 55 days to assess the effect of group size on per-capita pro-
ductivity. Queens began laying eggs on day 3, and production continued to increase
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Figure 3.7: Temporal Correlations Between Queens Across Nesting Contexts. Each En-
try in the Matrix (pij) Shows Proportion of times the Both Queen Were Simultaneously
Observed Preforming Behavior in the ith row and jth column Respectively. Queens Spent
More Time Together on Brood Care in Pairs (top) than in Groups with 4+ Individuals
(bottom).
until day 10, which coincided with the appearance of the first larvae cohort (Fig.
3.8). There was a large decline in egg numbers after day 10, in part due to hatch-
ing, but also because the newly hatched larvae cannibalized large numbers of eggs
. Therefore, we assessed cumulative egg production at day 10 before the first larva
hatched. Group size had an effect on cumulative egg production at day 10 (ANOVA:
F2,24 = 3.77, p < 0.05). The per capita number of eggs was higher in pairs than in
groups of 4+ queens, but did not differ between solitary queens and queens in pairs.
(T-HSD: p < 0.03).
We also examined the maximum number of larvae, pupae, and adult workers
reared in nests that survived up to day 55 (4 of 9 solitary, 11 of 14 pairs, and 11 of 19
with 4+ queens; Fig. 3.9). Although larvae production per-capita was similar among
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Figure 3.8: Effects of Group Size on per-capita Investment by Day 10. Plot Shows the
Mean ± SEM per-capita Egg Production of Surviving Nests at Day 10. Egg Counts Peaked
on Day 10, and Remained at Low Levels for the Remainder of the Experiment. Groups
with 4+ Queens Produced Fewer Eggs on Average than Singles or Pairs.
solitary and group-founding treatments (ANOVA: F2,23 = 0.21, p = 0.81), worker
production was not (ANOVA: F2,23 = 5.17, p=0.014). Queens reared twice as many
larvae into workers in pairs than in groups with 4+ individuals (T-HSD: p < 0.05).
Across nests, the number of offspring on day 55 was significantly associated with
the total fraction of time queens spent on brood care (T25 =3.0, p < 0.01) and non-
tasks (T25 =-2.9, p < 0.01), but not with division of labor in groups (T21 = −0.6,
p=0.5) (Fig 3.10). Moreover, nests exhibiting higher variance in work output between
days 3-8 were less productive in subsequent weeks than those with smaller variance
compared during the same period (Fig 3.11).
Theoretical Effects of Group Size on Variance in Productivity
Existing models of group size and DOL tend to focus on contexts where individu-
als are always available or motivated to perform tasks, mapping to the expectations
for eusocial colonies with sterile workers (Gautrais et al., 2002; Jeanson et al., 2007).
57
010
20
30
40
50
Singles 
(n=4)
Pairs 
(n=11)
4 or more 
(n=11)
M
ea
n 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 ±
 S
EM
Brood
Eggs
Larvae
Pupae + Workers
Max count in surviving nests through day 55
Figure 3.9: Effects of Group Size on Per-capita Productivity by Day 55. Plot Shows the
Mean ± SEM of Maximum Amount Brood Produced among Queens in Nests Surviving up
to Day 55. Egg Production Declined with Increasing Group Size. As a Proportion, the
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However, these assumptions may not hold in cooperative (non-eusocial) systems gen-
erally, in which individuals must balance the fitness costs of expressing different be-
haviors (as suggested here by our study of P. barbatus queens during nest foundation).
Our empirical results show that queens varied their activity levels in the presence of
conspecifics, and that this variation was associated with differential patterns of work
output and productivity in small versus large groups (Fig. 3.3; Fig. 3.10). Here,
we develop a model to explore possible individual-level causes for this pattern. In
relation to our empirical results, the model tests the hypotheses that short-term de-
clines in task availability (e.g., due to queen inactivity) might exacerbate the costs of
specialization in groups where the demands of brood care are high relative to other
tasks. Under the hypothesis that queens have a lowered probability of remaining ac-
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Figure 3.11: Effects of Variability in Work Output on Productivity Across Nests. (a) We
Compared the Relative Variance (i.e., Coefficient of Variation) in Task Performance During
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Subsequent 3-week Period. (b) We Compared the Relative Variance in Periodic Brood
Counts Between Weeks 2-4 with Maximum Number of Adult Offspring by Day 55.
tive following periods in which they are unsuccessful in performing a task, we expect
that work demand might fluctuate increasingly in larger groups where there are more
queens available than tasks needed.
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An Agent-based Model
Our model considers a social group with N queens (agents) and M=2 tasks (i.e.,
excavation and brood care). Each task j is characterized by a variable Sj(t), which
reflects its level of need in period t. Similar to previous studies (Gautrais et al., 2002;
Jeanson et al., 2007), we define a task demand parameter 0 < δj < 1, which represents
the fraction of simulation time N queens must collectively spend working on task j
in order to keep its stimulus from growing between periods. Likewise, each queen
i is characterized by a parameter (θij) that describes her threshold for performing
task j as well as a variable τ(t) that models her homeostatic cost of activity. We
assumed that thresholds remain fixed over time; but that a queen might become
more or less active in the group depending on her success in finding and completing
tasks previously. More specifically, we assume that τi(t) increases by c units during
periods when queen i is active without a task, and decreases when she was engaged
in a task. This dynamic captures the feedback between queen’s availability to work
and her perceived need for work in the group. The model also includes a component
of task fidelity; i.e. specifically that a queen’s likelihood of encountering a specific
task might depend on her recent history (see table 3.1 and ODD protocol for details)
Simulations run in discrete time for a total of T periods (0 ≤ t ≤ T ). During
each period, queens can be in one of three behavioral states: (1) inactive, (2) active
without task, or (3) active in a task. We assume that inactive queens are unavailable
to perform tasks, but that active queens might encounter a task (or switch between
tasks) once every period. Similar to previous studies (Gautrais et al., 2002; Jeanson
et al., 2007), we assume that work arises in each task at a fixed rate σj that scales
proportionally with group size (i.e., σj ∼ Nβj , 0 ≤ βj < 1). We also model the
delay between the start of nest construction and brood care using a piece-wise linear
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function during the simulation (see appendix for details). Finally, we assume that all
queens work at a fixed rate α.
The model is implemented as follows. At the start of period t, each task regen-
erates its stimulus by σj = δjαN
β
j . Next, queens are randomly selected to make
decisions based on their current state. First, inactive queens may become active with
probability PA(t) = 1/τi. Next, active queens may encounter stimulus for either task
1 or 2 (i.e., excavation or brood care) and become engaged with if Sj(t) > θij. Finally,
queens who do not become engaged in a task might enter an active, non-task state
with probability PNT (t), or retire (i.e., become inactive) with probability 1−PNT (t).
We assume that PNT (t) is nonzero at its baseline in period t, and increases with the
fraction of the group currently active without tasks (see appendix for details). The
model updates tasks only after all queens have made their decisions. During the up-
date period, each task reduces its stimulus by a value of α multiplied by the number
of queens engaged in it.
We explored how the task demand ratio (δ1/δ2) and queen’s fidelity to recent
tasks (ρ) influenced work output and DOL with increasing group size. We use the
coefficient of variation of task stimuli over the length of a simulation lasting T periods
as a proxy measure for expected productivity. Further details of our implementation
including a table of parameter values used in simulations can be found in the ODD
protocol section end of this chapter. Here, we highlight the following key results.
Simulation Results
We first considered a null model (c = 0) in which queens had an equal likelihood
of encountering both tasks (ρ = 0.5) and were always available to work throughout
model simulations (i.e., τi(t) = 1, ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ T ). Simulations recapitulated our exper-
imental findings of a curvilinear scaling of work performance with increasing group
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Figure 3.12: Predictions of Null Model in Which Agents Perform Tasks above a Fixed
Threshold and Work Demands Scale Proportionally with Increasing Group Size (see ODD
protocol for details). Plots Show the Predicted Activity Budget for a Typical Agent under
the Hypotheses That She Always Available to Work (c=0) and Encounters Both Tasks
with Equal Probability (ρ = 0.5) During Simulations. The Fraction of Time Spent on
Excavation and Brood Care Declines with Group Size N When Tasks Have Equal Needs
(left), but Increases for a Range of Sizes When There Unequal Need (right).
size. But this result developed only under assumption that queens faced unequal de-
mands for excavation versus brood care tasks (i.e., δ1 << δ2, Fig. 3.12). This result
was amplified in a context where queens had increased likelihood of encountering re-
cently performed tasks (Fig. 3.13). As expected, division of labor also increased with
group size and larger groups had lower variance in work output than smaller ones.
Next, we considered the modified model (c > 0) in which queens had a lower
probability of activity following periods in the simulation when they were idle (i.e.,
active without performing a task). Here, we observed a nonlinear relationship between
group size and expected productivity, depending on the level of fidelity to recent tasks
(ρ). In the absence of activity costs (c = 0), larger groups had less variance in work
output than smaller groups for any value of ρ (Fig. 3.14). However, groups tended to
achieve their lowest variance for intermediate values of ρ. In the presence of activity
costs (c = 1), smaller groups tended to have lower variance in work output than
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larger ones (Fig. 3.14). Nonetheless, increasing task fidelity among queens tended
to lower expected variance in larger groups, but only when it was sufficiently high
(ρ > 0.9). These results are likely explained by the fact that queens in larger groups
are less likely to find work (and thus become increasingly inactive) during the early
parts of the simulation when excavation is the only task available. On the other hand,
active queens are less likely to encounter tasks below their thresholds in larger groups,
especially if they are also highly specialized.
Discussion
Existing theory suggests that division of labor (DOL) can develop via of self-
organizing feedbacks that amplify (and stabilize) behavioral differences within groups
(Robinson and Page Jr, 1989; Bonabeau et al., 1996; Page and Mitchell, 1998; Ther-
aulaz et al., 1998). However, not much is known about how these feedbacks scale with
group size, or their consequences for productivity in a context where individuals must
weigh the costs of performing different activities (Jeanson and Fewell, 2008; Holbrook
et al., 2013). We examined these questions in an experimental social system: forced
associations of the normally solitary ant P. barbatus. Our results support the asser-
tion that DOL can spontaneously emerge in a de novo system (Fewell and Page Jr,
1999; Cahan and Fewell, 2004; Jeanson et al., 2005, 2008), but that its expression
and consequences are proximately shaped by group size (Jeanson and Fewell, 2008;
Holbrook et al., 2013).
On mechanisms driving the emergence and scaling of division of labor
Our empirical context, in which we forced solitary nesting queens into communal
associations, allows us to assess how social environment influences individual task
choice, and by extension task organization (Fewell and Page Jr, 1999). P. barbatus
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Figure 3.13: Effects of Task Fidelity on Predictions of the Null Model. Plots Explore
the Effects of Group Size on the Scaling of Task Organization for Different Levels of Task
Fidelity Assuming That Queens Are More Likely to Encounter Recently Performed Tasks
During Simulations (ρ > 0.5). Division of Labor (DOLi) Increases with Group Size, and Is
Amplified by the Effects of Increasing ρ. Likewise, Larger Groups Have Lower Variability
(CV) in Task Stimuli than Smaller Ones.
queens perform two major tasks during the early stages of colony foundation: con-
structing a nest and caring for brood. As is typical for females of any solitary species,
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Figure 3.14: Comparing Predictions of Null Model to Modified Model with Individual-level
Costs (c > 0). Plots Explore the Combined Effects of Group Size (N) and Task Fidelity
(ρ) on the Expected Variance in Work Output Assuming That Queens Are More Likely
to Become Inactive Following Periods When They Are Idle Without Work (c > 0). (See
Protocol for Details). In the Absence of Activity Costs (c = 0), Larger Groups Have Less
Variance in Output than Smaller Groups; But Groups Tended to Achieve Their Lowest
Variance for Intermediate Levels of ρ. In the Presence of Activity Costs (c = 1), Smaller
Groups Tend to Have Lower Variance in Work Output than Larger Ones.
queens initiating a nest alone spent most of their time alternating between tasks (Fig.
3.2, 3.4). However, when paired with a conspecific, a division of labor emerged in
which one queen primarily performed excavation while the other provided brood care
(Fig. 3.5). This differentiation increased with group size, indicating that tasks are
increasingly monopolized by a subset of individuals in larger associations (Fig. 3.5).
One issue that is often ignored in models of division of labor is how individuals
behave when there are intrinsic costs associated with performing different tasks. In
the case of nest founding, evidence suggests that excavation may be a particularly
expensive task in terms of mortality risk (Johnson, 2000; Cahan, 2001). Indeed, we
observed that queens excavated most frequently when nesting alone and consistently
less in larger associations (Fig. 3.2). However, a different pattern was seen for brood
care. Although the number of eggs produced (per-queen) declined with increasing
group size (Fig. 3.8), paired queens performed significantly more bouts of brood care
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than individuals in any other context (Fig. 3.3).
The positive scaling of division of labor might have emerged due to a reduction
in demand (i.e., the overall need for work relative to the amount of labor needed
to complete tasks) (Jeanson et al., 2007). But if lower demand led to fewer queens
working in larger groups, what were they doing instead? We observed that queens in
associations spent significantly more time on self-maintenance behaviors (i.e., groom-
ing and resting). This was particularly evident during the first couple of days when
excavation was the primary task available (Fig. 3.5 - 3.6). We also found some an-
cillary behavioral differences among queens classified as excavation specialists (HFE)
versus non-specialists (LFE). For instance, HFE queens were generally more active
and tended to engage in non-task behaviors (i.e., walking and social contacts) with
greater frequency than their LFE nest mates (Fig. 3.3). These differences varied
across groups, suggesting that performance of either self-maintenance (or non-tasks)
may intrinsically connect with a queen’s perception of work needed within the nest
(i.e., given her specialist role).
Our results also suggest that the value of work (or performing a particular task)
to individual queens was influenced by intrinsic and extrinsic factors. In general,
queens showed a fair degree of behavioral fidelity during each day such periods of
work tended to follow periods of work (and likewise for resting) (Fig. 3.4 - 3.6). We
also observed a shift in task performance over several days, which varied between
solitary and group founding nests (Fig. 3.4 - 3.6). We speculate that queens may
reduce their digging rate once they have reached a critical nest volume and that the
size of the brood pile may represent a cue triggering the transition to brood care.
However, it is also possible they might have responded directly to the activity of
other nest mates. In support of this idea, we found correlations between the activity
of excavation specialists (HFE) and non-specialists (LFE) were influenced by group
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size (Fig. 3.7). For instance, HFE queens were more likely to be observed displaying
the same behavior as their LFE nest mate in pairs than in groups with four (or more)
conspecifics (Fig. 3.7). These results highlight the roles of individual experience in
shaping patterns of task choice within groups; and also that group size can influence
these patterns.
Functional costs of increased group size on task organization and productivity
Division of labor might provide functional benefits in incipient social groups, as
hypothesized for more complex and derived societies (Oster and Wilson, 1978; Chit-
tka and Muller, 2009). However, the extent of these benefits may depend on the type
of social group considered and the environment they inhabit (Dornhaus et al., 2009;
Charbonneau and Dornhaus, 2015). For instance, while specialization can improve
individual efficiency (Chittka and Muller, 2009), it might be especially costly in envi-
ronments where work needs can fluctuate unexpectedly (Charbonneau and Dornhaus,
2015).
In the case of nest founding in P. barbatus, we hypothesized that dividing labor
might allow queens to better regulate the costs of task switching in work critical
for brood care (e.g., grooming, feeding, etc). Under this regime, one might have
reasonably expected larger groups to benefit more from dividing labor than smaller
ones. However, we observed an opposite pattern. Among surviving colonies, the
number of adult offspring (per-capita) peaked among paired queens and declined in
groups with four (or more) conspecifics. This difference developed despite the fact
that larvae production was similar across nests (Fig. 3.9).
Some of the earliest studies of foundress associations showed an optimum curve of
colony productivity with group size (reviewed by Bernasconi and Strassmann (1999)).
These findings were typically ascribed to conflict interactions and competition among
67
queens that resulted in decreased per-capita productivity (Taki, 1976; Rissing and
Pollock, 1987; Tschinkel, 1993). For instance, in associations of S. invicta, queens
often consume the eggs of their nest mates (Tschinkel, 1993). Moreover, differential
loss of mass from reproductive investments can affect survival (Bernasconi and Keller,
1996). Our study of P. barbatus, however, focused on a de novo context where queens
are not likely to have evolved such strategies. Although we can not completely rule
out the possibility of egg cannibalism, our data suggest queens had lower egg-laying
rates in groups with four (or more) conspecifics (Fig. 3.8). This result is inline with
previous work showing that queens contribute disproportionately to brood production
when forced into associations (Cahan and Gardner-Morse, 2013)
An alternative viewpoint is that the declining productivity of larger group sizes
may have emerged as a consequence of within-group dynamics that modified the
brood rearing environment. We observed that queens tended to maintain a common
brood pile in a narrow, isolated tunnel inside the nest. Thus, it was not surprising to
find that co-founding queens were more likely to perform brood care together than
specialists in larger associations (Fig. 3.3). However, nests where queens had less
consistent work output during the nest initiation period were generally less productive
in subsequent weeks compared to those with more consistent output during nest
initiation (Fig 3.11). This finding suggests a possible link between the variability
of brood care and offspring quality during experiment. The proximate costs of non-
constant task availability is probably lower for brood care during egg-laying phase
than in latter stages when larvae start to eclose. Ant larvae require near constant
feeding and monitoring to minimize oophagy (Urbani, 1991; Liu et al., 2001; Masuko,
2003). With increased specialization, there were likely fewer individuals nursing brood
in larger groups. This pattern might have increased variability of care and resulted
in higher rates of brood attrition.
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What mechanisms might underlie the variability within groups? We hypothesized
P. barbatus queens may conserve energetic resources by minimizing superfluous activ-
ity in their natural solitary founding context. This might be achieved via a strategy
whereby queens decrease their likelihood of activity during periods when work de-
mands are low or absent–a pattern suggested by our data (see 3.4 - 3.6). Simulations
of a model in which agents employ a similar cost-mitigating strategy showed a curvi-
linear relationship between group size and expected productivity (measured as the
variability of work needed across tasks). In general, the model suggests that special-
ization might be more beneficial in smaller groups, where there is sufficient demand
for work in order for keep queens active, than in larger groups where queens are less
likely to find work and become increasingly less active (Fig 3.13 - 3.14). Moreover, the
model also predicts that group performance should be maximized at a “threshold”
size, where there was sufficient need for work in order for queens to remain partially
active across tasks. These predictions can be tested in empirically by analyzing pro-
ductivity P. barbatus colonies reared in different experimental nests where queens
have varying levels of access to the brood pile.
The comparison of naturally evolved associations to artificially created ones like
P. barbatus can provide some insights into the fitness consequences of self-organized
division of labor under different ecological and social contexts (Fewell and Page Jr,
1999; Cahan and Fewell, 2004; Jeanson et al., 2008; Holbrook et al., 2013). Division
of labor (DOL) may present a barrier to sociality because it can generate dispari-
ties among individuals specializing on different tasks. Our results here suggest that
these costs might be exacerbated by increased group size with measurable effects on
productivity. Thus, we expect that selection, as a rule, should favor behavioral adap-
tations leading towards task sharing rather than specialization in order to maintain
cooperation in these systems. Cahan and Gardner-Morse (2013) identified several
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ways this could occur; for instance, decreasing response thresholds to social cues,
changes in the connections between stimulus inputs and behavioral outputs to mini-
mize performance of high-cost tasks, or adaptive modification of behavioral responses
in response to group size or composition.
Concluding remarks
Our results support the assertion that division of labor can emerge from self-
organizational processes drive specialization in de novo groups (Fewell and Page Jr,
1999; Jeanson et al., 2005, 2008; Jeanson and Fewell, 2008; Holbrook et al., 2013), but
that these mechanisms likely have potentially negative consequences for productivity
at larger sizes. In all, we argue based on these results and others (Jeanson and
Fewell, 2008) that behavioral adaptations to minimize differentiation may have been
necessary for the evolution of social groups in which individual and collective fitness
are enhanced by cooperation.
Protocol for Agent-based Model
This section provides a model description of the main components of the model
based on the ODD protocol of Grimm et al. (2010).
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to shed light on mechanisms that might explain the
empirical relationship between division of labor (DOL), group size and per-capita
productivity in de novo associations of colony-founding ant queens (Fig 3.11). Our
data shows that queens divided labor in pairs and worked increasingly less in larger
groups. However, this dynamic might have increased the cost of DOL in larger groups
because there were fewer queens available to respond to changing demands of offspring
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care. We developed a model to examine the consequences of an individual-level
mechanism which might explain patterns in our data. In it, agents increase/decrease
their activity levels in response to consistent success/failure in finding/completing
tasks. We explore how this dynamic influences the variability of work output in
context agents also tend to specialize on tasks and how group size can exacerbate this
cost.
Entities, state variables and scales
The model considers a social group with N agents (queens) and m tasks. Each task
j is characterized by its stimulus level Sj(t), which reflects its work need in period t.
Task stimuli are perceivable by all agents. However, this may depend on the agent’s
task history (see submodel section for details). Agents can either be inactive, engaged
in a task, or active without a task during each period. Each agent i is characterized
by an internal demand τi(t), which changes with her activity level and influences her
probability of being available to work in future periods. The model runs in discrete
time; each time steps represent a decision epoch during which agents can change their
behavioral state.
Process overview and scheduling
At the start of each period, each task increases its stimulus by a fixed value σj. Next,
depending on their current state, agents are randomly selected to make decisions.
First, inactive agents may become active with activation probability PAi(t). Next, ac-
tive agents may encounter stimulus for some task j (i.e., excavation or brood care) and
become engaged with probability PTi(Sj). The likelihood that an agent encounters
either task may depend on previous performance. Finally, those who do not become
engaged in a task remain in an active, idle state with probability PNT (t) or retire
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Parameter Description Simulation values
βj Demand scaling coefficient for task j β1 = 0, β2 = 0.6
δj Baseline demand for task j δ1 = 0.25, δ2 = [0.25, 0.5, 0.75]
θij Response threshold of agent i to task
j stimulus
N(50, 5)
ρ Probability of encountering most re-
cent task
ρ ∈ [0.5, 1)
 Baseline probability of remaining ac-
tive (non-task)
 = 0.5
α Agents’ max work rate per period 3
b Expected benefit of activity 1
c Expected cost of activity 1
Table 3.1: Definition of Parameters Used in the Numerical (Agent-based) Model.
(i.e., become inactive) with probability 1 − PNT (t). Tasks are updated immediately
after each agent makes a decision. During the update period, each task reduces its
stimulus by a fixed value α
Design concepts
Basic principles: Our study draws on previously published model of division
of labor and group size (Gautrais et al., 2002; Merkle and Middendorf, 2004;
Jeanson et al., 2007). A common assumption in these models is that agents are
always available/motivated to perform tasks, and behave without reference to
underlying costs. Here, we assume that agents suffer homeostatic costs from
performing tasks, and act (myopically) to minimize these costs by reducing their
activity during periods when work demands are low or absent.
Emergence: We will examine how division of labor (i.e, the degree to which
different individuals tend to perform different tasks) scales with increasing group
size. We will also explore how the combination of increased specialization and
declining need for work in larger groups might theoretically influence work out-
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put by assessing fluctuations in task stimuli throughout the simulations.
Adaptation: We assume all agents are initially available to work on any task
that exceeds their intrinsic threshold. However, individuals who have an experi-
ence of not finding tasks to perform become less available to work in subsequent
periods. We also assume that agents’ probability of encountering a task may
depend on recent experience performing it (see task fidelity in submodels).
Objectives: Agents do not have any explicit objectives. Their actions are
strictly based on their current internal state and/or their external environment.
Learning: Agents become less active over time if they continue to have an
experience of not finding tasks to perform.
Sensing: Agents are aware of their internal state and task stimulus levels.
They are also aware of the behavioral state of others in each period.
Interaction: Agents directly affect tasks by performing them. The can in-
fluence each other’s probability of remaining active (as opposed to becoming
inactive) during idle periods (see Probability of remaining active in submodels
section).
Stochasticity: The order in which agents are asked to make each decision is
random. Each agent’s task response thresholds are drawn from a distribution
with known mean and variance.
Observation: During the simulation, we store the number of times each agent
transitions into a new state and stimulus levels across tasks. From these data,
we can compute (at simulations end) the variability of task stimuli, how much
time the individuals/group spends on different activities, and division of labor
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(DOLi) statistic (Gorelick et al. 2004). Since this a stochastic model, we
calculated the mean and variance of these quantities over 50 simulation runs.
Modeling details
State variables
Tasks: We assume that there are m = 2 tasks; each task j is associated with
stimulus value Sj ∈ R+, which denotes with its current need. The stimulus for
task j increases at a rate σj(t), and decreases by the number of agents working
on it Qj(t) (multiplied by their work rate α). Thus, the change in task stimuli
between time periods is given by:
∆Sj = σj(t)− αQj(t).
where σj(t) is the increase in stimulus intensity in period t. Naturally, σj should
reflect the demand for each task (i.e., total work required to complete it relative
to total work force available)(Jeanson et al., 2007). Our data suggests that
the demand for excavation and brood care scale differently with group size.
For instance, paired queens produced twice as many eggs as single queens, but
groups with 4+ queens produced less than four times as many. Task demand
may also change over time. For instance, we observed there was usually a
delay in commencing egg tending until excavation reached a certain depth.
Moreover, the demands of brood care change as eggs develop into larvae. For
our simulations, we assumed that demand is function of group size: σj(t) =
δj · α · N (βj) where δj ∈ [0, 1] is the baseline need for task j and βj ∈ [0, 1] is a
scaling factor. Notes: δj can be interpreted as the proportion of the group that
must perform in task j in period t in other to keep its stimulus from growing
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(i.e., ∆Sj < 0). Moreover, βj provides a way of modeling how the needs of task
j increases with number of agents in the group.
Individuals: We model the effects of work on agent i’s internal state by intro-
ducing an activity variable τi(t) ∈ R+ Its value is updated between periods as
follows:
τi(t+ 1)− τi(t) =

+c if agent i is idle in period t
−b · δj if agent i performs task j
0 Otherwise
τi models agent i
′s perceived costs of activity. It captures a sense of how agents
valuate the profitability of the work environment. Agents become more moti-
vated/available to perform tasks when perceived costs are low (e.g., τi = 0) than
vice versa. The update rule requires τi to increase c units during periods when
agent i is active but unable to find work. In contrast, τi decreases b · δj units
during periods when agent i is working on task j. Either changes will affect her
probability of being active in subsequent periods (see activation probability in
the next section).
Submodels
Initialization : Each simulation runs for 1440 time periods. At the beginning
of each simulation, all agents are inactive. The stimulus for excavation is ini-
tially set at value of S1(0) = 50, while the stimulus for brood care is set at zero
S2(0) = 0. Furthermore, the demand for brood care is set at zero (σ2 = 0) until
t=250, when it is assumed queens start producing eggs. Similar to Gautrais
et al. (2002), and Jeanson et al. (2007) each agent i has a genetically deter-
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mined threshold θij ∈ R+ for performing task j. θij is sampled from a normal
distribution N(50,5). Furthermore, each agent’s intrinsic demand is initialized
to zero (i.e., τi(0) = 0).
Activation probability PAi(t): We assume each agent becomes active with
probability PAi(t) = 1/τi(t) at the beginning of period t, depending on their in-
ternal demand variable τi(t). Otherwise, they remain inactive for the remainder
of the period.
Probability that agent i performs task j PTi(Sj): Next, all active agents
can encounter a stimulus for either task 1 or 2. The probability of agent i
performing in task j conditional on encounter is:
PTi(Sj) =

1 if Sj(t) ≥ θij
0 Otherwise
We assume that both tasks are initially encountered with equal probability.
Probability of encountering recent task (i.e., task fidelity): ρ: We
allow for the possibility that agents may be more likely to encounter stimulus
for recently performed task. This might reflects the spatial heterogeneity in the
distribution of tasks and their associated stimuli (e.g., in P. barbatus colonies,
queens kept brood in the innermost chambers of the nest; away from parts
being excavated). Specifically, let k(i) denote the index of agent i’s most recent
task. Also, let ρ ∈ [0.5, 1) represent the probability that agent i encounters
stimuli associated with task k(i). If ρ = 0.5, then agents have equal likelihood
of encountering both tasks. As ρ→ 1, agents are more likely to encounter their
most recently performed task.
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Probability of remaining active (non-task) PNT (t): Agents who do not
become engaged in a task may retire (i.e., become inactive) with probability
1− PNT (t) or remain active probability PNT (t). We assume that PNT (t) has a
baseline value  ∈ [0, 1], but increases with the number of individuals who are
currently idle in period t : PNT (t) =  · (1 + A(t)/N).
Implementation
The model was developed in Netlogo (http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/). A code
is available on request.
77
Chapter 4
A NOVEL MODELING FRAMEWORK TO STUDY TASK ORGANIZATION IN
ANIMAL GROUPS
Abstract
We introduce a mathematical modeling framework to study factors that shape the
dynamics and outcomes of task organization in social groups. Our approach, which is
based on the theory of multi-agent systems, focuses on groups of adaptive (reinforce-
ment learning) agents whose behavior is based on a valuation of alternative choices
in a given environment. As an application, we analyze two representational models
in which agents must manage demands for one or two tasks, while constrained by a
fixed cost of activity. We obtain a number of theoretical results including threshold
conditions under which agents are likely to become specialized on a task, contribute
proportionally to both tasks, or abstain from work altogether. Simulations of a model
where agents have similar preferences across tasks, but vary in their work rate, re-
veal parameter regions with multiple coexisting attractors that correspond to distinct
group efficiency outcomes. This result highlights the importance of studying initial
conditions as part of a broader analysis of factors that might shape variation in
groups where individuals balance costs of performing different activities. In sum, our
framework expands the scope of existing models to study the theoretical causes and
consequences of task organization in animal groups .
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Introduction
Much of the behavior and success of social (group-living) animals is dependent
on their capacity to organize and regulate work (i.e., tasks needed to survive, grow
and produce offspring) on a systematic basis (Charbonneau and Dornhaus, 2015).
The degree to which they achieve this is often defined by flexibility of their members
to switch between roles in response to environmental changes. Mathematical models
have been instrumental in highlighting conditions under which groups can achieve
emergent regulation of work via self-organization (Bonabeau et al., 1996, 1998; Page
and Mitchell, 1998; Theraulaz et al., 1998). However, there is still a gap in our
understanding of how the processes and outcomes of task organization at the group-
level are shaped by behavioral mechanisms at the individual level. Here, we propose
a novel modeling approach that aims to bridge this gap.
There is a great deal of interest in relating causes and patterns of task orga-
nization to understand the variation seen across social taxa (Fewell et al., 2009).
Classical studies focused on patterns of division of labor and how its regulation might
contribute to colony efficiency (Oster and Wilson, 1978). However, there has been
a more recent shift towards a proximate theory (Beshers and Fewell, 2001), with a
focus on principles that allow group-level regulation to emerge as a consequence of
individual-level behavior (Hemelrijk, 2002). The key challenge of this analysis is to
understand how individuals make task decisions in different environments. Existing
models finesse this question by focusing on phenomenological rules that describe how
they behave without reference to underlying mechanisms that produce them (Besh-
ers and Fewell, 2001). The paradigmatic example of this is based on the concept of
response thresholds (Robinson and Page Jr, 1989; Bonabeau et al., 1996, 1998; Page
and Mitchell, 1998; Theraulaz et al., 1998). Response-threshold models hypothesize
79
that division of labor can self-organize within groups where individuals vary in their
sensitivity to extrinsic task stimuli. This pattern develops in part due to a stigmergic
feedback in which one’s performance of a task changes in the environment in ways
that decreases the likelihood of others performing the same task (Theraulaz et al.,
1998). For instance, in the case where individuals have fixed sensitivities, those with
the lowest threshold for a task will consistently initiate it sooner than others reducing
its need (and thus the likelihood that others will perform it in the immediate future)
(Bonabeau et al., 1998). The response threshold model also offers an explanation for
how groups can adaptively respond to changing conditions without central control.
This is because increasing the demand for a specific task will cause its stimulus level
to exceed the thresholds of a broader subset of individuals in the group, causing them
to initiate work on the task (Detrain and Pasteels, 1991; Fewell and Page Jr, 1993;
O’Donnell and Foster, 2001; Weidenmu¨ller, 2004).
Although, threshold models have been instrumental for exploring conditions un-
der which groups can self-organize around work, this approach has some limitations
(Beshers and Fewell, 2001). First, by studying response thresholds as a phenomeno-
logical concept, we lose sight of a broader set of factors that shape decision-making
at the individual-level. For instance, an individual’s decision to perform a task might
relate with her current physiological state (e.g., energy reserves), or depend on prior
experience of others in the group (Charbonneau and Dornhaus, 2015). From an
adaptive perspective, it makes sense for animals to modulate their activity in re-
sponse to their environment particularly, when there are costs of performing different
behaviors. Second, the lack of underlying theory of task choice limits the power of
threshold models to explain how group-level patterns of organization are shaped by
individual-level characteristics (Schelling, 1971). For instance, even in groups where
individuals have similar response thresholds, variation in work demand resulting from
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differences in task ability might influence the resulting structure of division of labor.
A phenomenological approach forecloses on the possibility to evaluate whether par-
ticular equilibrium patterns of task choice are utility maximizing for an individual,
or systematically efficient for the group (Granovetter, 1978). Finally, for explanatory
power, models of task organization should be as broad and integrative as possible
with narrowly focused hypotheses that can be empirically tested (Beshers and Fewell,
2001). Existing approaches so far have been exploratory; in that they are designed
to reveal the consequences of specific behavioral rules. Moreover, because they have
been developed within a computational framework, there is little hope of gaining any
analytical insights into their predictions.
In this article, we develop a mathematical framework to study task organization
that integrates mechanisms of decision-making at the individual level (Fig. 4.1). Our
approach, which is inspired by the theory of multi-agent systems (Sato and Crutch-
field, 2003; Lerman et al., 2006) focuses on myopic, reinforcement learning agents,
who valuate utilities of performing different actions and adjust their behavior in fa-
vor of alternatives that provide the highest expected return (Herrnstein and Prelec,
1991; Loewenstein, 2010). The framework combines some key features from existing
RT models (Bonabeau et al., 1998; Theraulaz et al., 1998) because we assume that
individuals are able to assess task needs through specific environmental stimuli and re-
duce their activity level if the task environment becomes less profitable. However, by
modeling the tradeoffs associated with different task choices (rather than thresholds
explicitly), our approach allows us to evaluate factors that shape behavioral response
at the individual-level and explore their group-level consequences for work.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, we will present a general
description of our framework along with a discussion of its assumptions. Next, we
will analyze two representational models developed for a pair of agents managing
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Figure 4.1: A Behavioral Modeling Framework (modified from Beshers and Fewell (2001)).
Boxed Quantities Represent Factors Known (or Hypothesized) to Influence an Individual’s
Task Choice. We Theorize That Behavior Should Be Adaptive, Reflecting a Balance Be-
tween Costs and Rewards of Activity in a Dynamic Task Environment.
a single task, and a pair of agents and tasks. In each scenario, we ask how the
presence of competing work demands and intrinsic costs of activity influence each
agent’s behavioral likelihood over time (e.g. to what degree they tend to perform
tasks versus abstain from work altogether). The chapter concludes with a discussion
of our main theoretical results in connection with previous studies and empirical data.
Model Derivation
State variables
We consider the behavior of N agents denoted by i in a group over discrete time
periods t, t + 1, ...etc. In each period, agents can be engaged in one of M tasks,
denoted by j or inactive in a non-task state (e.g, resting). Now, let xi0(t) represent
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the probability that agent i is inactive at time t. Similarly, let xij(t) represent the
probability that agent i performs task j at time t. Then, the allocation strategy of
agent i is given by xij(t) = {xi0(t), xi1(t)..., xiM(t)}, where
∑
j
xij(t) = 1. Moreover,
the allocation profile for task j is given by xj(t) = {x1j(t), ..., xNj(t)}.
Dynamics of task stimulus
Let Sj represent the intensity of stimulus associated with task j. Biologically, Sj
might refer to any quantitative cue that signals the demand for task j (e.g., number
of physical encounters, a chemical concentration, etc.). Naturally, Sj should decrease
proportionally with the total amount of work done by agents performing task j.
However, Sj may increase at a maximum (constant) rate δj due to exogenous factors
(e.g., nest degradation, brood development, etc.) that drive up the need for work in
task j and require agents to continually invest some effort in performing each task.
Following the work of (Bonabeau et al., 1998), we will assume Sj follows a linear rate
dynamic:
S˙j = δj︸︷︷︸
task need
−
N∑
i=1
αij · xij · Sj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total task effort
(4.1)
where αij is the maximum effective work rate of agent i in task j.
Reward values: Vij(t)
Similar to Bonabeau et al. (1998) , agents ascribes a time-varying non-negative value
Vij to each task j > 0 proportional to its stimulus intensity (i.e., Vij ∝ Sj). How-
ever, Vij may also depend on other factors such as self-reinforced behavior (prefer-
ences) where successful performance of an action increases the likelihood of future
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performance (Theraulaz et al., 1998). Another possible factor is social facilitation
where agents directly increase (or decrease) their propensity to express a behavior
when it is expressed by others (Webster and Fiorito, 2001). For any agent i, let
x−ij = {x1j, x2j, ..., x(n−1)j} represent the allocation vector of other agents towards
task j at time t. In other words, x−ij holds the proportion of effort all agents (i ex-
cluded) allocates to task j. We allow for the possibility of self vs. socially-facilitated
reinforcement using a multi-variate weight function F (xij,x−i) ∈ [0, 1]:
Vij(Sj, xij,x−ij) =
Sj
θij
· F (xij,x−ij), j = 1, 2, ...,m (4.2)
where 1
θij
is agent i′s preference for task j (in which case θij is an “aversion” param-
eter). Generically, F (xij,x−ij) should be some linear combination of xij and x−i. As
an illustration, consider the following possibility:
F (xij,x−ij) = 1 + i · xij︸ ︷︷ ︸
self-reinforcement
+ σi · 1N − 1
N−1∑
k=1
xkj︸ ︷︷ ︸
social reinforcement
, k 6= i.
where i ∈ [0, 1] and σi ∈ [−1, 1]. If σi = 0 ⇔ F = 1 + ixij, then Vij does not
depend on behavior of others. However, if 0 < σi ≤ 1, then Vij increases with F (i.e.,
the value of task j to agent i increases when other agents are likely to perform it).
Conversely, if −1 ≤ σi < 0, then Vij decreases with F (i.e., the value of task j to
agent i decreases when other queens are likely to perform it).
Intrinsic demand: Vi0(t)
We also assume that agents are subject to intrinsic demands Vi0(t) that might
limit their availability to perform tasks in period t. In biological terms, this might
reflect a need to perform self-maintenance activities (e.g., grooming, resting etc) to
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maintain homeostasis. For simplicity, we subsume these demands into a single con-
stant: Vi0(t) = Φi, which can be interpreted as agent i’s intrinsic cost of activity at
time t.
Dynamics of behavior switching
Now, suppose that in a small time-interval dt, an agent in behavioral state j
encounters a stimulus for an alternate state k 6= j with probability 1/M . We make
a sensible assumption that agents follow a simple rule: switch to new state k if its
perceived reward value is larger than that of current state j. This rule is commonly
referred to as a reinforcement learning and has been used in previous multi-agent
modeling contexts (Sato and Crutchfield, 2003; Lerman et al., 2006). We can order
the value of each behavioral state to agent i such that: Vi0 ≤ Vi1 ≤ ... ≤ ViM . Based
on this switching dynamic, we can write down an expression for the expected rate of
change of xij in period t+ dt:
xij(t+ dt)− xij(t) =
j∑
k=0
xik · xij · [Vij − Vik] · dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflow from less valuable states
− xij
M∑
k=j+1
xik · [Vik − Vij] · dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow to more valuable states
= xij
M∑
k=1
xik · [Vij − Vik] · dt
= xij[Vij − V¯i] · dt
(4.3)
where
V¯i =
M∑
k=0
xikVik =
(
1−
M∑
k=1
xik
)
Φi︸ ︷︷ ︸
weighted value of inactive state
+
M∑
k=1
xik
Sj
θij︸ ︷︷ ︸
weighted value of task states
(4.4)
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is the weighted average rate of return to agent i over all possible activities. In the
continuous-time limit, dt → 0 the dynamics of (4.3) can be approximated by an
M + 1 dimensional system:
x˙ij = xij[Vij − V¯i], j = 0, 1, ...,M (4.5)
where Vij and V¯i are defined accordingly by equations (4.2) and (4.4) respectively.
General framework
Combining the model equations (4.1) and (4.5), we get an M × (N + 1) dimensional
dynamical system:
x˙i0 = xi0
[
Vi0 − V¯i
]
x˙ij = xij
[
Vij − V¯i
]
i = 1, 2, ..., N
S˙j = δj −
N∑
i
αijxijSj j = 1, 2, ...,M
(4.6)
where xi0 = 1 −
M∑
k=1
xik, and all parameters are positive. Moreover, Vij and V¯i are
given by (4.2) and (4.4). The generalized framework (4.6) can be used to study how
the dynamics of task organization within a social group relates with the composition
and behavior of its members. For instance, we can explore how varying parameters
relating to individual preference/aversion for certain tasks (θij), intrinsic costs (Φi),
as well as environmental parameters (e.g., δj) affects their long-term patterns of task
performance.
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Parameter Meaning
δj Task regeneration rate
αij Mean work rate of agent i in task j
Φi Intrinsic constraint of agent i
θij Aversion of agent i for task j
i Self reinforcement of agent i
σi Social reinforcement of agent i
Table 4.1: Description of Parameters Used in the General Modeling Framework (4.7).
A baseline model
To begin, let’s suppose that agents are neither influenced by experience nor by social
reinforcement (i.e., i = σi = 0). This reflects typical assumptions made in the
fixed response-threshold model (Bonabeau et al., 1998). Suppose also that agents
have fixed constraints. Under these conditions, the value of resting for each agent is
constant: Vi0 = Φi, and the value of each task depends only on perceived demand:
Vij = Sj/θij and (4.6) becomes:
x˙i0 = xi0
[
Φi − V¯i
]
x˙ij = xij
[
Sj
θij
− V¯i
]
i = 1, 2, ..., N
S˙j = δj −
N∑
i
αijxijSj j = 1, 2, ...,M
(4.7)
where V¯i =
(
1−
M∑
k=1
xik
)
Φi +
M∑
k=1
xik
Sj
θij
.
Mathematical Analysis
In this section, I will study the dynamics of Model (4.7) using a combination
of analysis and simulations. First, I discuss some general properties of (4.7) and
comment on their biological implications in the context of how individual activity
and specialization affects division of labor. Next, I focus on specific cases to provide
some clear intuition about these results. The first study focuses on a pair of agents,
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who must manage a single task while facing a constant physiological cost. The second
study focuses on a pair of agents and tasks. These analyses help us understand about
how individuals behave behave when faced with multiple (dynamic) demands. Proofs
for analytical results are located in section 4.
Definition 4.0.0.1. An equilibrium point of (2.1) satisfies S∗j =
δj∑
i
αijx∗ij
and∑
i
x∗ij > 0 for every task j. Moreover, let X = [x
∗
ij]N×(M+1) denote the equilibrium
matrix of (2.1) in which: (i) the ith row represents the work allocation strategy for
agent i, (ii) the jth + 1 column represents the allocation profile for task j:
X =

x∗10 x
∗
11 . . . x
∗
1m
x∗20 x
∗
21 . . . x
∗
2m
...
...
. . .
...
x∗n0 x
∗
n1 . . . x
∗
nm

N×(M+1)
Remark. X is a row-stochastic matrix
(
M∑
j=0
x∗ij = 1
)
and has non-zero columns (j >
0)
Definition 4.0.0.2. Agent i is a complete specialist for task j > 0 if she has zero
probability in every other task: x∗ij + x
∗
i0 = 1. Conversely, agent i is a generalist if
they have non-zero probability in every task: 0 < x∗ij < 1, ∀ j > 0.
Definition 4.0.0.3. We define Dij = δjαij as the expected (equilibrium) demand
for task j with agent i as its sole specialist.
Definition 4.0.0.4. Let θijΦi represent the “inertia” of agent i to perform task
j. Moreover, the ratio: Ri/h = θhjΦhθijΦi define the relative availability of agent i (versus
h) for task j.
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General Properties
Lemma 4.0.0.1. The hyperplanes xij = 0 are invariant under the flow of (4.5).
Moreover, every initial condition that satisfies: xij(0) > 0,
M∑
j=0
xij(0) = 1, ∀ i, j
remains in the unit simplex:
SMi =
{
xij = {xi0, xi1, ..., xiM}, xij ≥ 0,
M∑
j=0
xij = 1
}
(4.8)
for all time.
Some general results
Theorem 4.0.0.3. [Number zeros in the equilibrium matrix] Suppose that N,M >
1. If for any pair of agents {g, h} we have that: (i) θgjΦg 6= θhjΦh and (ii) θgjθgk 6=
θhj
θhk
, k 6= j, then every equilibrium matrix X = [x∗ij] of (4.7) has at least (N−1)(M−
1) + 1 and at most NM zeros in its entries.
Remark. This result proves that (4.7) cannot have a “work sharing” equilibrium
where two (or more) agents work on all tasks (i.e., complete generalists). This result
holds provided that agents differ in the ratio of preference for any arbitrary pair of
tasks (i.e.,
θij
θik
6= θhj
θhk
).
The following results follow as a consequence of theorem 4.0.0.3.
Corollary 4.0.0.2 (Specialist only equilibria). Suppose that N ≥M . Then model
(4.7) has an equilibrium where every agent is active and specializes on a unique task
u: x∗iu + x
∗
i0 = 1, x
∗
iu ≤ 1. No such equilibrium exists if N < M .
Remark. In the former case (x∗iu = 1), every task is performed at a high level. Thus,
the group is characterized as having high work activity and equal division of labor
(DOL) because all tasks are performed at the same level of effort. In the latter case,
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if x∗iu =
Diu
θiuΦi
< 1, tasks may be performed at different levels depending on each agent’s
constraint.
Corollary 4.0.0.3 (Generalist + Specialist equilibria). Suppose that N,M >
1. Then, model (4.7) has an equilibrium where exactly one agent h is a complete
generalist: 0 < x∗hj < 1, ∀ j, and others i 6= h are specialists for some task u. At this
state, one of the following conditions must hold: (a) x∗h0 = 0 with 0 < x
∗
iu < 1, or (b)
x∗hj =
Dhj
θhjΦh
−
N∑
i 6=h
αiux
∗
iu
αhj
∀ j > 0.
Remark. In the case (x∗h0 = 0) agent h is always active. Moreover, other agents
i 6= h may specialize on the same task or on different tasks). These cases are visualized
below:
X =

0 x∗11 x
∗
12 . . . x
∗
1m
x∗20 x
∗
21 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
x∗n0 x
∗
n1 0 0 0

vs. X =

0 x∗11 x
∗
12 . . . x
∗
1m
x∗20 0 x
∗
22 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
x∗n0 0 0 0 x
∗
nm

.
Corollary 4.0.0.4 (Non-contribution equilibria). Suppose that N,M > 1. Then,
model (4.7) has an equilibrium where one agent h is a complete generalist: 0 < x∗hj <
1, ∀ j, and at least one agent i 6= h is inactive (non-contributor): x∗i0 = 1.
X =

x∗10 x
∗
11 x
∗
12 . . . x
∗
1m
1 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . . . . .
...
1 0 . . . 0 0

.
Remark. The number of equilibria with non-contributors should increase with the
ratio of agents to tasks (N/M). If N < M , then the existence of one non-contributor
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necessitates the existence of a task generalist. This need not hold if N > M provided
there at least as many (contributing) agents as there are tasks.
Theorem 4.0.0.4 (Stability of specialization equilibria). Suppose that N ≥ M .
The set equilibria where every agent specializes on unique activity u = l(i) such that:
x∗iu = 1, x
∗
ij = 0, ∀ j 6= u is asymptotically stable under the following conditions.
(a). S
∗
u
θiu
> max
{
max
j 6=u
S∗j
θij
,Φi
}
for all i with u > 0 and
(b). Φi > max
j
S∗j
θij
for all i with u = 0.
Remark. The first condition requires that every active (contributing) agent values
their specialized task u more than any other task (and also resting). The second
condition requires that every inactive (non-contributing) agent values resting over
performing any task.
Biological implications
The preceding results for the null system (4.7) have some direct implications for
groups where agents have fixed constraints, and are driven solely by the demand for
work.
• Task organization: The system does not admit equilibria where all tasks are
performed by every agent (i.e., complete “work sharing”). In this sense, the
dynamics of task choice always leads to a equilibrium allocation containing a
mix of specialists, generalists and inactive (non-contributors). In the case where
agents specialize, the resulting division of labor in the group may be equal (or
unequal) depending on how each agent’s constraint compares to the demand of
the task they specialize in (i.e.,
Dij
θijΦi
). For instance, if
Dij
θijΦi
> 1 holds for all i, j,
then each agent contributes equally (and maximally) to work and the group can
be characterized as having high levels of activity.
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• Predictable specialists: Our analysis (and simulations) suggest that the sys-
tem has only equilibrium dynamics and provide no evidence of coexisting stable
states provided agents have ordered, well-defined preferences across tasks. This
means that an agent’s initial task weight (θij) and intrinsic demand (Φi) are
sufficient to infer their equilibrium probability of activity and task. The former
result is akin to prediction of fixed-response threshold models (e.g., Bonabeau
et al. (1998)) that individuals with lowest task thresholds become its specialists.
• Inactivity in low demand environments: The number of equilibria with
non-contributors increases as the ratio of agents to tasks increases. This result
is consistent with experimental observations of colony-founding P. barbatus ants
(discussed in chapter 3), which showed queens became less active on work in
larger groups (see Fig. 3.2).
To make the general results in the last section more concrete, I will now discuss some
specific examples for pair of agents facing one or two tasks.
Dynamics with a Single Task
One Agent, One Task
If M = N = 1, model (4.7) can be expressed as:
˙x11 = x11(1− x11)
(
S1
θ11
− Φ1
)
S˙1 = δ1 − α11x11S1.
(4.9)
A straightforward calculation reveals two possible equilibrium outcomes (see Table
4.2). The dynamics of (4.9) depends on the ratio: D11
θ11Φ1
, which relates the minimum
(expected) demand for work (i.e, when the agent is fully active on the task) with the
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intrinsic demands of the agent. When D11
θ11Φ1
> 1, the demand for work is perceivably
higher than resting (and vice-versa). In the former case, the agent commits fully to
work (x∗10 = 0) and the system converges to E(1). In the latter case, the agent works
in exact proportion to the ratio (x∗11 =
D11
θ11Φ1
) and the system converges to E(∗).
Equilibrium Component Existence Stability
E(1)
(
1, δ1
α1
)
Always D11 > θ11Φ1
E(∗)
(
D11
θ11Φ1
, θ11Φ1
)
D11 < θ11Φ1 Always
Table 4.2: Equilibria and Stability of Model (4.9). E(∗) and E(1) Are Linked via a Trans-
critical Bifurcation, Which Occurs as D11θ11Φ1 =
δ1
α11θ11Φ1
Passes Through One.
Two Agents, One Task
When M = 1, N = 2, model (4.7) can be expressed as:
˙x11 = x11(1− x11)
(
S1
θ11
− Φ1
)
˙x21 = x21(1− x21)
(
S1
θ21
− Φ2
)
S˙1 = δ1 − [α11x11 + α21x21]S1.
(4.10)
A lengthy but straightforward calculation provides the following results.
Theorem 4.0.0.5. [Global dynamics] Model (4.10) may have up to seven (4 + 3)
equilibria E(x∗11,x∗21) depending on the values of D11 = δ1α11 and D21 = δ1α21 . Sufficient
conditions for the existence and local stability are summarized in Table 4.3. Moreover,
the dynamics of (4.10) can be classified into two categories.
Remarks
Our analysis of model (4.10) reveals up to seven equilibrium possibilities (see Table
2.2). Here, we limit our discussion to E(0,1), E(0,∗), E(∇,1) and E(1,1). Although
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Equilibrium Component Existence Condition Stability
E(0,1)
(
0, 1, δ1
α21
)
Always θ21Φ2 < D21 < θ11Φ1
E(0,∗)
(
0, D21
θ21Φ2
, θ21Φ2
)
D21
θ21Φ2
< 1 θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
> 1
E(∇,1)
(
D11
θ11Φ1
− α21
α11
, 1, θ11Φ1
)
α21 <
δ1
θ11Φ1
<
α11 + α21
θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
> 1
E(1,1)
(
1, 1, δ1
α11+α21
)
Always δ1
α11+α21
> max{θ11Φ1, θ21Φ2}
Table 4.3: Existence and Stability of Equilibria E(x∗11,x∗21) in Model (4.10). Note: E(1,0),
E(∗,0), and E(1,∇) Can Also Exist Under Similar but Reflective Set of Conditions.
Other Quantities: D11 = δ1α11 , D21 = δ1α21
several of these equilibria can coexist, no pair can be simultaneously asymptotically
stable. Simulations of (4.10) under the conditions given in Table ?? suggest these
states are globally attracting if both agents initially have a non-zero probability of
task performance (xi1(0) > 0, i = 1, 2).
According to Theorem 4.0.0.5, the stability of these states depends on two impor-
tant quantities. The first quantity D21 = δ1/α21 measures the (minimum) equilibrium
demand for the task if agent 2 is fully active and works at maximum rate α21 (see
Definition 4.0.0.3). The second quantity describes the relative availability of agent
2 for work compared to agent 1 (R2/1 = θ11Φ1θ21Φ2 ) (see Definition 4.0.0.4). It is given by
the ratio of each agents’ cost of activity (Φi) weighted by their perceived costs of
performing the task (θi1).
1. One agent is inactive: Suppose that R2/1 > 1. Under this condition, agent 2
is more likely to work exclusively on the task since agent 1 perceives a greater
cost of being active. However, her work rate on the task will depend on how
its current demand compares to her perceived costs of performing it. If D21 >
θ21Φ2, then the system converges to E(0,1) where agent 2 performs the task with
unit probability (i.e., x∗21 = 1) works at her maximum rate α21. Conversely, if
D21 < θ21Φ2, then the system converges to E(0,∗) where she performs the task
at a rate proportional to its demand (i.e., x∗21 =
D21
θ21Φ2
). These results have a
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clear biological interpretation: individuals should condition their behavior on
the level work needed in the group and adjust their activity level to match its
perceived costs.
2. One agent is partially active: Again, suppose thatR2/1 > 1. E(∇,1) necessar-
ily exists if agents vary in their work rate (i.e., α21
α11
6= 1). However, its stability
only depend on agent 2 being more available than agent 1 (i.e., R2/1 > 1 ).
This result is interesting because there is no requirement for the most efficient
agent to work maximally on the task at equilibrium. For instance, suppose that
agent 2 has significantly lower work rate than agent 1 (α21
α11
<< 1). Then E(∇,1)
is a likely attractor whenever the demand for work (even with agent 2 work-
ing at her maximum rate) is sufficiently large to spur agent 1 out of inactivity
(D21 > θ11Φ1). Under this condition, agent 1 works at a rate proportional to the
difference between D11
θ11Φ1
and agent 2’s work rate on the task. Biologically, this
outcome might reflects a cooperative scenario where one individual specializes
on a task, while the other tailors its activity level to perform any leftover work
the specialist is unable to handle.
3. Both agents fully active: E(1,1) always exist, but becomes a likely attractor
whenever task demand is sufficiently larger than both agents intrinsic costs of
activity (i.e., δ1
α11+α21
> max{θ11Φ1, θ21Φ2}).
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Figure 4.2: Bifurcations of System (4.10) under the Assumption That Agent 1 Has
Greater Inertia than Agent 2 (θ11φ1 > θ21φ2). Increasing the Ratio of Task Needs
and Work Rate δ1/α21 Can Cause an Exchange of Stability between Equilibria. For
Instance, E(∇,1) and E(1,1) at δ1 = (α11 + α21)θ11φ1.
Dynamics with Multiple Tasks
One Agent, Two Tasks
If M = 2, N = 1 model (4.7) can be expressed as:
˙x11 = x11
[
(1− x11)
(
S1
θ11
− Φ1
)
− x12
(
S2
θ12
− Φ1
)]
˙x12 = x12
[
(1− x12)
(
S2
θ12
− Φ1
)
− x11
(
S1
θ11
− Φ1
)]
S˙1 = δ1 − α1x11S1
S˙2 = δ2 − α1x12S2.
(4.11)
A straightforward calculation here also reveals two possible equilibrium outcomes (see
Table 4.4).
The equilibrium dynamics of model (4.11) depends on the demand ratio for both
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Equilibrium Component Existence Stability
E
(4)
(4)
(
x∗11, 1− x∗11, δ1α11x∗11 ,
δ2
α12(1−x∗11)
)
Always D11
θ11Φ1
+ D12
θ12Φ1
> 1
E
(∗)
(∗)
(
D11
θ11Φ1
, D12
θ12Φ1
, θ11Φ1, θ12Φ1
)
D11
θ11Φ1
+ D12
θ12Φ1
< 1 Stable if it exists
Table 4.4: Existence and Stability of Equilibria in (4.11). The Equilibrium Pair
E
(x∗11)
(x∗12)
Are Linked Through a Transcritical Bifurcation at η = D11
θ11Φ1
+ D12
θ12Φ1
= 1, where
D11 = δ1α11 , D12 = δ2α12 . Other Quantities: x∗11 = δ1α12θ12δ1α12θ12+δ2α11θ11 and x∗12 = 1 − x∗11 =
δ2α11θ11
δ1α12θ12+δ2α11θ11
.
tasks: η = D11
θ11Φ1
+ D12
θ12Φ1
. When η > 1, the need for work (i.e., in either task) is
perceivably greater than the agent’s intrinsic demand. Under this condition, the
agent will commit fully to work (x∗10 = 0) and balance her performance of each task
in proportion its maximum (weighted) demand. Specifically, each task is weighted
by the her preference for (and work rate in) the alternate task (x∗11 ∝ δ1α12θ12 and
x∗12 ∝ δ2α11θ11) (see Fig. 4.3). On the other hand, when η < 1, she performs each
task with probabilities x∗11 =
D11
θ11Φ1
and x∗12 =
D12
θ12Φ1
) and rests for the remaining time.
Finally, simulations suggest that changes in the agent’s intrinsic demands (or activity
costs), can have important effects on the transient dynamics of model (4.11). In
particular, increasing Φ1 can amplify the variability of workload in the system if the
she has unequal work rate across tasks (Fig. 4.4).
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Figure 4.3: Bifurcations of System (4.11) as a Function of δ1/δ2 Assuming That
the Agent Has Unequal Work Rates Across Tasks (α11 = .25 , α12 = 1). Dashed
Vertical Line Denotes the Threshold Level of Demand η = δ1
α11θ11φ1
+ δ2
α12θ12φ1
= 1
Where Change in Dynamics Occur. As Demand Increases, the Probability That
Performing of Her Least Efficient Task 1 Increases. In Contrast, Performance of Her
More Efficient Task 2 Remains Constant below the Threshold η. Other Parameters:
φ1 = 3, δ2 = θ11 = θ12 = 1
Two agents, Two Tasks
When M = N = 2, model (4.7) is a 6D system
x˙ij = xij
[(
Sj
θij
− Φi
)
−
2∑
k=1
xik
(
Sk
θik
− Φi
)]
i = 1, 2
S˙j = δj −
2∑
i
αijxijSj j = 1, 2.
(4.12)
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Figure 4.4: Effects of Φ1 on the Dynamics of System (4.11) Assuming That the
Agent Is More Efficient in Task 2 than Task 1 (α11 = .25 , α12 = 1). Increasing Φ1,
Which Models the Agent’s Intrinsic Cost of Activity Amplifies the Variability of Task
Stimuli. Other Parameters: δ1 = 0.25, δ2 = θ11 = θ12 = 1.
This system has up to 24 (4+8+12) steady states classified into the following cat-
egories: (i) One agent is inactive, (ii) Both agents specialize, and (iii) specialist and
generalist. Due to the inherent symmetry of (4.12), each equilibrium state can be
paired with at least one other that is reflectively similar in structure (e.g. E
(1,0)
(0,1) vs.
E
(0,1)
(1,0)). Thus, it is possible to obtain a general classification of equilibria in system
(4.12) by focusing on a subset of states. Here, we focus our discussion on equilibria
where agent 1 abstains from work or specializes on a task. A lengthy but straightfor-
ward calculation provides the following results.
Theorem 4.0.0.6. [Existence & stability of specialization equilibria] Model (4.12)
can have up to 12 equilibrium states E
(x∗11,x
∗
12)
(x∗21,x
∗
22)
where either one agent is inactive (4),
or both agents specialize (8). Here, we focus on six states where agent 1 is either
inactive or specializes on task 1. Table 4.5 summarizes conditions under which these
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equilibria are asymptotically stable.
Equilibrium Component Existence Stability
E
(0,0)
(4,4)
(
0, 0, x∗21, 1− x∗21, D21x∗21 ,
D22
1−x∗21
)
Always 1 <
D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
< min
{
θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
, θ12Φ1
θ22Φ2
}
E
(0,0)
(∗,∗)
(
0, 0, D21
θ21Φ2
, D22
θ22Φ2
, θ21Φ2, θ22Φ2
)
D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
< 1 min
{
θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
, θ12Φ1
θ22Φ2
}
> 1
E
(∗,0)
(0,∗)
(
D11
θ11Φ1
, 0, 0, D22
θ22Φ2
, θ11Φ1, θ22Φ2
)
D11
θ11Φ1
< 1, D22
θ22Φ2
< 1
θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
< 1, θ12Φ1
θ22Φ2
> 1
E
(∗,0)
(0,1)
(
D11
θ11Φ1
, 0, 0, 1, θ11Φ1,D22
)
D11
θ11Φ1
< 1 max
{
θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
, 1
}
< D22
θ22Φ2
< θ12Φ1
θ22Φ2
E
(1,0)
(0,∗)
(
1, 0, 0, D22
θ22Φ2
,D11, θ22Φ2
)
D22
θ22Φ2
< 1 max
{
θ22Φ2
θ12Φ1
, 1
}
< D11
θ11Φ1
< θ21Φ2
θ11Φ1
E
(1,0)
(0,1)
(1, 0, 0, 1,D11,D22) Always
D11
θ11Φ1
> max
{
D22
θ12Φ1
, 1
}
,
D22
θ22Φ2
> max
{
D11
θ21Φ2
, 1
}
Table 4.5: Existence and Local Asymptotic Stability (L.A.S) of Model (4.12). Equi-
libria E
(x∗11,x
∗
12)
(x∗21,x
∗
22)
Denote Where (i) One Agent Is Inactive, or (ii) Both Agents Are
Complete Specialists. Other Parameters: D11 = δ1α11 , D12 = δ2α12 , D21 = δ1α21 , D22 = δ2α22 .
Remarks
1. One agent is inactive: Our analysis of model (4.12) reveals at least two
equilibria where agent 1 is inactive: E
(0,0)
(4,4) and E
(0,0)
(∗,∗) . A necessary condition on
these states is that agent 2 is more available than agent 1 to work on either task:
R2/1 = Φ1Φ2 ·min{ θ11θ21 , θ12θ22} > 1. E
(0,0)
(4,4) is the likely attractor whenever the demand
for work in both tasks exceeds agent 2’s intrinsic costs: η = D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
>
1. Otherwise, E
(0,0)
(∗,∗) is the likely attractor. The exchange of stability at the
threshold level η = 1 recapitulates the dynamics of model (4.11) with one agent
and two tasks (see Table 4.4).
2. Both agents are specialists: Model (4.12) also has at least four equilibria
where both agents specialize on a unique task (Table 4.5). Their stability nec-
essarily requires that each agent i ascribes greater value to the task they are
specialized on than available alternatives. This valuation obviously depends on
how both agents’ intrinsic demand relate with external needs of their preferred
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task. For instance, suppose that agent 1 has lower inertia (or greater prefer-
ence) for the first task compared to agent 2 ( θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
< 1) and vice-versa for the
second task (i.e., θ22Φ2
θ12Φ1
< 1). Under these hypotheses, E
(0,1)
(1,0) becomes an attrac-
tor whenever the demand both tasks exceeds each agent’s intrinsic costs: (i.e.,
D11
θ11Φ1
> 1, D22
θ22Φ2
> 1). Otherwise, E
(0,∗)
(∗,0) is the likely attractor (see Table 4.5).
Theorem 4.0.0.7 (Existence of specialist - generalist equilibria). Model (4.12)
can also have up to 12 equilibrium states E
(x∗11,x
∗
12)
(x∗21,x
∗
22)
where one agent is a complete
specialist while the other is a generalist. Here, we focus on three states where agent
1 specializes on task 1. Table 4.6-4.7 summarizes minimum set of conditions under
which these equilibria might exist and be asymptotically stable.
Equilibrium Component Existence
E
(∇,0)
(4,4)
(
D11
θ11Φ1
− α21x∗21
α11
, 0, x∗21, 1− x∗21, θ11Φ1, θ22θ11Φ1θ21
) θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
< D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
<
(
α11+α21
α21
)
· θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
,
D22
θ22Φ2
< θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
E
(1,0)
(∇,∗)
(
1, 0, D21
θ21Φ2
− α11
α21
, D22
θ22Φ2
, θ21Φ2, θ22Φ2
)
α11
α21
< D21
θ21Φ2
< α11+α21
α21
, D22
θ22Φ2
< 1
E
(1,0)
(4,4)
(
1, 0, 1− x∗22, x∗22, D22x∗22 ·
θ21
θ22
, D22
x∗22
)
D11
D22 >
θ21
θ22
Table 4.6: Existence and Local Asymptotic Stability (L.A.S) of Model (4.12). Equi-
libria E
(x∗11,x
∗
12)
(x∗21,x
∗
22)
Denote Where Agent 1 Completely Specializes on Task 1 and Agent
2 Is a Generalist. Stability Conditions Are Necessary, but May Not Be Sufficient
Otherwise. Other Parameters: D11 = δ1α11 , D12 = δ2α12 , D21 = δ1α21 , D22 = δ2α22 .
Equilibrium Stability (necessary)
E
(∇,0)
(4,4) θ11Φ1θ21Φ2 > 1,
θ11
θ12
< θ21
θ22
E
(1,0)
(∇,∗)
θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
< 1, θ11
θ12
< θ21
θ22
, D11D22 <
θ21
θ22
E
(1,0)
(4,4)
D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
>
(
α11+α21
α21
)
·max
{
1, θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
}
,
θ11
θ12
< θ21
θ22
Table 4.7: Stability of Equilibria E
(x∗11,x
∗
12)
(x∗21,x
∗
22)
in Model (4.12) Where Agent 1 Completely
Specializes on Task 1 and Agent 2 Is a Generalist. The Conditions given Are Neces-
sary, but May Not Be Sufficient. Other Parameters: D11 = δ1α11 , D12 = δ2α12 , D21 = δ1α21 ,
D22 = δ2α22 .
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Φ1 > Φ2
↑ E(∆ ,∆)
(1,0)
↑  E(∆ ,∆)
(∇ ,0)
↑ E(∆ ,∆)
(0,0)
E(∗,∗)
(0,0)
Figure 4.5: Bifurcations of System (4.12) As a Function of δ1/δ2. Here, Agents Have
Dissimilar Task Preferences (θ11 = θ22 = .5, θ12 = θ21 = 1, but Are More Efficient
in Their Preferred Task (α11 = 1.5, α22 = 3, α12 = α21 = 1). Equilibrium points
E
(x∗11,x
∗
12)
(x∗21,x
∗
22)
Are Denoted as Stable Attractors (Blue) or Unstable Saddles (Green). The
Dynamics of (4.12) Ultimately Converges to Specialist + Generalist EquilibriaE
(1,0)
(∆,∆)
When Demand Is Sufficiently High.
Remarks
Our analysis of model (4.12) reveals 12 equilibria where one agent specializes on
a unique task while the other works on both tasks. Theorem 4.0.0.7 focuses on
three states in which agent 1 specializes on the first task: E
(1,0)
(4,4) , E
(∇,0)
(4,4) , E
(1,0)
(∇,∗).
Intuitively, these equilibria might necessarily occur if agent 1 has a greater preference
for the first task when available compared to agent 2 and vice-versa ( θ11
θ12
< θ21
θ22
).
However, there are several other factors in play including agents’ relative availability
to work (Φ1/Φ2) as well as their relative efficiency on each task (α11/α21). Here, we
discuss the intuition behind analytical conditions described in Theorem 4.0.0.7 and
explore their veracity via simulations.
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Figure 4.6: Effects of Relative Efficiency on the Outcomes of System (4.12). Here,
Agents Have Distinct Task Preferences (θ11 = θ22 = .5, θ12 = θ21 = 1) and Equal
Availability (φ1 = φ2 = 1). As Agent 1 Becomes Less Efficient (i.e., α11/α21 → 0), the
Overall Workload Increases Forcing Agent 2 to Perform Both Tasks. However, Spe-
cialization is More Likely When Both Agents Are More Efficient on Their Preferred
Task (α11/α21 > α12/α22). Other Parameters: α21 = α12 = 1, α22 = 1.5.
1. Agent 1 is fully active: At E
(1,0)
(4,4), both agents have a maximum probability
of being active on a task. However, agent 1 works exclusively on the first. E
(1,0)
(4,4)
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necessarily exists if the weighted value to agent 2 of performing the first task
(with agent 1 fully specialized on it) is greater than that of the second task: (
D11
θ21
> D22
θ22
). This might occur if agent 1 tends to be less available than agent 2
(Φ1 > Φ2) but has greater preference for the first task when available compared
to agent 2 (i.e., θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
< 1).
ã Suppose that θ11
θ12
< θ21
θ22
. Under this hypothesis, agent 2 has a greater pref-
erence for the second task compared to agent 1 (regardless of availability).
In this scenario, E
(1,0)
(4,4) likely becomes stable whenever the workload in
both tasks is sufficiently large that it exceeds agent 2’s intrinsic costs of
performing them (i.e., η = D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
> 1). This result is supported by
numerical analysis (Fig. 4.5).
2. Agent 1 is partially active: At E
(∇,0)
(4,4) agent 2 has maximum probability of
being active on either task. In contrast, agent 1 works partially, but exclusively
on the first task. E
(∇,0)
(4,4), necessarily exists if the expected workload of the
second task with agent 2 specializing on it is less that of task 1 with agent 1
working partially on it (i.e., D22
θ22Φ2
< θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
). This might occur if agent 1 tends
to be less available compared to agent 2 (i.e., Φ1 > Φ2).
ã Suppose that θ11
θ12
< θ21
θ22
. Under this hypothesis, agent 1 has a greater
preference for the first task than the second compared to agent 2. In this
scenario, E
(∇,0)
(4,4) likely becomes stable whenever the workload in both tasks
is sufficiently large that it exceeds agent 2’s intrinsic costs of performing
them (i.e., η = D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
> 1). This result is supported by a numerical
analysis (Fig. 4.5).
3. Agent 2 is partially active: At E
(1,0)
(∇,∗), agent 1 has maximum probability
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being active on the first task. In contrast, agent 2 works partially on both
tasks.E
(1,0)
(∇,∗) necessarily exists if agents vary in their work rate on the first task
(i.e., α21
α11
6= 1) and whenever its demand exceeds its perceived cost of perfor-
mance to agent 2: D21
θ21Φ2
> α11
α21
⇔ D11 > θ21Φ2. This might occur if agent 2 has
a significantly lower work rate on the task than agent 1 (α21 < α11) or whenever
δ1 is sufficiently large relative to
α11
α21
.
ã Suppose that θ11
θ12
< θ21
θ22
. Also, suppose that agent 1 is relatively for efficient
on the first task compared to agent 2 (i.e.,α11 > α21) but has lesser pref-
erence for it when available (i.e., θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
< 1). In this scenario, E
(1,0)
(∇,∗) might
become stable when there roughly equal need for both tasks (δ1/δ2 ≈ 1).
However, further increases in δ1 might move the system towards E
(1,0)
(4,4)
(see Fig 4.6).
Degenerate Cases
So far, I have focused my discussion of model (4.12) under the assumption that
agents have well-defined and ordered preferences across tasks (i.e., θ11
θ12
6= θ21
θ22
). What
happens if the converse is true? As indicated in the following theorem, (4.12) may a
number of condition-dependent interior equilibria.
Theorem 4.0.0.8 (Existence of interior equilibria). Suppose that θ11
θ12
= θ21
θ22
and
that xij = ρ ∈ (0, 1) is fixed some agent i and task j. Under these conditions, model
(4.12) may have up to 3 equilibrium states E
(x∗11,x
∗
12)
(x∗21,x
∗
22)
where both agents perform each
task with non-zero probability. Table 4.8 summarizes conditions under which interior
equilibria exist for a generic case where agent 1 is initially fixed on task 2 (x12(0) = ρ).
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Equilibrium Component Existence
E
(∇,•)
(4,4)
(
D11
θ11Φ1
− (1− x∗22) · α21α11 , x∗12, 1− x∗22, D22θ12Φ1 − α12α22 · x∗12, θ11Φ1, θ12Φ1
) 0 < D21
θ11Φ1
+ D22
θ12Φ1
− (1 + α12
α22
x∗12) < 1
0 < D22
θ12Φ1
− α12
α22
x∗12 < 1
E
(•,•)
(∇,∇)
(
1− x∗12, x∗12, D21θ11Φ2 − (1− x∗12) · α11α21 , D22θ12Φ2 − α12α22 · x∗12, θ11Φ2, θ12Φ2
) 0 < D21
θ11Φ2
− (1− x∗12)α11α21 < 1
0 < D22
θ12Φ2
− α12
α22
x∗12 < 1
E
(•,•)
(4,4)
(
1− x∗12, x∗12, 1− x22, x∗22, S∗1 , S∗1 · θ12θ11
) θ12
θ11
−D11D22
θ12
θ11
+
D11
D12
< x∗12 <
1+
α21
α11
1+
D11θ12
D12θ11
Table 4.8: Existence of Interior Equilibria in (4.12) Assuming That Agents Have
Similar Preferences Across Tasks (i.e., θ11
θ12
= θ21
θ22
). Existence Conditions Are Defined
Relative to Focal Agent’s Initial Probability on Either Task (i.e., xij(0) = ρ, for
some i, j). Here, We Suppose x12(0) = ρ. Other Parameters: D11 = δ1α11 , D12 = δ2α12 ,
D21 = δ1α21 , D22 = δ2α22 .
Remarks
Model (4.12) can have up to three interior equilibria if agents 1 and 2 have similar
preferences across both tasks (i.e., θ11
θ12
= θ21
θ22
). A necessary condition for their existence
is that one agent has a fixed probability of performing either task (i.e., xij = ρ, for
some i, j). Here, we explore the stability these states relative to agent 1’s initial
probability of performing task 2 (i.e., x12(0) = ρ). As discussed below, the dynamics
of (4.12) may be subject to initial conditions when these equilibria exist (cf. figure
4.7-4.8.).
ã At E
(∇,•)
(4,4), agent 2 has a maximum probability of being active on either task.
In contrast, agent 1 has a possibility of being inactive. An opposite pattern
develops at E
(•,•)
(∇,∇); specifically agent 1 has a higher probability of activity than
agent 2. Finally at E
(•,•)
(4,4) both agents have maximum probability of being
active.
ã E
(∇,•)
(4,4) and E
(•,•)
(∇,∇) can co-exist in a context where agent 1 is less efficient at
work compared to agent 2 (α11/α21 < 1, α12/α22 < 1) if demand for both tasks
exceeds agent 2’s perceived costs (i.e, D21 > θ11Φ1 ,D22 > θ12Φ1). However,
simulations suggest that they cannot be simultaneously stable.
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ã E
(•,•)
(4,4) is likely to exists when the workload for both tasks exceeds both agents
intrinsic costs of activity (e.g. if δ1/δ2 is sufficiently high). Moreover, simula-
tions it can be simultaneously stable with one (or more) boundary equilibria (see
Fig ??). One reason for this is the dynamics of (4.12) has the effect of creating
“emergent” preferences at equilibrium if agents vary in their work rates across
tasks. For instance, consider a scenario where agent 1 has greater efficiency on
the second task than agent 2 (and vice-versa for the first task), but agent 1 also
has initially high probability on least efficient task 1 (x11(0) >> x12(0)). Under
this condition, E
(•,•)
(4,4) can be stable along with a relatively less efficient equilib-
rium E
(1,0)
(0,1) in a region where δ1 > δ2 (Fig 4.7). On the other hand, consider a
scenario where agent 1 has is relatively inefficient on the second task compared
to agent 2 (α12
α22
< 1), and is also has greater activity costs (Φ1 > Φ2). Under this
condition, the dynamics of (4.12) may converge to one of two attractors (Fig
4.7). If agent 1 has an initially low probability of activity (x11(0)+x12(0) << 1),
and agent 2 has an equal likelihood of working on both tasks initially, the system
coverages to a boundary state where agent 1 tends to specializes on her more
efficient task 1 (black and blue lines, Fig 4.8). Conversely, if agent 2 initially
has a high probability of performing task 1 (on which she is least efficient in),
the system converges to an interior state where agent 1 takes on performance of
task 2 (on which she is least efficient in). This latter dynamic results in an inef-
ficient group-level outcome where the overall workload in the system is greater
with each agents are maximally active than with agent 1 partially active. (c.f.
red lines, Fig 4.8).
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(b) α11 = 1, α22 = 3, α12 = α21 = 0.25
Figure 4.7: Bifurcations of System (4.12) As a Function of δ1/δ2. Here, Agents Have
Similar Preferences Across Tasks ( θ11
θ12
= θ21
θ22
), but Have Different Relative Efficiencies
(α11/α21 vs. α12/α22). Interior Equilibria E
(x∗11,x
∗
12)
(x∗21,x
∗
22)
Are Denoted as Stable Attractors
(Blue) or Unstable (Orange) Whenever They Exist. Other Parameters: (a) θ11 =
θ21 = 0.95, θ12 = θ22 = 1, Φ1 = Φ2 = 1, ρ = 0.15, (b) θ11 = θ21 = 0.8, θ12 = θ22 = 1.7,
Φ1 = 3Φ2 = 3, ρ = 0.05.
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Figure 4.8: Bi-stability of (4.12) in the Parameter Space Shown in Figure 4.7 b.
We assume Agent 1 Has Greater Activity Costs than Agent 2 (Φ1 > Φ2), and that
α11 = 1, α22 = 3, α12 = α21 = 0.25. (left) Plots Showing the Trajectory of Agents’
Behavior Probability Space Starting from Different Initial Conditions xij(0) (open
circles). (right) Resulting Effects on the Dynamics of Task Stimuli. The System
Converges to the Interior Equilibrium With Greater Workload if Both Agents Have
Higher Initial Probabilities on Their Least Efficient Task, and Agent 1 is Initially
More Likely Be Inactive
Discussion
Social dynamics (i.e., emergent nonlinear effects of interactions on individuals)
can play a critical role in the task organization of animal groups (Fewell et al., 2009).
Existing models generally assume that costs have a nominal influence on how individ-
ual task choice, and thus have limited applicability to study groups where individuals
must weigh the utility of their actions. Here, we propose a general mathematical
model that is applicable in a border set of contexts. Our models can be used to study
how changes in task organization might emerge as a consequence of how individuals
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dynamically weigh the costs (and benefits) of working in a group setting. We obtain
a number general theoretical results including threshold conditions under which indi-
viduals are likely to become specialize on task role, contribute proportionally to both
tasks, or abstain from work altogether in the group.
1. In groups where individuals have well-defined and ordered preferences across
different tasks, our models predict an equilibrium organization with at least
one individual who tends to perform all tasks and individuals who tend to
specialize on a task (c.f. Theorem 4.0.0.3 and Corollary 4.0.0.2-4.0.0.4).
2. However, in groups where individuals have similar preferences across all tasks,
the equilibrium organization of work may be sensitive to initial conditions (cf.
Theorem 4.0.0.8, Fig 4.7). This might specifically relate to differences among
individuals in their initial propensity to perform different tasks (as well as their
work rates across different tasks; Fig 4.8).
Our analytical results are inline with probabilistic self-organizational models of
task organization (Bonabeau et al., 1996, 1998; Page and Mitchell, 1998; Theraulaz
et al., 1998). In their basic form, these models posit that individuals have an intrin-
sic “response-threshold” above which they have an increased likelihood of performing
different tasks in a social group. Assuming there is sufficient within-group variation in
the initial distribution of thresholds, RT models predicts that individuals with lower
thresholds for a specific task are more likely to become its specialists (Fewell et al.,
2009). Our results here provides a richer description of components that might consti-
tute individual’s “response-threshold” . Moreover, by separating intrinsic and extrin-
sic factors that might drive variation in task propensities within a social group, our
modeling approach provide a much more parsimonious and generalizable framework
for studying emergent mechanisms of task organization across biological contexts.
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Self-organization might underpin the emergence of division of labor in most animal
groups. However, not much is known about their consequences for productivity. Al-
though division of labor might generate efficiencies that should theoretically increase
task output at individual and/or group level (Chittka and Muller, 2009), these ben-
efits may not automatically follow in an emergence context (Dornhaus et al., 2009).
The costs and benefits of different mechanisms of work organization may depend
on the types of tasks groups face and the environments they inhabit (Charbonneau
and Dornhaus, 2015). Our results contribute a further insights into this question.
Specifically, we show that specialization can be costly to group performance in the
absence of a mechanism to coordinate individual’s initial performance of a task with
its potential efficiency on it (Fig 4.7).
Concluding remarks
We emphasize the our multi-agent systems approach, provides a more general
dynamical theory for understanding the emergence and consequences of task organi-
zation in animal groups. Our analysis provide useful set of thresholds that describes
how individuals’ behavior on different tasks relate with their perceived costs and
efficiency of performance (i.e., Φi, θij, αij). Biologically, these relationships allow
us to connect individuals (and their behavioral dynamics) with group-level patterns
of organization more concretely compared to previous models (Pacala et al., 1996;
Bonabeau et al., 1998; Theraulaz et al., 1998). Ultimately, our results contributes
theoretical understanding of social dynamics and task organization in animal groups
by showing how an individual’s behavior not only depends intrinsic factors, but also
emerges out of a collective experience of a shared environment.
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Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.0.0.1
Proof. From (4.5), x˙ij = 0 implies either (i) xij = 0, or (ii) Vij = V¯i for all i and
j. Therefore, xij = 0 is invariant. Now, suppose that we restrict initial conditions:
xij(0) > 0,
M∑
j=0
xij(0) = 1 xij = 1. Since xij(0) = 1 −
M∑
k 6=j
xik(0), and xij = 0 is
invariant, then xij = 1 =⇒ xik = 0 =⇒ x˙ik = 0, ∀ k 6= j. Moreover, this indicates
that Vij ≡ V¯i = Sjθij =⇒ x˙ij = 0, ∀ i, j. Therefore, xij = 1 is also invariant. Finally,
it easy to check from (4.5)
M∑
j=0
x˙ij = 0 ∀ i. This indicates that SMi is invariant: any
trajectory starting in SMi will remain confined for all time.
Proof of Theorem 4.0.0.3
Proof. First, we note the following about model (2.1): (a) S˙j = 0 =⇒ S∗j =
δj∑
i
αijx∗ij
< ∞ ⇐⇒ ∑
i
x∗ij > 0 ∀ j, (b) x˙ij = 0 implies either: x∗ij = 0, x∗ij = 1, or
Vij = V¯i ⇔ S
∗
j
θij
−Φi =
M∑
k=1
xik
(
S∗k
θik
− Φi
)
, and (c) x∗ij = 1⇔ x∗ik = 0 ∀ k 6= j. Now, let
Z(i) denote the number of zeros in the ith row of X. The objective is to show that:
(a) min
0≤x∗ij≤1
N∑
i
Z(i) = 1 + (N − 1)(M − 1), and (b) max
0≤x∗ij≤1
N∑
i
Z(i) = NM under the
constraint:
N∑
i
x∗ij > 0, ∀ j > 0. Note that if xij = 1, then Z(i) = M . Conversely, if
0 ≤ x∗ij < 1, then 1 ≤ Z(i) ≤M .
1. Maximum zeros: The maximum possible number of zeros in each row of X
occurs when x∗ij = 1 for some j. If every agent i performs a unique task u such
that: x∗iu = 1, x
∗
ij = 0 ∀ j 6= u, then, we have
N∑
i
x∗ij > 0, ∀ j > 0. Clearly,
this equilibrium only exists if N ≥ M . Nonetheless, we can infer under this
condition that Z(1) = Z(2) = ... = Z(N) = M and, max
0≤x∗ij≤1
N∑
i
Z(i) = NM .
2. Minimum zeros: Since Z(i)|xij 6=1 ≤ Z(i)|xij=1, the minimum possible number
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of zeros in each row of X should occur for equlibria that satisfy x∗ij 6= 1, and
x∗ij > 0, ∀ j. Note that the equilibrium constraint:
N∑
i
x∗ij > 0, ∀ j > 0 always
holds under this condition. Suppose there exists an agent h who satisfies: x∗hj >
0, ∀ j. Then, Vhj = V¯h =⇒ S
∗
j
θhj
= Φh, ∀ j > 0. However, since θhjΦh 6= θijΦi
for all other agents i 6= h, then x∗ij = 0, ∀ i 6= h. Under the preceding condition,
Z(h) = 0, Z(i) = M , and
N∑
i
Z(i) = (N − 1)M . Now, suppose x∗h0 = 0 and
x∗hj > 0, ∀ j > 0. Then, Vhj = V¯h =⇒
S∗j
θhj
=
S∗k
θhk
, ∀ k 6= j. Likewise, suppose
there exist an agent i 6= h satisfies: Vij = V¯i =⇒ S
∗
j
θij
=
S∗k
θik
, ∀ k 6= j. However,
since
θij
θik
6= θhj
θhk
, then either x∗ij = 0, or x
∗
ik = 0. From this, we can deduce that if
one agent h satisfies: 0 < x∗hj < 1, then every other agent i must satisfy either
x∗ij = 0 or
S∗j
θij
= Φi. Moreover, if there exists a i 6= h such that: S
∗
j
θij
= Φi, then it
follows that x∗ij = 0 ∀ i 6= g. This indicates that (a) any task column j > 0 of X
has at most two non-zero entries, and (b) any row of X has at most M non-zero
entries. Nonetheless, we can infer under the preceding condition that Z(h) = 1,
Z(i) = M − 1, ∀ i 6= h, and
N∑
i
Z(i) = 1 + (N − 1)(M − 1). To establish that
this is the minimum, it suffices to note that 1 + (N − 1)(M − 1) ≤ (N − 1)M
for N > 1.
Proof of Corollary 4.0.0.2
Proof. From (2.1), S˙j = 0 ⇔ S∗j = δj∑
i
αijx∗ij
. Suppose that N < M . Clearly, if every
agent perfoms a unique task u: x∗iu ≤ 1, x∗ij = 0, ∀ j 6= u, then there is at least one
j for which
∑
i
x∗ij = 0 ⇐⇒ S∗j =∞. Hence, such a point cannot be an equilibrium.
Now suppose that N = M . According to lemma 4.0.0.1 xij = 1 is invariant. Hence,
if every task is performed (i.e., u’s are distinct) then x∗iu + x
∗
i0 = 1 is always an
equilibrium of (2.1). Alternatively, if x∗iu 6= 1, then from (2.1) Viu = V¯i ⇔ S∗u =
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δu
αiux∗iu
= θiuΦi ⇔ x∗iu = DiuθiuΦi . Hence, x∗iu = DiuθiuΦi < 1, x∗ij = 0, ∀ j 6= u is also an
equilibrium if u’s are distinct. Finally, if N > M , u’s cannot be distinct. Thus, we
require
∑
i
x∗ij > 0, ∀ j > 0.
Proof of Corollary 4.0.0.4
Proof. Since 0 < x∗hj < 1, ∀ j, we can infer that
∑
i
x∗ij > 0 ⇐⇒ S∗j < ∞, ∀ j > 0.
Moreover, from (2.1), x˙hj = 0 =⇒ Vhj = V¯h ⇔ S
∗
j
θhj
− Φh =
M∑
k=1
xhk
(
S∗k
θhk
− Φh
)
.
1. First, suppose that x∗hj > 0, ∀ j > 0. Then, Vhj = V¯h =⇒
S∗j
θhj
=
S∗k
θhk
⇔
δj
αhjx∗hj +
N∑
i 6=h
αijx∗ij
=
δkθhj
θhk
(
αhkx∗hk +
N∑
i 6=h
αikx∗ik
) , ∀ k 6= j. (4.13)
At equilibrium, this equation must also hold for other agents i 6= h. However,
since
θij
θik
6= θhj
θhk
, k 6= j, there are no solutions to (4.13) for which 0 < x∗hj < 1
and 0 < x∗ij < 1 hold for all i, j. Thus, we make the following assumption.
(A1) Each agent i 6= h, specializes on an activity u such that 0 < x∗iu < 1, and
x∗ij = 0, ∀ j 6= u. Under this condition, there is at least one j for which x∗hj > 0,
and x∗ij = 0 for all i 6= h. Thus, (4.13) can be expressed alternatively in terms
of j:
δj
αhjθhjx∗hj
=
δk
θhk(αhkx∗hk + αiux
∗
iu)
, ∀ k 6= j (4.14)
where u = k. A necessary condition for solution is that the number of equations
must be equal to number of variables. Thus, we make an additional assumption.
(A2) x∗h0 = 0 ⇔ x∗hj = 1 −
M∑
k 6=j
xhk. Notice that if x
∗
ik = 0, or x
∗
ik = 1 ∀ i, then
(4.14) is an M−1 dimensional system for agent h that can be solved for a unique
solution:
M∑
j=1
x∗hj = 1. Conversely, if 0 < x
∗
ik < 1 ∀ i 6= h, then Vik = V¯i =⇒
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S∗k
θik
= Φi. Solving these equations along with (4.14) simultaneously yields a
unique solution that satisfies:
M∑
j=1
x∗hj = 1, and x
∗
ik =
αhjδkθhj
(
1−
M∑
k 6=j
x∗hk
)
αiuδjθhk
− αhkx∗hk
αik
.
2. Now, suppose that x∗h0 > 0, and x
∗
hj > 0 ∀ j > 0. Then, Vhj = V¯h =⇒
S∗j =
δj
αhjx
∗
hj+
N∑
i6=h
αijx∗ij
= θhjΦh. Since θhjΦh 6= θijΦi for all i 6= h, we must seek
solutions on the boundary. Assume that (A1) holds. Then, x∗hj =
δj
αhjθhjΦh
−
N∑
i 6=h
αiux
∗
iu
αhj
∀ j > 0. Since x∗iu must be on the boundary, we have the following
scenarios: (a) If x∗iu = 0, ∀ i, then x∗hj = DhjθhjΦh . (b) If x∗iu = 1, ∀ i, then
x∗hj =
Dhj
θhjΦh
−
N∑
i 6=h
αij
αhj
.
Proof of Theorem 4.0.0.4
Proof. The dynamics of (2.1) can be studied by analyzing the subsystem with x˙ij
and S˙j
x˙ij = F (xij, Sj) = xij
[
Sj
θij
− V¯i
]
i = 1, 2, ..., N
S˙j = G(xij, Sj) = δj −
N∑
i
αijxijSj j = 1, 2, ...,M.
(4.15)
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The jacobian of (4.15) at a steady state has the following structure:

∂F (x11,S1)
dx11
. . . x11
(
Φ1 − Smθ1m
)
. . . 0 . . . 0 x11(1−x11)
θ11
. . . −x11x1m
θ1m
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
x1m
(
Φ1 − S1θ11
)
. . . ∂F (x1m,Sm)
dx1m
. . . 0 . . . 0 −x1mx11
θ11
. . . x1m(1−x1m)
θ1m
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 . . . ∂F (xn1,S1)
dxn1
. . . xn1
(
Φn − Smθnm
)
xn1(1−xn1)
θn1
. . . −xn1xnm
θnm
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 . . . xnm
(
Φn − S1θn1
)
. . . ∂F (xnm,Sm)
dxnm
−xnmxn1
θn1
. . . xnm(1−xnm)
θnm
−α11S1 . . . 0 . . . −αn1S1 . . . 0 −
∑
i
αi1xi1 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . −α1mSm . . . 0 . . . −αnmSm 0 . . . −
∑
i
αimxim

(4.16)
where:
∂F (xij, Sj)
dxij
= (1− 2xij)
(
Sj
θij
− Φi
)
−
M∑
k 6=j
xik
(
Sk
θik
− Φi
)
. (4.17)
1. Suppose that at equilibrium, every agent is mapped to a unique task u such
that: x∗iu = 1, and x
∗
ij = 0, ∀ j 6= u. To make this definition clear, let l(i) = u
represent the index of the task for agent i. Then x∗il(i) = 1 ⇔ S∗l(i) =
δl(i)∑
i
αil(i)
.
Thus, it follows that:
∂F (xij, Sj)
dxij
=

Φi − S
∗
j
θij
if j = l(i)
S∗j
θij
− S
∗
l(i)
θil(i)
otherwise.
(4.18)
Under this condition, the eigenvalues of (4.16) can be deduced by noting the
following properties.
(a) The mth order principal submatrix of P , obtained by deleting its first m2
rows and (same) columns, is a diagonal matrix with non-zero entries: Λ0 =
−{αiu} < 0.
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(b) The leading principal submatrix of P is given by:

∂F (x11,S1)
dx11
x11
(
Φ1 − S2θ12
)
. . . x11
(
Φ1 − Smθ1m
)
. . . 0 0 . . . 0
x12
(
Φ1 − S1θ11
)
∂F (x12,S2)
dx12
. . . x12
(
Φ1 − Smθ1m
)
. . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
x1m
(
Φ1 − S1θ11
)
x1m
(
Φ1 − S2θ12
)
. . . ∂F (x1m,Sm)
dx1m
. . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 0 . . . ∂F (xn1,S1)
dxn1
xn1
(
Φn − S2θn2
)
. . . xn1
(
Φn − Smθnm
)
0 0 . . . 0 . . . xn2
(
Φn − S1θn1
)
∂F (xn2,S2)
dxn2
. . . xn2
(
Φn − Smθnm
)
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 . . . xnm
(
Φn − S1θn1
)
xnm
(
Φn − S2θn2
)
. . . ∂F (xnm,Sm)
dxnm

(4.19)
Now, let L(i) = l(i) + (i − 1)M . Since x∗il(i) = 1 =⇒ x∗ij = 0 ∀ j 6=
l(i), the L(i)th column of (4.19) is zero everywhere but in its L(i)th entry.
The N(M − 1) order submatrix of Pˆ , obtained by deleting the L(i)th row
and column for each agent i, is a diagonal matrix with entries: Λ1 ={
S∗j
θij
− S
∗
l(i)
θil(i)
}
, ∀ i, j 6= l(i). Moreover, the M th order submatrix of Pˆ ,
obtained by deleting all except the L(i)th row and column, is also a diagonal
matrix with entries: Λ2 =
{
Φi − S
∗
l(i)
θil(i)
}
, ∀ i
(c) The preceding discussion indicates that the characteristic polynomial (4.16)
det(P − λI) = 0 has M roots given Λ0, N(M − 1) roots given Λ1, and
N roots given Λ2. Note that Λ1 < 0 ⇐⇒ S
∗
l(i)
θil(i)
> max
j 6=u
S∗j
θij
, and Λ2 <
0 ⇐⇒ S
∗
l(i)
θil(i)
> Φi for all i. Therefore, (x
∗
ij,S
∗
j) with x
∗
iu + x
∗
i0 = 0 is L.A.S.
if S
∗
u
θiu
> max
{
max
j 6=u
S∗j
θij
,Φi
}
, ∀ i where u = l(i).
2. Suppose that N > M . Under this condition, there can be up to N −M agents
indexed by h who do not perform any tasks (i.e. l(h) = 0, x∗h0 = 1). Thus,
∂F (xhj ,Sj)
dxhj
=
S∗j
θhj
− Φh for all j. In this case, Λ2 =
{
Φi − S
∗
l(i)
θil(i)
,
S∗j
θhj
− Φh
}
, ∀ j
where i = 1, 2...N, and h = N + 1, N + 2..., N −M . A sufficient condition for
Λ2 < 0 that
S∗
l(i)
θil(i)
> Φi holds and Φh > max
j
S∗j
θhj
for all h.
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Proof of Theorem 4.0.0.5
Proof. Proof of existence are left to the reader as an exercise. The stability of E(0,1)
and E(1,0) and E(1,1) can be obtained from Theorem 4.0.0.4.
1. At E(0,1), agent 1 is inactive (i.e., l(1) = 0) while agent 2 specializes on the task
(i.e., l(2) = 1). Thus, E(0,1) is L.A.S. if
S∗1
θ11
< Φ1 and
S∗1
θ21
> Φ2. Combining
these conditions, we get θ21Φ2 < D21 < θ11Φ1.
2. Conversely, at E(1,0), agent 1 specializes on the task while agent 1 is inactive.
Thus, E(1,0) is L.A.S. if θ21Φ2 < S
∗
1 < Φ1θ11 ⇔ θ11Φ1 < D11 < θ21Φ2.
3. Finally, at E(1,1) both agents are specialists (i.e., l(1) = l(2) = 1). Thus, E(1,0)
is L.A.S. if S∗1 =
δ1
α11+α21
> max{θ11Φ1, θ21Φ2}.
The stability of the remaining equlibria of (4.10) can be determined directly
from its Jacobian matrix
J :=

− (S∗1−θ11Φ1)(2x∗11−1)
θ11
0
x∗11(1−x∗11)
θ11
0 − (S∗1−θ21Φ2)(2x∗21−1)
θ21
x∗21(1−x∗21)
θ21
−α11S∗1 −α21S∗1 −α11x∗11 − α21x∗21
 . (4.20)
4. At E(0,∗), the first eigenvalue of (4.20) is given by: λ1 = θ21Φ2−θ11Φ1θ11 . The
remaining eigenvalues satisfy: λ2 + λ3 = − δ1θ21Φ2 , and
λ2λ3 = −4α21δ1Φ2(δ1 − α21θ21Φ2) > 0.
which holds whenever E(0,∗), exists (i.e. D21θ21Φ2 =
δ1
α21θ21Φ2
< 1). Therefore, E(0,∗)
is L.A.S. if λ1 < 0⇔ θ11Φ1θ21Φ2 > 1.
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5. A similar calculation at E(∗,0) shows that: λ1 = θ11Φ1−θ21Φ2θ21 , λ2 + λ3 = − δ1θ11Φ1 ,
and
λ2λ3 = −4α11δ1Φ1(δ1 − α11θ11Φ1) > 0.
which holds whenever E(∗,0), exists (i.e. D11θ11Φ1 =
δ1
α11θ11Φ1
< 1). Thus, E(∗,0) is
L.A.S. if λ1 < 0⇔ θ21Φ2θ11Φ1 > 1.
6. At E(∇,1), the first eigenvalue of (4.20) is given by: λ1 = θ21Φ2−θ11Φ1θ21 .
The remaining eigenvalues satisfy: λ2 + λ3 = − δ1θ11Φ1 , and
λ2λ3 = −4α11Φ1(α21θ11Φ1 − δ1) [α11θ11Φ1 + α21θ11Φ1 − δ1] > 0
which holds whenever E(∇,1) exists (i.e., δ1α21θ11Φ1 > 1 ⇔ D11θ11Φ1 > α21α11 and
δ1
(α11+α21)θ11Φ1
< 1 ⇔ D11
θ11Φ1
< α11+α21
α11
). Therefore, E(∇,1) is L.A.S. if λ1 <
0⇔ θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
> 1.
7. A similar calculation at E(1,∇) shows that: λ1 = θ11Φ1−θ21Φ2θ11 , λ2 + λ3 = − δ1θ21Φ2 ,
and:
λ2λ3 = −4α21Φ2(α11θ21Φ2 − δ1) [α21Φ2θ21 + α11Φ2θ21 − δ1] > 0
holds whenever E(∇,1) exists (i.e., δ1α11θ21Φ2 > 1⇔ D21θ21Φ2 > α11α21 and δ1(α11+α21)θ21Φ2 <
1⇔ D21
θ21Φ2
< α11+α21
α21
). Thus, E(∇,1) is L.A.S. if λ1 < 0⇔ θ21Φ2θ11Φ1 > 1.
Proof of Theorem 4.0.0.6 - 4.0.0.7
Proof. Proof of existence are left to the reader as an exercise.
1. The stability of E
(1,0)
(0,1) follows directly from Theorem 4.0.0.4. Here, agent 1
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is specializes on task 1 while agent 2 specializes on task 2 (i.e., l(i) = i).
Hence, E
(1,0)
(0,1) is L.A.S. if
S∗1
θ11
> max{ S∗2
θ12
,Φ1} ⇔ D11θ11 > max{D22θ12 ,Φ1}, and
S∗2
θ22
> max{ S∗1
θ21
,Φ2} ⇔ D22θ22 > max{D11θ21 ,Φ2}.
The stability of the remaining equlibria of (4.10) can be determined from its
Jacobian matrix J :

∂F (x11,S1)
dx11
x∗11
(
Φ1 − S
∗
2
θ12
)
0 0
x∗11(1−x∗11)
θ11
−x∗11x∗12
θ12
x∗12
(
Φ1 − S
∗
1
θ11
)
∂F (x12,S2)
dx12
0 0 −x∗11x∗12
θ11
x∗12(1−x∗12)
θ12
0 0 ∂F (x21,S1)
dx21
x∗21
(
Φ2 − S
∗
2
θ22
)
x∗21(1−x∗21)
θ21
−x∗21x∗22
θ22
0 0 x∗22
(
Φ2 − S
∗
1
θ21
)
∂F (x22,S2)
dx22
−x∗21x∗22
θ21
x∗22(1−x∗22)
θ22
−α11S∗1 0 −α21S∗1 0 −(α11x∗11 + α21x∗21)S∗1 0
0 −α12S∗2 0 −α22S∗2 0 −(α12x∗12 + α22x∗22)S∗2

(4.21)
where
∂F (xij ,Sj)
dxij
is given by (4.17) for i = 1, 2.
2. At E
(1,0)
(0,∗) =
(
1, 0, 0, δ2
α22θ22Φ2
, δ1
α11
, θ22Φ2
)
, (4.21) has six trivial eigenvalues given
by: λ1 = −α11, λ2 = Φ1 − S
∗
1
θ11
, λ3 =
S∗1
θ21
− Φ2, λ4 = S
∗
2
θ12
− S∗1
θ11
, and
λ5,6 =
−α22x∗22
2
±
√
α222(x
∗
22)
2 + 4α22Φ2(x∗22 − 1)
2
where x∗22 =
δ2
α22θ22Φ2
= D22
θ22Φ2
< 1.
(a) Clearly, λ1 < 0. Moreover, we have the following: (a) λ2 < 0⇔ S
∗
1
θ11
> Φ1,
(b) λ3 < 0⇔ S
∗
1
θ21
< Φ2, and (c) λ4 < 0⇔ S
∗
2
θ12
<
S∗1
θ11
. Finally, the remaining
eigenvalues satisfy: λ5 + λ6 < 0, and λ5λ6 = −α22Φ2(x∗22 − 1) > 0 which
holds whenever x∗22 < 1.
(b) In conclusion, the preceding discussion implies that E
(1,0)
(0,∗) is L.A.S. if: (i)
S∗1
θ11
> max{ S∗2
θ12
,Φ1} ⇔ D11θ11Φ1 > max{ θ22Φ2θ12Φ1 , 1}, and (ii)
S∗1
θ21
< Φ2 ⇔ D11θ11Φ1 <
θ21Φ2
θ11Φ1
.
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3. At E
(∗,0)
(0,1) =
(
δ1
α11θ11Φ1
, 0, 0, 1, θ11Φ1,
δ2
α22
)
, (4.21) has six trivial eigenvalues given
by: λ1 = −α22, λ2 = Φ2 − S
∗
2
θ22
, λ3 =
S∗2
θ12
− Φ1, λ4 = S
∗
1
θ21
− S∗2
θ22
, and
λ5,6 =
−α11x∗11
2
±
√
α211(x
∗
11)
2 + 4α11Φ1(x∗11 − 1)
2
where x∗11 =
δ1
α11θ11Φ1
= D11
θ11Φ1
< 1.
(a) Clearly, λ1 < 0. Moreover, we have the following: (a) λ2 < 0⇔ S
∗
2
θ22
> Φ2,
(b) λ3 < 0⇔ S
∗
2
θ12
< Φ1, and (c) λ4 < 0⇔ S
∗
1
θ21
<
S∗2
θ22
. Finally, the remaining
eigenvalues satisfy: λ5 + λ6 < 0, and λ5λ6 = −α11Φ1(x∗11 − 1) > 0 which
holds whenever x∗11 < 1.
(b) In conclusion, the preceding discussion implies that E
(1,0)
(0,∗) is L.A.S. if: (i)
S∗2
θ22
> max{ S∗1
θ21
,Φ2} ⇔ D22θ22Φ2 > max{ θ11Φ1θ21Φ2 , 1}, and (ii)
S∗2
θ12
< Φ1 ⇔ D22θ22Φ2 <
θ12Φ1
θ22Φ2
.
4. At E
(∗,0)
(0,∗) =
(
δ1
α11θ11Φ1
, 0, 0, δ2
α22θ22Φ2
, θ11Φ1, θ22Φ2
)
(4.21) has two trivial eigenval-
ues given by:
λ1 =
S∗1
θ21
− Φ2 and λ2 = S
∗
2
θ12
− Φ1.
Hence, λ1 < 0 ⇔ S∗1 < θ21Φ2. Similarly, λ2 < 0 ⇔ S∗2 < θ12Φ1. The remaining
eigenvalues are roots of the characteristic polynomial:
ρ(λ) = λ4 + c1λ
3 + c2λ
2 + c3λ+ c4. (4.22)
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The coefficients of (4.22) can be written as:
c1 = α11x
∗
11 + α22x
∗
22 > 0
c2 = α11x
∗
11(1− x∗11)Φ1 + α22x∗22(1− x∗22)Φ2 + α11α22x∗22x∗11 > 0
c3 = α11α22x
∗
22x
∗
11(Φ1(1− x∗11) + (1− x∗22)Φ2) > 0
c4 = α11α22x
∗
22x
∗
11(1− x∗22)(1− x∗11)Φ1Φ2 > 0
(4.23)
where x∗11 =
δ1
α11θ11Φ1
and x∗22 =
δ2
α22θ22Φ2
< 1.
Using the Routh-Hurwitz criteria (Brauer et al., 2001), we can conclude that
E
(∗,0)
(0,∗) is locally asymptotically stable if and only if (i) c1 > 0, (ii) c3 > 0, (iii)
c4 > 0, and (iv) c3(c1c2 − c3) > c21c4.
(a) Conditions (i)-(iii) whenever x∗11 < 1 and x
∗
22 < 1. Thus, it remains to
show under what condition (iv) is satisfied.
(b) According to (4.23), we have:
c1c2 − c3 = α211(x∗11)2(1− x∗11)Φ1 + α222(x∗22)2(1− x∗22)Φ2
+α11α22x
∗
22x
∗
11(α11x
∗
11 + α22x
∗
22) > 0.
(c) Similarly, we also have:
c21c4 = α11α22x
∗
22x
∗
11(1− x∗22)(1− x∗11)(α11x∗11 + α22x∗22)2Φ1Φ2 > 0.
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Moreover,
c3(c1c2 − c3) > c3 · [α211(x∗11)2(1− x∗11)Φ1 + α222(x∗22)2(1− x∗22)Φ2]
= α11α22x
∗
22x
∗
11
[
(♥−♣)2 + 2α11α22x∗22x∗11(1− x∗22)(1− x∗11)Φ1Φ2
]
+α11α22x
∗
22x
∗
11
[
[α211(x
∗
11)
2 + α22(x
∗
22)
2](1− x∗22)(1− x∗11)Φ1Φ2
]
where
♥ = α11x∗11(1− x∗11)Φ1 and ♣ = α22x∗22(1− x∗22)Φ2.
Since c21 = (α11x
∗
11 + α22x
∗
22)(α11x
∗
11 − α22x∗22) + 2α11α22x∗11x∗22, it follows
directly from the preceding inequality that:
c3(c1c2 − c3) > α11α22x∗22x∗11(♥−♣)2 + c21c4 > 0. (4.24)
(d) In conclusion, the preceding discussion implies that E
(∗,0)
(0,∗) is L.A.S. if and
only if: (i) S∗1 < θ21Φ2 ⇔ θ11Φ1 < θ21Φ2, (ii) S∗2 < θ12Φ1 ⇔ θ12Φ1 > θ22Φ2,
(iii) x∗11 ≡ D11θ11Φ1 < 1 and (iv) x∗22 ≡ D22θ22Φ2 < 1.
5. At E
(1,0)
(∇,∗) =
(
1, 0, δ1
α21θ21Φ2
− α11
α21
, δ2
α22θ22Φ2
, θ21Φ2, θ22Φ2
)
(4.21) has two trivial
eigenvalues given by:
λ1 = Φ1 − S
∗
1
θ11
and λ2 =
S∗2
θ12
− S
∗
1
θ11
.
Hence, λ1 < 0⇔ S∗1 > θ11Φ1. Similarly, λ2 < 0⇔ S∗2θ11 < S∗1θ12.
The remaining eigenvalues are roots of the characteristic polynomial:
ρ(λ) = λ4 + c1λ
3 + c2λ
2 + c3λ+ c4. (4.25)
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Now, suppose that α11 = α12 = α1, and α21 = α22 = α2. Moreover, let
η = D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
= δ1θ22+δ2θ21
α2θ21θ22Φ2
.The coefficients of (4.25) can be written as:
c1 = α2η > 0
c2 = α2
[
(η − α1
α2
)(1− η + α1
α2
) + 2x∗21x
∗
22
]
Φ2 + α
2
2x
∗
22(η − x∗22)
c3 = α
2
2x
∗
21x
∗
22(2− η + α1α2 )Φ2 + α1α2x∗22(1− x∗22)Φ2
c4 = α
2
2x
∗
21x
∗
22(1− η + α1α2 )Φ22.
(4.26)
Using the Routh-Hurwitz criteria (Brauer et al., 2001), we can conclude that
E
(1,0)
(∗∗,∗) is locally asymptotically stable if and only if (i) c1 > 0, (ii) c3 > 0, (iii)
c4 > 0, and (iv) c3(c1c2 − c3) > c21c4. This is left to the reader as an exercise.
6. At E
(1,0)
(4,4) =
(
1, 0, 1− x∗22, x∗22, D22x∗22 ·
θ21
θ22
, D22
x∗22
)
where x∗22 =
δ2(α11+α21)θ21
α21δ2θ21+α22δ1θ22
and
D22 = δ2α22 , the Jacobian matrix (4.21) has two trivial eigenvalues given by:
λ1 = Φ1 − S
∗
1
θ11
and λ2 =
S∗2
θ12
− S
∗
1
θ11
.
Hence, λ1 < 0⇔ S∗1 > θ11Φ1. Similarly, λ2 < 0⇔ S∗2θ11 < S∗1θ12.
The remaining eigenvalues are roots of the characteristic polynomial:
ρ(λ) = λ4 + c1λ
3 + c2λ
2 + c3λ+ c4. (4.27)
Now, suppose that α11 = α12 = α1, and α21 = α22 = α2. Moreover, let
η = D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
= δ1θ22+δ2θ21
α2θ21θ22Φ2
. Then, the coefficients of (4.27) can be written
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as:
c1 = α1 + α2 + (η − ξ)Φ2ξ
c2 = α2(η − ξ)Φ2 + κ
c3 = α
2
2ηx
∗
21(1− x∗21)Φ2 + κ(η − ξ)Φ2ξ
c4 = α
2
2ηx
∗
21(1− x∗21)(η − ξ)Φ
2
2
ξ
.
(4.28)
where x∗21 = 1− x∗22, ξ = α1+α2α2 and:
κ = α2(1− x∗21)
[
2ηx∗21Φ2
ξ
+ α1 + α2x
∗
21
]
. (4.29)
Using the Routh-Hurwitz criteria (Brauer et al., 2001), we can conclude that
E
(1,0)
(4,4) is locally asymptotically stable if and only if (i) c1 > 0, (ii) c3 > 0, (iii)
c4 > 0, and (iv) c3(c1c2 − c3) > c21c4.
(a) Conditions (i)-(iii) necessarily hold if η > ξ = α1+α2
α2
. Thus, it remains to
show under what condition (iv) is satisfied.
(b) Suppose that η > ξ. From (4.28), we have
c1c2 − c3 = κ(α1 + α2)− α22ηx∗21(1− x∗21)Φ2
+α2(η − ξ)
[
α1 + α2x
∗
21 + (η − ξ)
Φ2
ξ
]
Φ2 > 0,
which holds because:
κ(α1 + α2)− α22ηx∗21(1− x∗21)Φ2 = α22(1− x∗21) [ηx∗21Φ2 + ξ(α1 + α2x∗21)] > 0.
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(c) Next, we have:
c21c4 = α
2
2ηx
∗
21(1−x∗21)(η−ξ)
Φ22
ξ
·
[
(α1 + α2)
2 + 2α2(η − ξ)Φ2 + (η − ξ)2 Φ
2
2
ξ2
]
.
Similarly,
c3(c1c2 − c3) = c3 · [κ(α1 + α2)− α22ηx∗21(1− x∗21)Φ2]
+c3 · α2(η − ξ)Φ2 · c1.
This indicates that:
c3(c1c2 − c3) > c3 · α2(η − ξ)
[
α1 + α2 + (η − ξ)Φ2
ξ
]
Φ2.
From (4.28), we have that c3 > α2x
∗
21(1 − x∗21)
[
2η(η − ξ)Φ22
ξ2
+ α2ηΦ2
]
.
Therefore, c3(c1c2 − c3) > ♥ · ♣ where:
♥ = α2ηx∗21(1− x∗21)(η − ξ)
Φ22
ξ
[
2(η − ξ)Φ2
ξ2
+ α2
]
♣ =
[
(α1 + α2)
2 + (α1 + α2)(η − ξ)Φ2
ξ
]
.
This indicates that:
c3(c1c2 − c3)− c21c4 > α22ηx∗21(1− x∗21)(η − ξ)2 ·
[
2(η − ξ)Φ2
ξ2
+ α2
]
Φ32
ξ
> 0.
(d) The preceding discussion implies that under the condition α11 = α12 = α1
and α21 = α22 = α2, equilibrium E
(1,0)
(4,4) is L.A.S. if: (i) η =
D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
> ξ
where ξ = α1+α2
α2
, (ii)
S∗1
θ11
> Φ1 ⇔ δ1θ22+δ2θ21(α1+α2)θ11θ22 > Φ1 ⇔
η
ξ
> θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
, and (iii)
S∗2
θ12
<
S∗1
θ11
⇔ θ11θ22 < θ12θ21.
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7. At E
(∇,0)
(4,4) =
(
x∗11, 0, x
∗
21, 1− x∗21, θ11Φ1, θ11θ22Φ1θ21
)
, (4.21) has one trivial eigen-
value given by:
λ1 =
S∗2
θ12
− S
∗
1
θ11
x∗11 − (1− x∗11)Φ1
where x∗11 =
δ1
α11θ11Φ1
− α21x∗21
α11
, x∗21 = 1 − δ2θ21α22θ11θ22Φ1 , and x∗22 = 1 − x∗21. Hence,
λ1 < 0 ⇔ S
∗
2
θ12
< Φ1 ⇔ θ11θ12 < θ21θ22 . The remaining eigenvalues are roots of the
characteristic polynomial:
ρ(λ) = λ5 + c1λ
4 + c2λ
3 + c3λ
2 + c4λ+ c5. (4.30)
Now, suppose that α11 = α12 = α1, and α21 = α22 = α2.
Also let η = D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
= δ1θ22+δ2θ21
α2θ21θ22Φ2
and ω =
S∗1
θ21
= θ11Φ1
θ21
=
S∗2
θ22
. Then, the
coefficients of (4.30) can be written as:
c1 =
α2ηΦ2
ω
+ ω − Φ2
c2 = α2(1− x∗21)(α1x∗11 + α2x∗21 + 2ωx∗21) + α1x∗11(1− x∗11)Φ1 +
α2ηΦ2
ω
(ω − Φ2)
c3 = α2(1− x∗21) [α1x∗11(1− x∗11)Φ1 + α2ηx∗21Φ2]
+ α2(1− x∗21) [(ω − Φ2)(2ωx∗21 + α1x∗11 + α2x∗21)] + (ω − Φ2)α1x∗11(1− x∗11)Φ1
c4 = α2(1− x∗21) [α2ηx∗21Φ2(ω − Φ2) + (ω + ωx∗21 − Φ2)α1x∗11(1− x∗11)Φ1]
c5 = α1α2ωx
∗
21x
∗
11(1− x∗21)(1− x∗11)(ω − Φ2)Φ1
where x∗21 = 1 − x∗22, and x∗22 = δ2θ21α2θ11θ22Φ1 = D22θ21θ11Φ1 . Thus, x∗22 < 1 ⇔ D22Φ2 <
ω
Φ2
= θ11Φ1
θ21Φ2
. Note also that 0 < x∗11 < 1 ⇔ ωΦ2 < η <
ω(α1+α2)
α2Φ2
. Using the
Routh-Hurwitz criteria (Brauer et al., 2001), we can conclude that E
(∇,0)
(4,4) is
locally asymptotically stable if and only if (i) c1 > 0, (ii) c3 > 0, (iii) c4 > 0,
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(iv) c5 > 0, (v) c3(c1c2 − c3) > c21c4, and (vi)
(c1c4 − c5)[c3(c1c2 − c3)− c21c4] > c5(c1c2 − c3)2 + c1c25.
This is left to the reader as an exercise.
8. At E
(0,0)
(4,4) =
(
0, 0, δ1α22θ22
δ2α21θ21+δ1α22θ22
, δ2α21θ21
δ2α21θ21+δ1α22θ22
, δ2α21θ21+δ1α22θ22
α21α22θ22
, δ2α21θ21+δ1α22θ22
α21α22θ21
)
(4.21) has two trivial eigenvalues given by:
λ1 =
S∗1
θ11
− Φ1 and λ2 = S
∗
2
θ12
− Φ1.
Hence, λ1 < 0 ⇔ S∗1 < θ11Φ1. Similarly, λ2 < 0 ⇔ S∗2 < θ12Φ1. The remaining
eigenvalues are roots of the characteristic polynomial:
ρ(λ) = λ4 + c1λ
3 + c2λ
2 + c3λ+ c4. (4.31)
Now, suppose that α21 = α22 = α2, and let η =
D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
= δ1θ22+δ2θ21
α2θ21θ22Φ2
.
The coefficients of (4.31) can be written as:
c1 = Φ2(η − 1) + α2
c2 = α2[(η − 1)Φ2 + x∗21(1− x∗21)(2ηΦ2 + α2)]
c3 = x
∗
21(1− x∗21)[2η(α2 + (η − 1)Φ2)− α2]α2Φ2
c4 = x
∗
21(1− x∗21)α22η(η − 1)Φ22.
(4.32)
Using the Routh-Hurwitz criteria (Brauer et al., 2001), we can conclude that
E
(4,4)
(0,0) is locally asymptotically stable if and only if (i) c1 > 0, (ii) c3 > 0, (iii)
c4 > 0, and (iv) c3(c1c2 − c3) > c21c4.
(a) Conditions (i)-(iii) hold whenever η > 1. Thus, it remains to show under
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what condition (iv) is satisfied.
(b) Suppose that η > 1. Then according to (4.32),
c3 = x
∗
21(1− x∗21)[2ηc1 − α2]α2Φ2 < x∗21(1− x∗21)2ηc1α2Φ2.
Likewise,
c1c2 = α2c1[(η−1)Φ2+x∗21(1−x∗21)(2ηΦ2+α2)] > α2c1x∗21(1−x∗21)(2ηΦ2+α2).
Thus, it follows that:
c1c2 − c3 = c1α2[(η − 1)Φ2 + α2x∗21(1− x∗21)] > 0 (4.33)
since η > 1. Next, notice that:
c3(c1c2 − c3) = c3 · [c1α2[(η − 1)Φ2 + x∗21(1− x∗21)(2ηΦ2 + α2)]]
−c3 · [x∗21(1− x∗21)[2ηc1 − α2]α2Φ2]
= c3 · [c1α2[(η − 1)Φ2 + α2x∗21(1− x∗21)] + x∗21(1− x∗21)α22Φ2] > 0.
Likewise,
c21c4 = c
2
1 · x∗21(1− x∗21)α22η(η − 1)Φ22.
However, since c3 > x
∗
21(1− x∗21)ηc1α2Φ2, we can infer that
c3(c1c2 − c3) ≥ x∗21(1− x∗21)c21α22η(η − 1)Φ22
+c3[c1α
2
2x
∗
21(1− x∗21) + x∗21(1− x∗21)α22Φ2].
This implies that c3(c1c2 − c3) > c21c4 > 0.
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(c) The preceding discussion implies that under the condition α21 = α22 = α2,
equilibrium E
(4,4)
(0,0) is L.A.S. if: (i) η =
D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
= δ1θ22+δ2θ21
α2θ21θ22Φ2
> 1, (ii)
S∗1 < θ11Φ1 ⇔ η < θ11Φ1θ21Φ2 , and (ii) S∗2 < θ12Φ1 ⇔ η < θ12Φ1θ22Φ2 .
9. At E
(∗,∗)
(0,0) =
(
0, 0, δ1
α21θ21Φ2
, δ2
α22θ22Φ2
, θ21Φ2, θ22Φ2
)
, (4.21) has two trivial eigenval-
ues given by:
λ1 =
S∗1
θ11
− Φ1 and λ2 = S
∗
2
θ12
− Φ1.
Hence, λ1 < 0 ⇔ S∗1 < θ11Φ1. Similarly, λ2 < 0 ⇔ S∗2 < θ12Φ1. The remaining
eigenvalues are roots of the characteristic polynomial:
ρ(λ) = λ4 + c1λ
3 + c2λ
2 + c3λ+ c4. (4.34)
The coefficients of (4.34) can be written as:
c1 = α21x
∗
21 + α22x
∗
22 > 0
c2 = α21α22x
∗
21x
∗
22 + [α11x
∗
21(1− x∗21) + α22x∗22(1− x∗22)]Φ2 > 0
c3 = α21α22x
∗
21x
∗
22(1− x∗21 + 1− x∗22)Φ2 > 0
c4 = α21α22x
∗
21x
∗
22(1− x∗21 − x∗22)Φ22 > 0
(4.35)
where x∗21 =
δ1
α11θ11Φ2
< 1 and x∗22 =
δ2
α12θ12Φ2
< 1. Using the Routh-Hurwitz
criteria (Brauer et al., 2001), we can conclude that E
(∗,∗)
(0,0) is locally asymp-
totically stable if and only if (i) c1 > 0, (ii) c3 > 0, (iii) c4 > 0, and (iv)
c3(c1c2 − c3) > c21c4.
(a) Now, let η = D21
θ21Φ2
+ D22
θ22Φ2
. Then, conditions (i)-(iii) necessarily hold since
η ≡ x∗21 + x∗22 < 1. Thus, it remains to show under what condition (iv) is
satisfied.
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(b) Suppose that η < 1. Then according to (4.35):
c1c2 − c3 = α21α22x∗21x∗22(α21x∗21 + α22x∗22)
+[(α11x
∗
21)
2(1− x∗21) + (α12x∗22)2(1− x∗22)]Φ2 > 0
(c) Likewise, we have that:
c21c4 = (α11x
∗
21 + α22x
∗
22)
2α21α22x
∗
21x
∗
22(1− η)Φ22
< (α11x
∗
21 + α22x
∗
22)
2α21α22(1− x∗21)(1− x∗22)Φ22.
However, notice that:
c3(c1c2 − c3) > c3 · [(α11x∗21)2(1− x∗21) + (α12x∗22)2(1− x∗22)]Φ2
= α21α22x
∗
21x
∗
22
[
(♥−♣)2 + 2α21α22x∗21x∗22(1− x∗21)(1− x∗22)
]
Φ22
+α21α22x
∗
21x
∗
22
[
[α211(x
∗
21)
2 + α22(x
∗
22)
2](1− x∗21)(1− x∗22)
]
Φ22
where
♥ = α21x∗21(1− x∗21) and ♣ = α22x∗22(1− x∗22).
Since c21 = (α11x
∗
21 + α22x
∗
22)(α11x
∗
21 − α22x∗22) + 2α21α22x∗21x∗22, it follows
directly from the preceding inequality that:
c3(c1c2 − c3) > α21α22x∗22x∗21(♥−♣)2Φ22 + c21c4 > 0. (4.36)
(d) In conclusion, the preceding discussion implies that E
(∗,∗)
(0,0) is L.A.S. if and
only if: (i) S∗1 < θ11Φ1 ⇔ θ21Φ2 < θ11Φ1, (ii) S∗2 < θ12Φ1 ⇔ θ22Φ2 < θ12Φ1,
and (iii) x∗21 + x
∗
22 ≡ D21θ21Φ2 + D22θ22Φ2 < 1.
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Proof of Theorem 4.0.0.8
Proof. Suppose that θ11
θ12
= θ21
θ22
. We seek solutions to (4.12) of the form 0 < x∗ij <
1 i, j = 1, 2. From (??), the nullclines of system satisfy:
x˙11 = 0 =⇒ Y1 = (1− x∗11)S1θ12 − θ11x∗12S2 − (1− x∗11 − x∗12)Φ1θ11θ12 = 0
x˙12 = 0 =⇒ Y2 = (1− x∗12)S2θ11 − θ12x∗11S1 − (1− x∗11 − x∗21)Φ1θ11θ12 = 0
(4.37)
and
x˙21 = 0 =⇒ Y3 = (1− x∗21)S1θ22 − θ21x∗22S2 − (1− x∗21 − x∗22)Φ2θ21θ22 = 0
x˙22 = 0 =⇒ Y4 = (1− x∗22)S2θ21 − θ22x∗21S1 − (1− x∗21 − x∗22)Φ2θ21θ22 = 0.
(4.38)
An interior equilibrium point (x∗11, x
∗
12, x
∗
21, x
∗
22, S
∗
1 , S
∗
2) of (4.12) with x
∗
11 +x
∗
12 ≤ 1
and x∗21 + x
∗
22 ≤ 1 must necessarily satisfy:
Y1 − Y2 = S∗2θ11 − S∗1θ12 = 0⇔ S
∗
1
S∗2
= θ11
θ12
Y3 − Y4 = S∗2θ21 − S∗1θ22 = 0⇔ S
∗
1
S∗2
= θ21
θ22
(4.39)
where S∗1(x
∗
11, x
∗
21) =
δ1
(α11x∗11+α21x
∗
22)
and S∗2(x
∗
12, x
∗
22) =
δ2
(α12x∗12+α22x
∗
22)
. Under the con-
dition θ11
θ12
= θ21
θ22
, every interior candidate must necessarily satisfy
S∗1
S∗2
= θ11
θ12
=⇒
δ1
(α11x∗11+α21x
∗
22)
= δ2θ11
(α12θ12x∗12+α22θ12x
∗
22)
. This leads to the following equilibrium cases with
x∗12 = ρ ∈ (0, 1).
1. First, suppose that x∗11 = 1 − x∗12 = 1 − ρ. Under this condition, Y1 = Y2 ≡ 0.
Moreover, if we also assume that x∗22 = 1− x∗21 =⇒ Y3 = Y4 ≡ 0, then solving
S∗1
S∗2
= θ11
θ12
yields a unique solution x∗21 =
δ1θ12(α12ρ+α22)−α11δ2θ11(1−ρ)
α21δ2θ11+α22δ1θ12
.
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2. Again, suppose that x∗11 = 1 − ρ =⇒ Y1 = Y2 ≡ 0. If we instead assume
x∗22 6= 1− x∗21, then solving S
∗
1
S∗2
= θ11
θ12
along with equations (??) yields a unique
solution: x∗21 =
δ1
α21θ11Φ2
− α11
α21
(1− ρ) and x∗22 = δ2α22θ12Φ2 α12α22ρ.
3. Finally, suppose that x∗11 6= 1 − x∗12. If we assume that x∗22 = 1 − x∗21 =⇒
Y3 = Y4 ≡ 0, then solving S
∗
1
S∗2
= θ11
θ12
along with equations (4.37) yields a unique
solution: x∗21 = 1− δ2α22θ12Φ1 + α11α22ρ and x∗11 = δ1α11θ11Φ1 − α11α21x∗21
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